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Foreword
Recent theoretical and empirical literature suggests that, in the long run, growth in in-come per capita is the result of improve-
ments in total factor productivity. To improve 
productivity, savings and investment are neces-
sary; however, they are not sufficient on their own. 
Findings show the significance of innovation ef-
forts in improving productivity. Policymakers and 
governments around the world have placed a great 
deal of attention on research and policy develop-
ment and their investments have paid off in places 
like Korea, Singapore and the Netherlands, as well 
as closer to home in Chile and Mexico. 
Unfortunately, the role of innovation and pro-
ductivity in economic growth is poorly understood 
in the Caribbean, mainly due to a lack of data and 
communication about what we already know. The 
region is complex, made up of small, heteroge-
neous economies that differ in production struc-
tures, size, historical backdrops, and development 
trajectories from their Latin America counterparts 
and the advanced economies that have pioneered 
work in productivity improvement. Questions thus 
remain about how innovation and productivity 
affect the Caribbean and whether this issue needs 
to be a higher priority for policymakers. 
This publication is intended to shed some light 
on innovation and productivity in the Caribbean. 
It begins this important discussion by providing a 
first ever, comprehensive evidence-based analysis 
of innovation and productivity at the firm level. The 
internationally comparable and statistically relevant 
data used herein come from two first-of-their-
kind micro-level datasets funded by the Compete 
Caribbean Program: the Caribbean Enterprise 
Survey (CES) and the follow-up Productivity, 
Technology, and Innovation (PROTEqIN) survey. 
In a nutshell, the analytical findings confirm the 
relevance of innovation and productivity to the 
Caribbean region. Novel results expose how factors 
such as gender, finance, energy, competition, for-
eign direct investment, and, particularly, business 
development programs impact firm level innova-
tion, productivity, and therefore economic growth. 
I highly recommend this novel product to poli-
cymakers charged with the great task of imple-
menting policies to help improve development 
conditions, academics conducting research in 
areas such as development economics and indus-
trial economics, and citizens of the region who are 
confounded by the region’s inability to improve its 
growth pattern and close the widening gap from 
more advanced economies. I am confident these 
findings will ignite new insights and motivate fur-
ther research that can influence the design of cur-
rent programs that support innovation activities 
and shed light on the relevance of these activities 
in enhancing economic development throughout 
the region.
In conjunction with the timely release of this 
knowledge product, we at the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Division of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) are delighted to usher 
in the second phase of the Compete Caribbean 
X EXPLORING FIRM-LEVEL INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Program (CCPII). The first phase positively affected 
the region by promoting private sector development 
that resulted in the program meeting or surpassing 
its set indicators and contributing to the develop-
ment of innovative firms and policy support in com-
petitiveness and innovation. The CCPII has been 
designed with a continued focus on promoting inno-
vation and productivity that has been informed by 
the results of the program’s final evaluation, lessons 
learned exercises, and by the findings summarized 
herein. The IDB, along with its partners at the UK’s 
Department for International Development, Global 
Affairs Canada, and the Caribbean Development 
Bank are proud donors to the Compete Caribbean 
Program and remain committed to supporting eco-
nomic development in the Caribbean. 
 
José Miguel Benavente
Division Chief, Competitiveness and 
Innovation Division
Inter-American Development Bank
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Executive Summary 
Using micro-level data, this publication pro-vides new and insightful findings on the de-terminants of firm innovation and produc-
tivity in a region with scarce empirical research: the 
Caribbean. Until very recently, the Caribbean did 
not have internationally comparable, statistically 
relevant data at the firm level to perform empirical 
analysis of what drives firm performance and inno-
vation. The chapters that make up this publication 
use two datasets to examine the impact of differ-
ent variables related to innovation and firm perfor-
mance that are of interest to regional policymakers. 
The chapters are part of the “Cutting Edge Research 
on Productivity, Technology and Innovation” (RG-
CC1066) research project, which was coordinated 
by the Competitiveness and Innovation Division of 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
As a collection, the chapters seek to unearth 
the relationship between different variables of 
interest and their impact on innovation, productiv-
ity, and/or performance at the firm level.1 In turn, 
the variables of interest have been chosen to align 
with major areas of concern for policymakers in the 
Caribbean. The chapters provide answers to the 
following questions:
 • Given that innovative firms in the Caribbean 
exhibit higher productivity (Mohan, Strobl, and 
Watson, 2016), what are the barriers to innova-
tion that firms face in the region? 
 • In countries with very small markets, where 
scant economies of scale create difficult 
choices for regulatory agents, to what extent 
does competition (or the absence thereof) 
impact innovation? 
 • In a region where foreign direct investment 
inflows average 10  percent of annual gross 
domestic product, does foreign investment 
act as a knowledge transfer mechanism and 
increase innovation and productivity? If so, 
through what channels?
 • In a region where firms seem to have dispro-
portionate difficulties accessing finance com-
pared to other economies, how do financing 
constraints affect innovation? 
 • In a region with female participation in owner-
ship and management that is higher on aver-
age than in the rest of the world, how does the 
participation of women in Caribbean enter-
prises at an ownership or managerial level 
affect firm performance? 
 • In a region with very expensive and unreliable 
energy, how do firms respond to erratic energy 
supply? How does this impact their long-run 
strategy and economic performance?
 • Finally, in a region with emerging programs to 
support innovation, what impact have these 
programs had on firm productivity?
1  While these three concepts are not used interchangeably, 
other research has proven that innovation, productivity, and 
firm performance are positively correlated (Mohan, Strobl, 
and Watson, 2016; Crespi, Tacsir, and Vargas, 2014; among 
others).
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What Micro-level Data Tell Us 
about Productivity, Innovation, 
and Growth in the Caribbean
Sylvia Dohnert, Gustavo Crespi, Alessandro Maffioli, and Kayla Grant
Over recent decades, the Caribbean re-gion has been getting poorer as GDP growth rates have stagnated. The last rap-
id growth spurt—in the 1980s—was fueled mainly 
by the expansion of tourism, banana production, 
and public investments.1 The literature links stag-
nation to very high debt levels,2 the costs associ-
ated with frequent natural disasters (which in turn 
impact debt and growth), financial sector vulnera-
bilities, and weak overall competitiveness. There is 
also consensus that the economic growth challeng-
es of the region are partly due to high labor, financ-
ing, and energy costs, but also to weak institutions 
and a complex business climate (IMF, 2013; CDB, 
2013; Amo-Yartey and Turner-Jones, 2014; Ruprah, 
Melgarejo, and Sierra, 2014).
How much of the Caribbean’s growth trajec-
tory can be explained by country size? Historically, 
the discussion of growth in the Caribbean has 
been intertwined with the literature on small state 
exceptionalism. The literature indicates that small 
nations have more difficulties growing their econ-
omies because of scant economies of scale, weak 
diversification, vulnerability to trade shocks, loca-
tion in regions of frequent natural disasters, limited 
pools of skills, and conflicting pressures on policy-
makers. More recent research dispels this current 
thinking, finding that size is not a binding constraint 
(Ruprah et al., 2014) and that, overall, small states 
do not have different per capita growth rates than 
other states (Easterly and Kraay, 2000). 
Over the past few decades, the Caribbean’s 
steady-state growth trajectory has been differ-
ent—and slower—than a broader group of small 
nation states. Growth decomposition reveals that 
1
1  For the purpose of this document, the Caribbean region 
refers to the following 13 independent Caribbean Commu-
nity (CARICOM) states: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
2  By 2015, 12 independent Caribbean countries had debt-to-
GDP ratios above 60 percent. Estimates for the Caribbean 
indicate that when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 56 per-
cent, there is a negative marginal and average effect of debt 
on growth (Ruprah et al., 2014).
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this growth gap is somewhat linked to lower levels 
of gross capital formation (especially private capi-
tal formation) in the Caribbean but, more impor-
tantly, to lower total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth over time (Ruprah et al., 2014). This finding 
aligns with research on the growth gap between 
Latin America and the United States over the past 
four decades, which identifies productivity gaps—
not factor accumulation—as the main driver of the 
GDP per capita growth gap between those econo-
mies (Crespi et al., 2010). 
Productivity starts at the firm level and is 
related to how efficiently firms convert inputs into 
outputs. Total Factor Productivity is an aggre-
gate economic measure and is the proportion of 
national economic output that cannot be explained 
by changes in labor and capital inputs. Productivity 
is also a key economic measure of innovation 
(Jorgenson, 2011); however, not all firms are equally 
productive. Even in developed economies like the 
United States, there are large, ubiquitous, and 
persistent productivity differences among firms 
(Syverson, 2011). Reallocation of economic activ-
ity from lower toward higher productivity firms 
also largely explains aggregate economic growth 
(Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001). 
The recognized importance of productivity for 
economic growth, coupled with the discovery of 
micro-level productivity differences among firms, 
has shaped several research agendas that seek to 
understand what influences varying productivity 
outcomes at the firm level. In the field of industrial 
organization, research has looked at the effect of 
competition, the amount of sunk costs, product 
market rivalry, technology spillovers, and organi-
zational structures on productivity. The labor eco-
nomics literature has explored the impact of human 
capital, incentive pay, managerial talent, manage-
rial practices, organizational form, and social con-
nections among coworkers. The trade literature 
has examined how productivity dispersion patterns 
affect trade (Syverson, 2011). 
Clearly, an analysis of the determinants of the 
productivity of Caribbean firms would help inform 
policymakers about mechanisms to jump-start 
growth. However, until very recently, there was no 
data available to conduct such research, as statistical 
offices in the region did not conduct industrial cen-
sus and/or business surveys. In 2010, the Compete 
Caribbean Program (a private sector development, 
technical assistance program funded by the Inter-
American Development Bank [IDB], the Government 
of Canada, and the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development and executed in part-
nership with the Caribbean Development Bank) 
sponsored the inclusion of 14 Caribbean countries 
in the World Bank’s Latin American and Caribbean 
Enterprise Survey (LACES).3 Four years later, 
Compete Caribbean funded a follow-up Productivity, 
Technology, and Innovation (PROTEqIN) survey of 
13 of the previously surveyed countries.4 These two 
datasets resulted in a panel dataset that could be 
used to conduct robust analyses over time. 
LACES followed the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey (WBES) methodology.5 Business owners 
and top managers of formal firms in the manufac-
turing and services sectors and with more than 
five employees were interviewed. Following the 
guidelines of the methodology, 360 firms were sur-
veyed in each of the larger countries in the sample 
(The Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad 
and Tobago), and 150 firm interviews were con-
ducted in each of the other countries. The surveys 
used the stratified random sampling methodology. 
Homogeneous groups were created based on firm 
size6 and business sector,7 and simple random sam-
ples were selected within each group. The dataset 
included firm-level behavior such as sales, supplies, 
3  The 14 countries were Antigua and Barbuda, The Baha-
mas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, The Dominican Republic, 
Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago.
4  The Dominican Republic was not included in the PROTE-
qIN survey.
5  The WBES methodology is available at https://www.enter-
prisesurveys.org/methodology.
6  Size was defined as small (5–19 employees), medium 
(20–99 employees), or large (100+ employees).
7  Business sector was defined as manufacturing, retail, or 
other services.
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foreign trade, competition, innovation, conflict res-
olution, crime prevention, business environment, 
government relations, labor and skills, financing, 
and performance.
The PROTEqIN survey was designed as a 
panel survey of LACES, with new sections and 
variables. The survey targeted 1,680 respondents 
drawn from the 2010 LACES, aiming to update the 
data from firms that had participated in that sur-
vey and to capture additional information on firm 
performance, finance, gender of ownership and 
management, use of productive development pro-
grams, and issues related to management style, 
innovation, and crime, among others. The final sur-
vey included 1,966 respondents, 286 more than 
the targeted sample.8 The questionnaire had 830 
variables. Like LACES, the survey concentrated 
on non-agricultural, formal establishments with a 
minimum of five employees, and its sample was 
stratified by industry and size. The same private 
contractor conducted both surveys. Table 1.1 shows 
the sample sizes in each survey.
Although LACES and the PROTEqIN 
survey were a major step forward for a better 
understanding of the micro-level determinants 
of productivity and innovation in the Caribbean, 
findings need to be evaluated with care, taking 
into consideration the typical limitations of large-
scale surveys. First, findings are only valid for 
firms larger than a given sampling threshold (in 
this case five employees), so results cannot be 
extrapolated to micro-enterprises, which are very 
common in the Caribbean. Also, and perhaps more 
importantly, the sampling framework comes from 
the population of formal firms, thus analytical work 
on the determinants of informality cannot be done 
based on LACES and PROTEqIN. Second, although 
the sectoral coverage of the sample considers 
manufacturing and important portions of the 
services sectors, it does not include agricultural 
and extractive industries that might be relevant for 
some Caribbean countries. Finally, when working 
with the panel data (data from both surveys), there is 
the problem of attrition (some firms did not survive 
from the period of LACES to that of the PROTEqIN 
survey), which might affect the representativeness 
of the results. Despite these limitations, LACES and 
PROTEqIN provide invaluable information that can 
be used to analyze productivity and innovation at 
the micro-enterprise level in the Caribbean. 
These datasets provided researchers previously 
unavailable opportunities to explore the relationship 
between growth, productivity, and private sector 
activity in the Caribbean. For example, using the 
LACES dataset and comparing it to enterprise 
surveys in other small economies, Ruprah et al. 
(2014) found that Caribbean firms performed 
8  The sample incorporated new enterprises in Suriname and 
Guyana and extended the size of the survey in Trinidad and 
Tobago to 340 firms. The additional respondents were in-
cluded using the stratified random sampling methodology 
used for LACES.
TABLE 1.1.  Number of Firms in Each Survey and Total 
Number of Observations
Country LACES PROTEqIN
Number of 
Observations
Antigua and Barbuda 151 131 282
Bahamas, The 150 127 277
Barbados 150 123 273
Belize 150 122 272
Dominica 150 126 276
Dominican Republic 360 — 360
Grenada 153 129 282
Guyana 165 70 235
Jamaica 376 242 618
Saint Lucia 150 128 278
St. Kitts and Nevis 150 125 275
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
154 133 287
Suriname 152 94 246
Trinidad and Tobago 370 340 710
Total 2,781 1,890 4,671
Sources: LACES and PROTEqIN.
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poorly between 2007 and 2010 in terms of sales 
growth, employment growth, and productivity, even 
adjusting for lower rates of growth in the Caribbean 
over that period. They also found significant 
differences between the profiles of Caribbean firms 
and those in other small economies. Caribbean 
businesses tended to be smaller (three quarters had 
less than 20 full-time employees), older (more than 
20 years in operation), and less involved in foreign 
trade than their other small economy counterparts. 
Moreover, Caribbean firms were concentrated 
in the tourism and retail sectors in middle-sized 
jurisdictions, and ownership was predominantly 
local. In the economic development literature, these 
business characteristics are not typically associated 
with dynamism.
Mohan et al. (2016) used the LACES dataset to 
identify the relationship between productivity and 
innovative activity at the firm level in the Caribbean. 
They verified that innovative firms in the region 
exhibited higher labor productivity compared to 
non-innovative firms. Certainly, some differences 
in firm characteristics accounted for some of the 
observed differences in productivity, such as size, 
access to public support for innovation, ownership 
of patents, export behavior, foreign ownership, and 
cooperation with other institutions for innovation. 
However, even after adjusting for these differences, 
the productivity mean for innovative firms was 
higher and there was less dispersion in productivity 
than for non-innovative firms. 
Cathles and Pangerl (2016) used both data- 
sets to understand what variables affect labor 
productivity in the Caribbean as firms move between 
productivity quintiles. In line with results of similar 
research for Latin America (e.g., Arias et al., 2012), 
they found that size, whether the firm had a website, 
and the percentage of full-time employees with at 
least a bachelors’ degree affected productivity. They 
also found that firms in higher productivity quintiles 
that reported access to finance as their biggest 
obstacle underperformed firms in the same quintile 
who did not report this barrier as their biggest 
obstacle. Cathles and Pangerl (2016) demonstrated 
how the business climate affected productivity. 
Indeed, recent research on productivity worldwide 
has shown that, while some factors that affect 
productivity are under the control of firm managers 
(e.g., managerial talent, input quality, research and 
development [R&D], innovation, and learning), 
other factors (e.g.,  rules, institutions, and other 
elements of the business climate) are outside a 
firm’s control but still impact aggregate productivity 
by affecting the firm’s ability to allocate resources 
to higher productivity uses (Syverson, 2011). This 
characteristic is referred to as the allocative miss-
allocation of economic resources.
To stimulate further original analytical research 
on the micro-determinants of productivity in the 
Caribbean, Compete Caribbean launched a global 
competition for research papers using the two data-
sets. The call had two objectives. First, to motivate 
research that could help identify the possible effect 
and causal role of public policies and market fail-
ures on firm-level productivity and innovation in the 
Caribbean. This objective extended to evaluating 
whether market failures or public policies stunt firm 
growth and/or allow for relatively inefficient produc-
ers to operate profitably. Second, the call sought to 
stimulate research that would extend knowledge of 
drivers of innovation and productivity in the Caribbean 
and how they compare with other regions, specifi-
cally attempting to clarify the role played by micro-
economic, structural, and political economy factors. 
Researchers were encouraged to paint a clear pic-
ture of the typology of Caribbean firms—illustrating 
their current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats in terms of productivity and innovation—
and to provide, to the extent possible, policy recom-
mendations stemming from rigorous analytical and 
evidence-based research. Particular subject matters 
of interest in relation to productivity were proposed, 
such as access to finance, labor markets, business 
climate, government support programs, use of tech-
nology, gender, and environment. This was not an 
exclusive list.
The chapters herein constitute the winning 
research projects, covering a variety of topics 
that are important to the region. The compilation 
touches on some of the topics examined in Firm 
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Innovation and Productivity in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: The Engine of Economic Development 
(Grazzi and Pietrobelli, 2016). As such, some of the 
themes included in that book resurface in the pres-
ent publication, such as innovation and produc-
tivity, the impact of credit on performance, and 
the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
productivity, but with the analysis focused on the 
Caribbean and benefiting from PROTEqIN, an addi-
tional Caribbean-specific dataset. As a collection, 
the chapters answer the following questions:
 • Given that innovative firms in the Caribbean 
exhibit higher productivity, what are the barri-
ers to firms innovating? 
 • In a region where firms seem to have dispro-
portionate difficulties in accessing financing 
compared to other economies, how does this 
constraint affect innovation? 
 • In countries with very small markets, where 
scant economies of scale pose difficult regula-
tion choices, to what extent does competition 
(or the absence thereof) impact innovation? 
 • In a region where FDI inflows average 10 per-
cent of annual GDP, does foreign investment 
act as a knowledge transfer mechanism and 
increase innovation and productivity? If so, 
through what channels?
 • In a region with female participation in owner-
ship and management that is higher on aver-
age than that of the rest of the world, how 
does this variable affect firm performance? 
 • In a region with very expensive and unreliable 
energy, how do firms respond to erratic energy 
supply? And, how does erratic energy supply 
impact their long-run strategy and economic 
performance?
 • In a region with emerging programs to support 
innovation, have these had any impact on firm 
productivity?
In Chapter 2, Preeya Mohan, Eric Strobl, and 
Patrick Watson explore the impact of barriers to 
innovation in the Caribbean. Their research is novel 
in that it distinguishes between barriers that affect 
the behavior of innovative firms—revealed barri-
ers—from those that inhibit potentially innovative 
firms—deterring barriers. Potential innovators are 
defined as firms that are not currently innovating 
but that are interested in innovating within the next 
three years. The global literature on innovation bar-
riers tends to only focus on the revealed barriers of 
innovative firms. By including potentially innovative 
firms, the authors’ analysis helps address the policy 
question of which innovation barriers are crucial in 
inhibiting innovation by non-innovative firms that are 
interested in innovating. This question is relevant for 
the Caribbean since, while the proportion of firms 
that are innovators is relatively small (26 percent of 
surveyed firms), there is a much larger proportion of 
potential innovators (59 percent of surveyed firms). 
The barriers examined were financing and cost, 
knowledge, market, and policy and regulation. The 
authors used the Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse 
(1998) model and an augmented Cobb-Douglas 
production function to model the firm’s innovation 
decision and the size of the innovation effort, while 
taking into account innovation barriers. Similar to 
other literature, they found that the determinants 
that increased the likelihood of a firm deciding to 
engage in innovative activities were size, whether 
the firm exported, the presence of an R&D 
department, competition (formal and informal), and 
patent protection. In contrast to other literature, 
however, foreign ownership in the Caribbean did 
not increase a firm’s decision to innovate. 
With respect to the decision to innovate, they 
found that all four types of barriers made the 
decision to innovate difficult, but only cost (the 
level of available financial resources and direct 
public funding for innovation) and market (time to 
market) barriers were significant. Similar to other 
literature, they found the cost barrier to be the most 
important. Potentially innovative firms experienced 
relatively higher barriers than innovators regardless 
of the barrier considered. With respect to the 
amount of effort placed on innovation, they found 
that exporting, competition, and patent protection 
positively affected innovation expenditures, while 
foreign ownership, public financial assistance, and 
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cooperation did not seem to predict innovation 
expenditures. The four barriers previously described 
negatively affected innovation expenditures, with 
the cost barrier having the largest negative impact. 
In Chapter 3, Diego Morris explores the impact 
of access to financing on innovation. Given that 
innovation is costly and risky, and that, as Mohan 
et al. document in chapter 2, cost barriers have 
the largest negative impact on innovation, how 
do restrictions on financing impact the innovation 
behaviors of firms? 
Morris developed a baseline model with a six-
tier index that increased in intensity the more cat-
egories under which a firm qualified as financially 
constrained. He found strong evidence of a nega-
tive relationship between innovation and access to 
financing, which is consistent with the global litera-
ture on this topic. However, constraints on access 
to financing seemed to negatively affect process 
innovation more than product innovation. Other 
interesting findings were that increasing the pro-
portion of skilled workers increased the likelihood 
that a firm would innovate; managerial experience 
positively influenced the likelihood of process inno-
vation, albeit marginally; and firms that considered 
government regulations burdensome were less 
likely to undertake product innovation, but there 
was no such evidence for process innovation.
In Chapter 4, Antonio Marcos Hoelz Pinto 
Ambrozio and Filipe Lage de Sousa explore the 
impact of competition on innovation behavior in 
the Caribbean. Most of the literature exploring the 
relationship between competition and innovation 
uses firm-level data from developed countries, so 
by using a dataset from a developing region to test 
for this relationship, the authors contribute to an 
expanded understanding of this topic. The chap-
ter makes a further contribution to the literature by 
distinguishing between the effects of formal and 
informal competition on innovation. 
In line with the global literature, Ambrozio and 
de Sousa found that firms tended to increase their 
expenditures on innovation when competition rose, 
but the power of competition to drive innovation 
decreased after a certain threshold, corroborating 
the existence of an inverted U-shape relationship. 
They also found that the current level of competi-
tion in the region was below the maximum thresh-
old, which may indicate that there is still room to 
stimulate innovation expenditures by promoting 
more competition. Interestingly, they found that 
competition from the informal sector also stimu-
lated innovation expenditures and exerted even 
more pressure than formal competition. These find-
ings present interesting policy options and dilem-
mas, as well as further research questions.
The development literature posits that one of 
the potential benefits of FDI is knowledge trans-
fer to local firms. In Chapter 5, Preeya Mohan, Eric 
Strobl, and Patrick Watson examine whether for-
eign firms in the Caribbean stimulate other firms 
to undertake innovative activity through (1)  intra-
firm spillover effects, (2) horizontal spillover effects 
(labor mobility or demonstration effects), and 
(3) the purchase of foreign goods and services. 
Their research showed that, while foreign firms 
in the Caribbean tended to engage more in inno-
vative activity (spent on innovation, had an R&D 
department, cooperated on innovation, used a 
licensed technology, had patents) and had more 
innovative outputs (product, process, market, and 
organizational innovation) compared to local firms, 
their innovative activity did not influence local firms 
to decide to innovate. There also did not seem to 
be a knowledge transfer effect from foreign firms 
to local firms through worker mobility in the same 
or related industries. On the other hand, the use of 
foreign material inputs by domestic firms increased 
the likelihood that the firm would undertake prod-
uct or process innovation. The use of foreign inputs 
by domestic firms also positively affected labor 
productivity, while foreign ownership and the sec-
tor’s share of foreign employment did not have a 
significant impact on labor productivity.
In Chapter 6, Winston Moore, Andrea F. 
Presbitero, and Roberta Rabellotti investigate 
whether the presence of a female owner or manager 
impacts firm productivity in the Caribbean. They 
found that the proportion of female-owned or 
managed firms in the Caribbean was higher than 
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expected compared to other countries where 
LACES data is also available. The authors compared 
women-owned or managed firms in the Caribbean 
to comparable firms across certain characteristics 
that are known to impact productivity and found 
no gender gap in the propensity to innovate, firm 
age, or the propensity to export. However, women-
owned or managed firms tended to be significantly 
smaller, were less likely to demand bank credit, 
indicated access to financing as a severe obstacle to 
their business, and were less likely to take advantage 
of technical assistance than comparable firms. 
The analysis further explored whether there was a 
productivity gap associated with female participation 
in ownership or management, controlling for firm 
characteristics and country and sector fixed effects. 
The results suggest that women-managed firms 
were in fact less productive than comparable firms. 
This result was not valid for women-owned firms, 
which were as productive as comparable firms. 
In Chapter 7, Manuel Barron assesses how 
firms in the Caribbean react to unreliable electricity 
supply by analyzing the relationship between out-
ages and firm behavior. This is an important issue in 
the Caribbean, where, according to PROTEqIN and 
LACES, 42  percent of firms own generators and 
use them to generate from 10 to 16 percent of their 
electricity needs. 
The analysis revealed that firms responded 
to the issue of erratic power supply by reducing 
capacity utilization and shedding jobs-mainly 
permanent positions. A one-standard deviation 
increase in outages was associated with a 
3  percent reduction in employment. Women lost 
most of the jobs. The estimated annual reductions 
in wages in the median firm due to reduced jobs 
amounted to US$40,000. Outages also affected 
firms’ investment in innovation. Firms with higher 
exposure to outages were less likely to introduce 
innovations in goods or services, suggesting that 
firms were allocating the resources that would have 
been used for innovation to self-generation. These 
findings suggest that unreliable power supply may 
have long-term consequences for firm performance 
and industry development.
In Chapter 8, Federico Bernini, Lucas Figal 
Garone, and Alessandro Maffioli explore how public 
support programs for innovation and business 
development have worked in the Caribbean. 
They examined the datasets to understand the 
determinants of program participation and found 
that larger, more productive, national firms were 
more likely to participate in support programs. 
Interestingly, firms that participated in publicly 
funded innovation programs experienced concrete 
impacts on sales and the ability to develop new goods 
and services or improve their production processes, 
and spent more on innovation as an intermediate 
outcome. Firm participation in training programs 
also generated a higher probability of a firm training 
its employees. Finally, they found that these two 
characteristics (investment in innovation and 
employee training), correlated with participation, 
had direct effects on firm productivity. Interestingly, 
those firms that admitted to having avoided taxes, 
as well as female-owned firms, participated less 
in support programs. The concluding chapter 
discusses what these findings mean for the region 
and suggests policy recommendations and future 
areas of research. 
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Barriers to Innovation and Firm 
Productivity in the Caribbean
Preeya Mohan, Eric Strobl, and Patrick Watson
Innovation has long been associated with pro-ductivity growth since it is believed to result in the more effective use of a firm’s resources and 
the adoption and development of new technology. 
Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence in the lit-
erature that firms that engage in innovation are 
more technologically advanced and have higher la-
bor productivity, enabling them to better compete 
internationally (Schumpeter, 1939; Griliches, 1986; 
Freeman, 1994; Griffith et al., 2006; Mairesse and 
Mohnen, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence that 
investment in innovation results in a country expe-
riencing sustainable long run growth and develop-
ment (Hall and Jones, 1999; OECD, 2009; Rouvinen, 
2002). However, a large number of firms—both inno-
vative and potentially innovative—are unable to in-
novate because they face numerous barriers. In this 
regard, D’Este et al. (2008) distinguish between re-
vealed barriers, which impede an innovative firm’s 
achievement of innovation and constrain innovative 
success, and deterring barriers, which prevent a po-
tentially innovative firm from engaging in innovation 
activities. Also, these barriers can be classified as in-
ternal and external and are related to factors such 
as financing and cost, market, knowledge, and poli-
cy and regulation.
Examining the impediments to innovation suc-
cess is relevant to policy development. More spe-
cifically, much government policy aims to tackle 
obstacles to innovation and alleviate barriers by 
designing and implementing appropriate poli-
cies and incentives for firms to engage in innova-
tion activities and reduce failures. Therefore, it is 
important to know which barriers are particularly 
relevant and constraining for innovative and poten-
tially innovative firms. Identifying and subsequently 
reducing these obstacles should help increase the 
number of innovative firms and the level of inno-
vation, thus leading a country to increased pro-
ductivity and growth and development. From the 
perspective of firms, it is important to identify 
innovation barriers since this may provide valuable 
information for entrepreneurs and managers when 
crafting innovation strategy, such as introducing 
new products and processes, and may increase 
the chances of success and economic pay-off from 
innovative activity. 
Considering barriers to innovation within the 
Caribbean, there is a general paucity of studies on 
firm innovation and productivity in Caribbean Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS). Moreover, the few 
studies tend to group the Caribbean together with 
2
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large Latin American countries and focus mainly 
on manufacturing and agro-processing sectors 
(Lederman et al., 2014; Ortiz et al., 2012; Daude and 
Fernández-Arias, 2010; IDB, 2010; Crespi and Zuniga, 
2012). However, in Caribbean SIDS, services play 
a much more important role than manufacturing. 
Mohan, Strobl, and Watson (2014) is one exception: 
these authors looked specifically at Caribbean SIDS 
and included the services sector. Nevertheless, these 
studies, including Mohan et al. (2014), investigated 
the determinants of innovation and the benefits from 
it only in terms of making firms more productive 
and not barriers to innovation. The findings suggest 
that innovation and productivity are quite low and, 
indeed, are acute constraints to growth and devel-
opment in the region. Therefore, firms in the region 
potentially face high barriers to innovation. Indeed, 
in the study by Mohan et al. (2014), just 11 percent of 
the firms in the region that were surveyed engaged 
in any type of innovation activity.
This chapter presents innovation barri-
ers related to financing and cost, market, knowl-
edge, and policy and regulations facing firms in 13 
Caribbean SIDS. Further, it studies the impact of 
these factors on innovation and productivity for 
innovative and potentially innovative firms using 
Compete Caribbean’s Productivity, Technology, 
and Innovation Survey (PROTEqIN).
Literature Review 
The literature on innovation barriers has mostly 
concentrated on differences in characteristics that 
affect the perception of barriers among innovative 
firms only (Galia and Legros, 2004; Mohnen and 
Rosa, 2001) and has treated non-innovative firms as 
an undifferentiated group (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; 
Hölzl and Friesenbichler, 2010; Iammarino, Sanna-
Randaccio, and Savona, 2009). However, innova-
tive firms experience barriers to increasing current 
innovation activities, while non-innovative firms that 
have an interest in innovation face barriers to starting 
innovation activities. D’Este et al. (2008) therefore 
distinguish between revealed barriers, which impede 
a firm’s innovation success and affect innovative 
firms, and deterring barriers, which constrain a firm’s 
innovation effort and affect innovative and non-inno-
vative firms. Only a small number of studies have 
addressed non-innovative firms (D’Este et al., 2008, 
2012; Savignac, 2008; Mohnen et al., 2008), and 
these studies found that non-innovative firms that do 
not wish to innovate rank barriers as low, while non-
innovative firms with an interest in innovation rank 
barriers just as high as innovative firms.
Since the majority of studies have focused on 
barriers faced by innovative firms only, the literature 
fails to identify the different nature of the barriers in 
terms of their revealed versus deterring effects, and 
the context in which they might co-exist. Thus the 
study of barriers faced by innovative firms does not 
address the main policy question of which innova-
tion barriers are crucial in inhibiting non-innovative 
firms with an interest in innovation in starting innova-
tion activities. A study of non-innovative firms that 
distinguishes between those that are interested in 
innovation and those that are not could provide infor-
mation on two neglected issues: whether differences 
among non-innovative firms exist in relation to their 
assessment of barriers, and what features distinguish 
non-innovative firms from each other and from inno-
vative firms. Additionally, including firms not will-
ing to innovate in the sample may create a positive 
spurious correlation between perception of barriers 
and firm innovativeness (Savignac, 2008; Mancusi 
and Vezzulli, 2010) and may overestimate the role of 
revealed barriers while underestimating or ignoring 
deterring barriers. Moreover, studies of non-innova-
tive firms that are not willing to innovate has led to 
conclusions of a negative relationship between inno-
vation intensity and innovation barriers (Mancusi and 
Vezzulli, 2010; Savignac, 2008).
Questions about barriers in innovation surveys 
cause firms to evaluate the problems they face 
and overcome in carrying out innovation activities: 
revealed barriers. However, the questions do not 
indicate whether these challenges represent an 
actual obstacle to pursuing innovation: deterring 
barriers. Thus, the literature is mainly focused on 
revealed barriers. However, carrying out innovation 
increases a firm’s awareness of the difficulties that 
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are likely to be encountered, without necessarily 
preventing them from pursuing innovation 
activities (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Galia and Legros, 
2004). The majority of the empirical studies based 
on these innovation surveys investigated factors 
that affected perceptions of the importance of 
innovation barriers, since engagement in innovation 
activity increases the firm’s awareness of these 
barriers but does not necessarily prevent them from 
being successful innovators. The findings show that 
the greater the firm’s involvement in innovation, the 
greater the importance attached to these barriers. 
Thus innovative firms are more likely to have 
experienced barriers to innovation and are more 
likely to recognize them as significant challenges 
to innovation activities. The perception of revealed 
innovation barriers may slow but not prevent 
innovative firms from engaging in innovation 
activities (Galia and Legros, 2004). Additionally, 
these barriers may serve as an indicator of how 
successful the firm is at overcoming them (Baldwin 
and Lin, 2002; Tourigny and Le, 2004).
In a study of Canadian manufacturing firms, 
Baldwin and Lin (2002) concluded that a larger 
proportion of innovators reported that innovation 
barriers negatively affected innovation intensity 
compared to non-innovators. Similarly, in a study 
of Canadian service firms which were innovators, 
Mohnen and Rosa (2001) also found that the most 
innovation intensive firms reported more frequent 
barriers to innovation. Iammarino et al. (2009) 
studied Italian firms and focused on whether 
the perception of barriers to innovation varied 
among types of firms and regions. Similarly, they 
concluded there is a positive relationship between 
a firm’s perception of innovation barriers and their 
propensity to innovate. Galia and Legros (2004) 
investigated French manufacturing firms and found 
a positive association between the propensity 
to or intensity of innovation and the likelihood 
of perceiving the barriers to innovation as very 
relevant. In a study in Turkey, Demirbas (2010) 
found that innovative entrepreneurs perceived 
barriers to innovation to be higher. Also, in a study 
of Portuguese manufacturing firms, Silva, Leitao, 
and Raposo (2007) showed that firms that innovate 
are those that perceive more barriers to innovation.
The main focus of the empirical literature on 
innovation barriers has been on the lack of avail-
able financing or cost factors (Hall, 2002). However, 
while financial resources are necessary to carry out 
innovation activities, there are other factors that 
may significantly hinder innovation that are related 
to knowledge, market, and the policy and regula-
tory environment. These factors are categorized 
as internal and external and can be revealed and 
deterring barriers (Stanislawsky and Olczak, 2010; 
Madrid-Guijarro, Garcia, and Van Auken, 2009; 
Hadjimanolis, 2003; D’Este et al., 2008; Blanchard et 
al., 2013; Pellegrino and Savona, 2013; Piatier, 1984). 
Internal barriers emerge and create resistance within 
the firm. Examples include issues of firm manage-
ment and internal policies, organizational culture, 
employee competence, and lack of internal financ-
ing. On the other hand, external barriers come about 
due to the environment in which the firm operates 
and arise when the firm interacts with other firms 
or institutions. Prevailing market conditions are also 
a factor. Firms have no control over external bar-
riers, which include limited government support, 
lack of external financing, deficiency of technology 
and technological knowledge, difficulty in access-
ing knowledge, paucity of knowledge about market 
opportunities, limited opportunity for innovation 
cooperation, inadequately skilled and knowledge-
able labor force, and lack of sufficient demand.
The empirical literature uses data from surveys 
to look at the impact of barriers—largely financial—
on the propensity to innovate and the intensity of 
innovation. Such studies have shown that firms’ 
engagement in innovative activity is significantly 
reduced or discouraged by barriers to innova-
tion. Savignac (2008) studied French manufactur-
ing firms and illustrated that the likelihood that a 
firm would carry out innovation activity is signifi-
cantly reduced by financial barriers. Tiwari, Buse, 
and Herstatt (2007) studied Dutch firms and found 
that perceived financial barriers to research and 
development (R&D) was a significant barrier. In a 
study of Italian manufacturing small and medium 
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sized enterprises (SMEs), Mancusi and Vezzulli 
(2010) provided empirical support for the the-
ory that financing is a significant barrier to inno-
vation, especially for young and small firms. In a 
similar study, Silva et al. (2007) provided empirical 
evidence that high innovation costs—along with a 
lack of qualified personnel and lack of customers’ 
responsiveness to new products—had a negative 
and significant effect on innovation propensity.
Empirical studies also examine whether small 
firms are more likely to experience and are more 
negatively affected by innovation barriers. In a 
study of Canadian firms, including SMEs, Tourigny 
and Le (2004) found that firm characteristics, 
in particular firm size, affected the propensity to 
innovate. Hadjimanolis (1999), in a study of SMEs 
in Cyprus, showed that the most important inter-
nal barriers were the lack of time, inadequacy of 
R&D activities, design and testing within the com-
pany, and inadequate financial resources, while 
the most challenging external barriers were ease 
of copying the innovation, government bureau-
cracy, lack of government support, lack of qualified 
human resources, government policies, and bank 
lending. Madrid-Guijarro et al. (2009) found that 
the barriers to innovation that Spanish SMEs faced 
were the external environment, human resources, 
and financial position. Mohnen and Rosa (2001), 
Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), and Iammarino et 
al. (2009) found that small firms faced significant 
financial barriers to innovation. Pihkala, Ylinenpaa, 
and Vesalainen (2002), using a sample of European 
SMEs, empirically illustrated that the barriers to 
innovation were not equally distributed among 
firms, but differed based on age, size, type of indus-
try, and the innovativeness of the firm. Other stud-
ies have shown that large firms are more likely to be 
negatively affected by innovation barriers. Baldwin 
and Lin (2002) claimed that large firms are more 
likely to report barriers to innovation than small 
firms due to differences in technology advance-
ment. Baldwin and Lin (2002) and Tourigny and Le 
(2004) found that large firms were more likely to 
report barriers related to costs and organization of 
innovation than small firms.
Studies have considered technology intensity as 
having an impact on innovation barriers (e.g., Dosi, 
1988). There are extensive differences in intensity of 
innovation since firms in different industries face dif-
ferent barriers (Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Tourigny and 
Le, 2004). For instance, firms in low and medium-
low technology industries are less likely to face barri-
ers than those in high and medium-high technology 
industries. Studies have also examined the percep-
tion of innovation between domestic and foreign 
firms. Iammarino et al. (2009) studied foreign- and 
Italian-owned multinational corporations operating 
in northern and central Italy and found that foreign-
owned firms were more aware of innovation barri-
ers. Baldwin and Lin (2002) and Mohnen and Rosa 
(2001) found that competition increased innova-
tion barriers. Mohnen and Rosa (2001) stated that 
firms that had less competition considered innova-
tion barriers irrelevant. Baldwin and Lin (2002) and 
Tourigny and Le (2004) claimed that the more com-
petition a firm faced, the higher the likelihood that it 
faced cost, labor, and other problems. The barriers 
to innovation are therefore strongest when competi-
tion is at its highest level.
Innovation barriers are likely to exert different 
effects during different phases of the innovation 
process. For instance, lack of finance might deter 
the initial decision to invest in innovation activities, 
while lack of demand might lower incentives to 
launch a new product or enter a new market even 
though adequate financing is available. Therefore, 
providing evidence about which of these factors 
affects each of the different phases of firms’ 
innovative processes has very relevant policy 
implications. There are very few empirical studies 
about barriers to innovation for each phase of the 
innovation cycle (Segarra-Blasco, Garcia-Quevedo, 
and Teruel-Carrizosa, 2008; Coad, Pellegrino, and 
Savona, 2013; Pellegrino and Savona, 2013). These 
studies used a modified version of the structural 
recursive model originally proposed by Crépon, 
Duguet, and Mairesse (1998), or the CDM model, and 
later extended in the literature (Griffith et al., 2006; 
Crespi and Zuniga, 2012). The model takes into 
account the decision by firms to invest in innovation 
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activities and how much to invest, along with other 
inputs related to labor productivity, in creating a 
knowledge production function from which the 
output production function is then created.
Data and Methodology
This chapter uses the PROTEqIN survey com-
pleted by Compete Caribbean in 2014. The survey 
was conducted in 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua 
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The data 
was used to identify innovation barriers related to 
financing and cost, knowledge, market, and policy 
and regulation faced by Caribbean firms.
The methodology was based on pioneering 
work in innovation and productivity by Crépon et 
al. (1998), later extended by Griffith et al. (2006), 
OECD (2009), and Crespi and Zuniga (2012). The 
CDM model takes into account the decision by 
firms to invest in innovation activities, along with 
other inputs related to labor productivity, to create 
a knowledge production function from which the 
output production function is then created. A firm’s 
innovation decision includes any action that aims 
to increase its knowledge, such as new concepts, 
ideas, processes, and methods. This includes R&D 
and other expenditures, such as product design, 
marketing, staff training, new machinery, and pat-
ents and other trademark licensing.
Unlike the majority of studies based on the 
CDM model that consider the effect of classic 
determinants of innovation on productivity at vari-
ous stages in a firm’s innovation cycle, this chapter 
focuses on the role of different types of obstacles 
to innovation as the potential cause of low levels 
of productivity rather than on the effect of classic 
determinants of innovation on productivity at var-
ious stages in a firm’s innovation cycle. The main 
explanatory variables used in this chapter account 
for the presence of obstacles to innovation related 
to financing and cost, market, knowledge, and pol-
icy and regulation, which have been outlined as key 
hindrances to innovation in past studies (D’Este 
et al., 2008, 2012; Savignac, 2008; Pellegrino and 
Savona, 2013). To reduce selection bias, the study 
for this chapter identified the relevant sample of 
innovators and potential innovators by excluding 
those firms that stated they are not willing to inno-
vate and therefore do not engage in any innovation 
activity for reasons other than obstacles. 
The importance of firm heterogeneity, such as 
size, in explaining innovation activities and the need 
to control for their effects on firm performance was 
also taken into account (Hall and Mairesse, 2006; 
Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). The study also included 
variables to account for sector and country effects. A 
weakness of the model that must be acknowledged 
is that, inherently, the interpretation of results in 
terms of causality is fairly limited since external 
shocks are not considered. Ideally, the occurrence 
of an exogenous shock to innovation barriers would 
allow causality to be identified confidently; however, 
no such shocks occurred during the sample period.
The Filtering Process: Sample Selection of 
Innovative and Potentially Innovative Firms 
Taking a lead from D’Este et al. (2008), Mohnen et 
al. (2008), and Savignac (2008), the study sample 
included innovative and non-innovative firms will-
ing to innovate, and filtered out firms unwilling to 
innovate that, therefore, did not engage in innova-
tion for reasons unrelated to innovation barriers. 
Firms that do not want to innovate, and there-
fore do not encounter barriers to innovation, are 
highly likely to report barriers as not important, 
which could lead to a spurious positive impact of 
innovation barriers on a firm’s propensity to inno-
vate. Thus, the study overcame the sample selec-
tion bias that arises when innovation surveys ask all 
firms interviewed, regardless of their willingness to 
innovate, about obstacles to innovation by filtering 
out firms uninterested in innovating. Three catego-
ries of firms were identified:
1. Innovative firms carry out innovation activities 
and rank barriers as important.
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2. Potentially innovative firms report that they 
are willing to innovate or that they experience 
some sort of barrier to starting to innovate.
3. Firms not willing to innovate do not carry out 
any innovation activities and thus do not expe-
rience any barriers to innovation. 
Information in the survey made it possible to 
identify these groups. Though the PROTEqIN sur-
vey began by questioning all firms about their 
innovation activities, not all firms would have been 
innovative: some may have undertaken innovation 
unsuccessfully and others may not have been inter-
ested in innovation. A firm might have decided that 
it did not need to innovate because of a lack of inter-
est or because it had innovated recently; therefore, 
in principle, such a firm did not experience innova-
tion barriers. Nevertheless, all firms surveyed were 
required to answer questions about the impact of 
innovation barriers on their innovation activities.
A firm was defined as an innovator if it intro-
duced a new or significantly improved product 
(either a good or service) or any new or significantly 
improved process for producing or supplying prod-
ucts. If the firm did not introduce a new or signifi-
cantly improved product or process over the period, 
it was classified as a non-innovator. To differenti-
ate between potentially innovative firms and firms 
not willing to innovate, the responses to questions 
regarding barriers to innovation were examined. 
Firms that ranked barriers as important were classi-
fied as potentially innovative, while those that viewed 
barriers as not important were classified as firms not 
willing to innovate. The relevant sample therefore 
included innovative and potentially innovative firms 
and excluded firms not willing to innovate to cor-
rectly estimate the sign and intensity of the relation-
ship between innovation and a firm’s assessment of 
barriers to innovation. The questionnaire included 19 
barriers to innovation classified into four categories: 
financing and cost, market, knowledge, and policy 
and regulation. The extent to which a firm experi-
enced any category of barrier was based on whether 
the firm experienced at least one of the innovation 
barriers included within each category.
The Econometric Model
The relationship between innovation and productiv-
ity is complex, beginning with a firm’s initial decision 
to innovate and how much to spend, followed by its 
innovative output and the impact on productivity. A 
firm faces various obstacles related to financing and 
cost, market, knowledge, and policy and regulation 
throughout this process. To take this into account, 
this chapter adapted the CDM model to the role 
played by barriers to innovation. CDM is a three step 
structural model that establishes the relationship 
among innovative input, innovative output, and pro-
ductivity. First, a firm decides whether to invest in 
innovation and the amount to invest. Second, inno-
vation output is treated as a function of innovation 
input and other factors in the knowledge production 
function. Third, an augmented Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function establishes the effect of innovative 
output on productivity. The adapted model made it 
possible to investigate the role of different obstacles 
to innovation at each of these three stages. 
The CDM model is a system of five equations 
that link a firm’s R&D expenditures to its innovation 
output, and its innovation output to productivity. 
The equations included four variables that identify 
the presence of obstacles to innovation related to 
financing and cost, market, knowledge, and policy 
and regulation.
The model was estimated in three steps. In 
the first step, a two-equation system as used 
to (1)  model the firm’s innovation decision and 
(2) the size of the innovation effort, while taking into 
account innovation barriers. Both equations used a 
generalized Tobit model and estimated using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation. Let i = 1,....,N represent 
an index of firms. The first equation of the model 
accounted for the firm’s innovative effort IEi*:
IEi
* = zi’ β + ei (1) 
where IEi
* is a latent variable for unobserved but 
desired expenditures, and zi is a vector of determi-
nants of a firm’s innovation decision, including inno-
vation barriers, β is a vector of parameters, and ei 
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is the error term. Equation 2 is an indicator function 
that takes the value 1 if the firm carried out innova-
tive activity. Equation 2 also uses various explanatory 
variables that affect a firm’s decision to undertake 
innovation activities, including firm size; whether the 
firm received public funding; whether the firm had 
an R&D department; whether the firm faced compe-
tition; ownership; patent protection; and whether it 
was an exporting firm, together with innovation barri-
ers related to financing and cost, market, knowledge, 
and policy and regulation barriers to innovation, as 
well as country- and industry- specific effects.
IDi = 1 if IDi 
* = wi’α + ei > 0
 0 if IDi 
* = wi’α + ei c  (2)
where ID is an observable binary endogenous vari-
able equal to 1 if the firm invested in innovation activ-
ities and 0 if it did not, ID* is a latent indicator variable 
whereby the firm incurred innovation expenditures if 
these were above a certain threshold level c, which 
is the minimum innovation expenditure and was 0 in 
our case, w is a vector of variables that influenced 
the innovation investment decision, including the 
variables related to innovation barriers, α is a vec-
tor of parameters of interest, and e is the error term.
Equation 3 was the innovation intensity equa-
tion. Conditional on firm i engaging in innovation 
activities, the amount of resources invested in inno-
vation IE activities was observed:
IEi = IEi
* = zi’ β + εi if IDi = 1
0 if IDi = 0 (3)
where z’ is a set of determinants of innovation 
expenditure and ε is the error term. Other deter-
minants in the innovation expenditure equation 
are dummies for exporting, patent protection, co-
operation on R&D, whether the firm faced compe-
tition, whether the firm had an R&D department, 
and public financial support, as well as the dummy 
variables for innovation barriers related to financ-
ing and cost, market, knowledge, and policy and 
regulation, together with country- and industry-
specific effects.
Assuming the error terms e and ε were bivari-
ate normal with a zero mean, variances σε
2 = 1 and 
σe
2 and correlation coefficient ρεe, the system of 
Equations 1 and 2 are then estimated as a general-
ized Tobit model by maximum likelihood.
The second step in the estimation exercise 
links innovation activities to innovation output 
with an innovation/knowledge production function 
using the predicted values of the innovation effort 
from step one as one of the dependent variables 
along with the various innovation barriers.
TIi = IEi*γ + xi’ δ + ui  (4)
where TI is the observed 0–1 variable indicating 
knowledge outputs by firm innovation activities 
(introduction of a new product or process at the 
firm level takes a value of 1 and 0 otherwise), and 
where the latent innovation effort, IE, from step one 
enters as an explanatory variable, x is a vector of 
other determinants of knowledge production, γ and 
δ are vectors of parameters of interest, and u is an 
error term. The explanatory variables are firm size 
and a dummy variable for exporting and owner-
ship, patent protection, and the innovation barrier 
dummy variables together with country- and indus-
try-specific effects. Equation 4 is estimated using 
a Probit model with the predicted value of (log) 
innovation expenditure as the main explanatory 
variable rather than reporting innovation efforts. 
Importantly, this corrects for potential endogene-
ity in the knowledge production equation. 
Equation 5 is the output production function/
productivity equation, which links a firm’s innovation 
output to productivity by including it as an input in 
an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function 
along with innovation barriers. As a third step in the 
estimation exercise, this equation is estimated using 
the predicted values from the Probit model in the 
second step since they account for endogeneity of 
the innovation output variables. The assumption 
was that a firm’s productivity depends on its own 
investment and external knowledge. Firms produce 
output using constant returns to scale with labor, 
capital, and knowledge inputs as follows:
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yi = θi ki + θ2 TIi + vi (5)
where output y is labor productivity (log of sales 
per worker), k is the log of physical capital per 
worker (using physical investment per worker as 
a proxy), TI enters as an explanatory variable that 
refers to the impact of technological innovation on 
productivity levels predicted from equation (3), and 
v is the error term. The independent variables in the 
production function include the log of physical cap-
ital per employee, predicted values of product and 
process innovation dummies from the second step, 
firm size, and variables for innovation barriers, as 
well as country- and industry-specific effects.
Results
Descriptive Analysis
The data show that, based on three firm catego-
ries, 26 percent of firms surveyed were innovators 
(started and completed innovation activities and 
ranked barriers as important), 59  percent were 
potential innovators (did not start or started but 
did not successfully complete innovative activity 
and ranked barriers as important), and 15 percent 
were non-innovators (did not undertake any inno-
vation activity and ranked barriers as not impor-
tant). Thus, while the proportion of firms that 
were innovators was relatively small, there was 
a large percentage of potential innovators in the 
Caribbean. Government policy aimed at reduc-
ing innovation barriers may therefore increase the 
number of innovative firms in the region, thereby 
stimulating increased innovation and productivity.
The study also investigated the extent to 
which differences among the three firm categories 
existed across the different Caribbean islands to get 
an idea of the distribution of innovators, potential 
innovators, and non-innovators across the region. 
Table 2.1 shows that Trinidad and Tobago (16 per-
cent), Suriname (15 percent), Guyana (14 percent), 
and Jamaica (10  percent) had the highest per-
centage of innovative firms. Antigua and Barbuda, 
TABLE 2.1. Innovators, Potential Innovators, and Non-innovators, by Country
Country
Innovative firms Potentially innovative firms Non-innovative firms
# % # % # %
Antigua and Barbuda 22 4 74 6 35 12
Belize 20 4 97 8 5 2
Barbados 39 8 79 7 5 1
Bahamas, The 28 5 72 6 27 9
Dominica 18 4 75 7 33 11
Grenada 22 4 81 7 26 9
Guyana 69 14 40 3 11 4
Jamaica 50 10 186 16 6 2
Saint Lucia 24 5 80 7 24 8
St. Kitts and Nevis 23 4 78 7 24 8
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 35 7 69 6 29 10
Suriname 76 15 39 3 5 1
Trinidad and Tobago 80 16 190 16 70 23
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on PROTEqIN data. 
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Belize, Dominica, Grenada, and St. Kitts and Nevis 
had the lowest percentage of innovative firms at 
4 percent. In terms of potential innovators, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica each had 16  percent 
of such firms, followed by Belize with 8  percent. 
For non-innovators, Trinidad and Tobago had 
the largest proportion (23  percent), followed by 
Antigua and Barbuda (12  percent), and Dominica 
(11 percent).
Table  2.2 provides the main firm characteris-
tics of the three groups to investigate and compare 
differences among innovators, potential innova-
tors, and non-innovators. Firm size was measured 
by number of employees, and innovators were sig-
nificantly larger than potential innovators and non-
innovators. Table  2.2 shows that 22  percent of the 
innovators were large firms compared to 11  per-
cent of potential innovators and 10  percent of 
TABLE 2.2. Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics
Innovative firms Potentially innovative firms Non-innovative firms
# % # % # %
Size (number of employees)
Small (< 20 employees) 183 36 595 51 159 53
Medium (≥ 20 and < 100 employees) 210 42 436 38 111 37
Large (≥ 100 employees) 113 22 129 11 30 10
Ownership
Local 412 81 986 85 257 86
Foreign 94 19 174 15 43 14
Exporter/non-exporter
Exporter 162 32 199 17 52 17
Non-exporter 344 68 961 83 248 83
Industry
Manufacturing 291 58 308 27 61 20
   Other manufacturing 67 13 96 8 11 4
   Food 106 21 74 6 16 5
   Textiles 1 0 5 0 — —
   Garments 12 2 26 2 3 1
   Chemicals 27 5 20 2 4 1
   Plastics and rubber 8 2 10 1 — —
   Non-metallic mineral products 17 3 31 3 1 0
   Basic metals 4 1 14 1 9 3
   Fabricated metal products 21 4 8 1 6 2
   Machinery and equipment 20 4 19 2 6 2
   Electronics 8 2 5 0 5 2
(continued on next page)
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non-innovators. Non-innovators had the largest 
share of local firms (86  percent local; 14  percent 
foreign), followed by potential innovators (85  per-
cent; 15 percent) and innovators (81 percent; 19 per-
cent). Innovators had the largest share of exporters 
at 32  percent, while potential innovators and non-
innovators both had 17 percent of the firms that were 
exporters. Innovators had the highest number of 
firms (24 percent) that were part of a larger organi-
zation, followed by potential innovators (15 percent) 
and non-innovators (14  percent). Potential innova-
tors had the largest percentage of female manag-
ers (24 percent), followed by innovators (18 percent) 
and non-innovators (12 percent).
A larger proportion of innovators were in 
manufacturing than in services (58 percent versus 
TABLE 2.2. Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics
Innovative firms Potentially innovative firms Non-innovative firms
# % # % # %
Services 215 42 852 73 239 80
   Construction 25 5 82 7 29 10
   Services for motor vehicles 6 1 64 6 8 3
   Wholesale 19 4 61 5 15 5
   Retail 85 17 296 26 85 28
   Hotel and restaurants 44 9 233 20 62 21
   Transport 26 5 93 8 35 12
   Information technology 10 2 23 2 5 1
Part of a Larger Firm 
Yes 120 24 175 15 41 14
No 386 76 985 85 259 86
Gender of Top Management
Male 416 82 885 76 234 88
Female 90 18 275 24 66 12
Competitors
Registered/formal firms
None 10 2 5 0.4 1 0
1 4 1 15 1.3 4 1
2–5 107 21 224 19 62 21
>5 385 76 916 79 233 78
Unregistered/informal firms
Yes 278 55 699 60 168 56
No 228 45 461 40 132 44
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on PROTEqIN data. 
(continued)
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42 percent). Potential innovators (27 percent manu-
facturing; 73 percent services) and non-innovators 
(20  percent manufacturing; 80  percent services) 
had a higher number of firms in the services sector. 
Thus, in the Caribbean, innovators were more likely 
to be in the manufacturing sector, while potential 
innovators and non-innovators were more likely 
to be in the services sector. Looking at the disag-
gregated sector profile, innovators had the larg-
est number of firms in food (21 percent) and retail 
(17  percent), while potential innovators and non-
innovators had the largest number of firms in the 
retail sector (26  percent and 28  percent, respec-
tively) followed by the hotel and restaurant sec-
tor (20  percent and 21  percent, respectively). 
Interestingly, innovators (13 percent) and potential 
innovators (8 percent) had a higher proportion of 
firms in “other manufacturing” compared to non-
innovators (4 percent), as well as in the knowledge-
intensive information technology sector (2 percent 
for innovators and potential innovators, and 1 per-
cent for non-innovators). 
For the level of competition from registered 
firms, all three groups reported that they face a 
relatively high level of competition. For innovators, 
76  percent stated that they face more than five 
competitors (the largest competitor category in the 
survey), while the corresponding figures for poten-
tial innovators and non-innovators were 79  per-
cent and 78  percent, respectively. With regard 
to informal competition, a significant portion of 
firms reported that they faced such competition. 
Potential innovators had the largest share of firms 
reporting that they faced competition from unreg-
istered firms (60 percent), followed by non-innova-
tors (56 percent) and innovators (55 percent). 
Table 2.3 details the items included within each 
of the four innovation barrier categories (financing 
and cost, knowledge, market, and policy and 
regulation) to examine how the different categories 
affected innovative versus potentially innovative 
firms. A barrier item was ranked as important if 
the firm assessed it as a “major obstacle” or “very 
severe obstacle” in the survey. The results are 
presented for innovative and potentially innovative 
firms only since non-innovative firms would have 
ranked these barriers as not important in the 
survey. 
Table  2.3 provides evidence of an important 
characteristic of the impact of barriers on innova-
tion that is consistent in the literature: potentially 
innovative firms in the Caribbean experience higher 
barriers to innovation than innovative firms regard-
less of the type and barrier category considered. 
Specifically, the barriers that affected potential 
innovators much more than innovators were: direct 
public funding for innovation (financing and cost); 
flexibility and openness of other companies in the 
sector to collaborative approaches (knowledge); 
time to market (market); and protection against 
copycats (policy and regulation). Therefore, firms 
in the region that have not yet innovated may be 
more likely to be affected by innovation barriers, 
perhaps even more than innovative firms. This 
result underscores the importance of investigating 
potentially innovative and innovative firms when 
studying innovation barriers. Moreover, when con-
sidering both groups, researchers should account 
for deterring barriers, which discourage firms from 
innovation activities and are more likely faced by 
potential innovators, and revealed barriers, which 
are faced during innovation activities and are more 
likely faced by innovators (Arundel, 1997; Baldwin 
and Lin, 2002; Iammarino et al., 2009). 
Table  2.3 also provides evidence of another 
well-established finding in the literature: financ-
ing and cost barriers are the most significant bar-
riers faced by firms, whether they are innovative 
or potentially innovative. Knowledge factors are 
the next most significant innovation barriers faced 
by Caribbean firms, followed by market barriers, 
and policy and regulation barriers, which are the 
least experienced obstacles. Direct public fund-
ing was listed by the largest number of firms as 
an important barrier (43  percent of innovators 
and 54  percent of potential innovators) com-
pared to any other barrier item. Additionally, the 
PROTEqIN survey specifically asked firms to iden-
tify any other innovation obstacles not stated in 
the questionnaire that are significant hindrances 
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to innovation. Funding opportunities for innova-
tion was identified as a severe barrier, as well as 
human capacity. The least significant innovation 
obstacles faced by Caribbean firms identified in 
the survey were client flexibility and openness to 
new goods or services (innovators 12 percent and 
potential innovators 16  percent) and the firm’s 
internal remuneration policy and incentive struc-
ture (innovators 12 percent and potential innova-
tors 17 percent).
Econometric Results
The Decision to Invest in Innovation and the 
Intensity of Innovation Expenditures 
The descriptive analysis above shows that a sig-
nificant proportion of firms surveyed are non-
innovators (15 percent)—they did not carry out any 
innovation activities and ranked innovation barri-
ers as not important (likely not encountering any). 
Including these firms in the analysis could lead to a 
TABLE 2.3. Proportion of Firms Assessing Barriers as Important
Barriers
Innovator Potential innovator
# % # %
Financing and cost 
Level of available financial resources 209 41 526 45
Direct public funding for innovation 219 43 625 54
Knowledge 
Qualification of employees 169 33 452 39
Technical uncertainties 135 27 412 36
Level of information about available technologies 98 19 286 25
Level of information about new trends in the market 155 31 455 39
Linkages with public universities and tertiary institutions 177 35 466 40
Technical capacity in key institution responsible for innovation promotion 100 20 282 24
Flexibility/openness of laboratories/research centers for collaborative approaches 199 39 523 45
Flexibility/openness of other companies in the sector for collaborative approaches 213 42 615 53
Market 
Client flexibility and openness to new goods or services 61 12 180 16
Time to market 195 39 583 50
Policy and regulation 
Requirements to comply with international standards 141 28 414 36
Current organizational and managerial culture 147 29 399 34
Internal remuneration policy and incentive structure 59 12 200 17
Protection against copycats 208 41 575 50
Investment and policy framework to foster innovation 109 22 301 26
Degree of self-confidence for innovation 104 21 267 23
Source: Author’s compilation based on PROTEqIN data. 
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spurious positive impact between the propensity 
to innovate and the existence of innovation barri-
ers. Hence, to obtain reliable results on innovation 
barriers, non-innovators were excluded from the 
regression sample, including only potential innova-
tors and innovators. The appendix provides the list 
of variables used in the econometric analyses and 
their definition.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the estimation 
of the Heckman equation with a selection model 
for a firm’s engagement in innovation activities and 
the outcome equation for the intensity of innova-
tion expenditures as the log of innovation expendi-
ture per employee. The reported estimates are the 
marginal effects. A firm’s decision to carry out inno-
vation activities was modelled in that it depends 
on the traditional determinants of the decision to 
innovate and on the existence of financing and 
cost, knowledge, market, and policy and regulation 
barriers to innovation. Four dummy variables were 
used, one for each barrier category. They take a 
value of 1 if the firm ranked the barrier as important 
in negatively affecting innovation.
Table 2.4 shows that factors that increased a 
firm’s likelihood of engaging in innovation activi-
ties include firm size, whether the firm exported, 
whether the firm had an R&D department, whether 
the firm faced competition from formal and infor-
mal firms, and patent protection, while foreign 
ownership did not increase the likelihood that a 
firm would decide to innovate. Thus, larger firms, 
firms that have patents, firms that have an R&D 
department, and firms that face competition are 
more likely to carry out innovation activities. All 
four barrier categories made the decision to inno-
vate difficult since all the coefficients were nega-
tive; however, only the cost and market coefficients 
were significant. These results suggest that, in gen-
eral, barriers to innovation limit a firm’s decision to 
innovate. Moreover, the significant negative results 
for innovative and potentially innovative firms 
highlight the importance of revealed and deter-
ring barriers, as shown in the literature by D’Este et 
al. (2008, 2012), Savignac (2008), and Mohnen et 
al. (2008). Thus potentially innovative firms in the 
Caribbean also rank barriers as important and are 
negatively affected by them.
Examining the results of the determinants 
of logged innovation expenditure per employee 
TABLE 2.4.  Probability of Investing in Innovation (ID) 
and Intensity of Innovation Expenditure 
per Employee (IE)
ID (probability of investing in innovation IE>0)
Exporting 0.032** (.012)
Foreign ownership 0.005 (.010)
Patent protection 0.242*** (.053)
R&D department 0.219*** (.037)
Competition 0.022*** (.007)
Size 0.015*** (.030)
Financing and cost barriers −0.015** (.007)
Knowledge barriers −0.011 (.008)
Market barriers −0.023*** (.007)
Policy and regulation barriers –0.005 (.007)
IE (log of innovation expenditure per employee)
Exporting 0.240*** (.087)
Foreign ownership 0.041 (.072)
Patent protection 1.684*** (.353)
Co-operation in R&D 0.000 (.008)
Public Financial Support −0.012 (.007)
R&D department 1.573*** (.262)
Competition 0.169*** (.054)
Financing and cost barriers −0.099* (.052)
Knowledge barriers −0.082 (.058)
Market barriers −0.168*** (.052)
Policy and regulations barriers −0.036 (.052)
Observations 1,666
Censored observations
Wald test
1,297
133.34***
Wald test of independence () 36.73***
Log pseudo likelihood −1,176.094
Source: Authors.
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects. *Coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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reveals that whether the firm exported, whether 
the firm had an R&D department, whether the firm 
faced competition, and patent protection appear to 
predict innovation expenditure, while foreign own-
ership, public financial assistance, and cooperation 
on innovation were not predictive. All four barrier 
categories negatively affected innovation expendi-
tures, although once again, only the cost and market 
coefficients were significant. These results suggest 
that, in general, barriers to innovation related to 
financing and cost, knowledge, market, and policy 
and regulation limit a firm’s innovation expenditures. 
Further, since these barriers affect the decision to 
engage in innovation and the intensity, they can be 
considered both revealed (faced during innovation 
activities) and deterring barriers (faced at the start 
of innovation activities). 
The Impact of Innovation Investment on the 
Probability of Technological Innovation 
Table 2.5 illustrates the results for the estimation of 
the knowledge production function for a product 
and process innovation dummy variable that was 
used as the technological innovation output vari-
able. The coefficients reported are the marginal 
effects. 
The results illustrate that Caribbean firms 
that spent more on innovation per employee were 
more likely to introduce product or process inno-
vation. More specifically, as the coefficient on the 
predicted innovation expenditure shows, a unit 
increase in logged innovation expenditure per 
employee increased the probability of technologi-
cal innovation by about 50  percent. In addition, 
firm size increased the probability of technologi-
cal innovation. More specifically, as the size of the 
firm increased, the probability of technological 
innovation rose by about 4 percentage points. The 
innovation barriers related to financing and cost, 
knowledge, and policy and regulation were nega-
tive and significant and therefore reduced the prob-
ability of a product or process innovation. The cost 
barrier dummy variable coefficient was the largest. 
A firm facing cost obstacles was 46  percent less 
likely to introduce a product or process innovation. 
Knowledge barriers reduced product and process 
innovation by 25 percent, while the corresponding 
figure for policy and regulation barriers was 34 per-
cent. The results, in keeping with the literature, 
suggest that cost factors appear to be the most rel-
evant constraint facing firm innovation (Hall, 2002; 
Savignac, 2008). However, the findings also high-
light that, while financial factors are significant hin-
drances, other factors also play a role.
The Impact of Innovation on Productivity 
Finally, Table 2.6 shows the results of the productiv-
ity equation, where the coefficients were reported 
as elasticities or semi-elasticities since the depen-
dent variable was the log of sales per employee. 
The study found that innovation expenditure per 
employee had a positive but not significant impact 
on labor productivity. Of note, none of the four 
TABLE 2.5.  Probability of Technological Innovation  
(TI: Introduction of Product or Process 
Innovation)
IE_p (predicted innovation expenditure 
per employee) 
0.499*** (.046)
Size 0.043*** (.013)
Exporting −0.039 (.036)
Foreign ownership 0.054 (.058)
Financing and cost barriers −0.459*** (.027)
Knowledge barriers −0.254*** (.054)
Market barriers 0.055 (.046)
Policy and regulation barriers −0.345*** (.037)
Observations 1,666
Wald 483.60***
Log pseudo likelihood −468.084
Pseudo R2 0.542
Observed probability 0.304
Predicted probability (values at means) 0.212
Source: Authors.
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level. 
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innovation barriers had a significant impact on 
labor productivity. 
Conclusions
A large number of firms face numerous obstacles 
to innovation. These barriers hinder progress for 
both innovative and potentially innovative firms. 
Revealed barriers impede an innovative firm’s 
achievement of innovation and constrain innova-
tion success, while deterring barriers prevent a 
potentially innovative firm from engaging in inno-
vation activities. These barriers are related to 
financing and cost, market, knowledge, and policy 
and regulation factors. This chapter studied such 
innovation barriers and their impact on innova-
tion and productivity for innovative and poten-
tially innovative firms in 13 Caribbean SIDS using 
Compete Caribbean’s PROTEqIN survey, which was 
completed in 2014. 
The PROTEqIN data indicated that innovation 
is quite low in the Caribbean, as only 26 percent of 
firms surveyed engaged in any sort of innovative 
activity. On a more positive note, however, the data 
also showed that 59 percent of all firms surveyed are 
potentially innovative. These firms are willing to inno-
vate but may not have been successful in doing so 
because they face various barriers. Also, the portion 
of non-innovative firms in the region was quite low 
at 15 percent. Government policy can therefore play 
a key role in helping to reduce innovation failures 
and alleviate barriers to innovation by designing and 
implementing appropriate policies and incentives 
for firms to engage in innovative activity and reduce 
market failures to innovation in the Caribbean. This 
could increase the number of innovative firms and 
the level of innovation, thereby leading to increased 
productivity and growth and development in the 
region. It is also important for a firm’s innovation 
strategy to take into account these obstacles, since 
recognizing the barriers may increase the chances 
of success and the economic pay-off from innova-
tion activities.
The study found that potentially innovative 
firms in the Caribbean experienced higher barriers 
to innovation than innovative firms regardless of 
the type and category of barrier. Specifically, the 
barriers that affected potential innovators much 
more than innovators were: direct public funding 
for innovation (financing and cost); flexibility and 
openness of other companies in the sector to 
collaborative approaches (knowledge); time to 
market (market); and protection against copycats 
(policy and regulation). Therefore, firms in the 
region that have not yet innovated are more likely 
to experience innovation barriers and, perhaps, 
even more so than innovative firms.
The descriptive findings also showed that 
financing and cost were the most significant barriers 
faced by Caribbean firms whether they were 
innovative or potentially innovative. Knowledge 
factors were the next most common innovation 
barrier followed by market barriers, with policy and 
regulation barriers being the obstacles experienced 
least often. Direct public funding was most often 
listed as an important barrier (43  percent of 
innovators and 54 percent of potential innovators). 
Additionally, the PROTEqIN survey specifically 
TABLE 2.6.  The Impact of Innovation on Labor 
Productivity (Y: log sales per employee)
IE_p (predicted innovation 
expenditure per employee) 
0.092 (.116)
Size 0.109*** (.047)
Capital per employee 0.376*** (.054)
Financing and cost barriers −0.103 (.099)
Knowledge barriers 0.085 (.134)
Market barriers 0.107 (.155)
Policy and regulation barriers −0.020 (.102)
Observations 1,666
Wald test 577.98***
R2 0.140
Source: Authors.
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 
replications). The variable used as a proxy for physical capital 
is investment made during the period considered the stock of 
physical capital. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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asked firms to identify any barriers to innovation 
not stated in the questionnaire that were significant 
hindrances. Funding opportunities and human 
capacity were identified as severe barriers. The 
least significant innovation barriers identified in 
the survey were client flexibility and openness 
to new goods or services (innovators 12  percent 
and potential innovators 16  percent) and internal 
remuneration policy and incentive structure 
(innovators 12  percent and potential innovators 
17 percent). The findings of the econometric model 
illustrated that firms that export, firms with an R&D 
department, firms that face competition, firms that 
have patents, and larger firms are more likely to 
decide to carry out innovation activities. 
Financing and cost, knowledge, market, and 
policy and regulation barriers make the deci-
sion to innovate difficult since all the coefficients 
were negative, although only the cost and market 
coefficients were significant. Therefore, this study 
found that, in general, barriers to innovation affect 
both innovative and potentially innovative firms in 
the decision to innovate. The results also showed 
that exporting, competition, and patent protec-
tion affect innovation expenditures, while foreign 
ownership, public financial assistance, and coop-
eration on innovation have no significant effect. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that, in general, 
all four barrier categories negatively affect firm 
innovation expenditures, with the cost and market 
coefficients being significant.
The study found that Caribbean firms that 
spend more on innovation are more likely to intro-
duce a product or process innovation. More spe-
cifically, a unit increase in logged innovation 
expenditure per employee increased the probabil-
ity of technological innovation by about 50  per-
cent. In addition, exporting and firm size increased 
the probability of technological innovation. More 
importantly, cost, knowledge, and policy factors 
reduced the probability of a product or process 
innovation. The cost barrier dummy variable coef-
ficient was the largest, suggesting that cost barri-
ers have the largest negative impact on innovation 
in the region. A firm facing cost obstacles was 
46 percent less likely to introduce a product or pro-
cess innovation. Knowledge barriers reduced prod-
uct and process innovation by 25  percent, while 
the corresponding figure for policy barriers was 
34 percent. Moreover, innovation expenditures had 
a positive but not significant impact on labor pro-
ductivity. Lastly, the four innovation barrier vari-
ables did not appear to have a significant impact 
on labor productivity. 
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Appendix: Variables and Definitions
Technological innovation (TI): Dummy equal to 1 if the firm introduced a product or process innovation.
Expenditures on innovation activities per employee (IE): Firm innovation expenditures divided by the number of employees.
Productivity (Y): Total sales divided by the number of employees.
Firm size (LEM): Number of employees.
Exporter/non-exporter (EX): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm exported.
Foreign ownership (FO): Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign capital was above 10 percent.
Patent protection (PA): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had or had filed for a patent.
R&D department (R&D): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had an R&D department.
Competition (COM): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm faced competition from formal and informal firms.
Co-operation (CO): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm collaborated on innovation.
Public finance (FIN): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm received public financing for innovation activities.
Capital per employee (INV): Firm capital divided by the number of employees.
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Access to Financing and 
Innovation in Caribbean Firms
Diego Morris
Innovation is costly and risky, which makes in-vestments in innovation more demanding of ade-quate and readily available financing (O’Sullivan, 
2006). In support of this hypothesis, Aghion and 
Durlauf (2014) argued that financial development is 
almost exclusively the conduit through which tech-
nological catch up occurs in developing countries. 
As a consequence, it is plausible that productivity 
and subsequent growth is restricted when access 
to financing is constrained. These positions high-
light a clear link between innovation and develop-
ment of the financial sector and, by extension, eco-
nomic growth at the macroeconomic level.1 What is 
not so clear is how this link is reconciled at the mi-
cro-level, especially for small open economies like 
those in the Caribbean.
In particular, from all existing surveys of pri-
vate sector activity in the Caribbean, access to 
financing is perceived by managers as one of the 
top constraints on firm growth. Figure 3.1 clearly 
illustrates the distance from the frontier score (the 
best performing economy) in getting access to 
credit as measured in Doing Business 2016 (World 
Bank, 2016). The figure illustrates that, with the 
exception of Jamaica, which performs very well, 
and Trinidad and Tobago, which performs relatively 
well, all other Caribbean economies are far from the 
frontier. In essence, the figure shows that the best 
performing economy provides firms with access to 
credit at almost three times the rate of the average 
Caribbean country.2
The background study for this chapter looked 
at whether restricted access to financing nega-
tively affects innovation in the region. Specifically, 
it sheds light on this issue based on 13 developing 
countries in the Caribbean by assessing whether 
access to financing significantly affects firm-level 
decisions to innovate.3 To answer this question, 
the study focused on innovation output (process 
and product innovation), which helped to iden-
tify whether credit constraints heterogeneously 
3
1  See Schumpeter (2013), Baumol (2002), and Aghion and 
Durlauf (2014), which illustrate the importance of innovation 
for growth and development.
2  In World Bank (2016), the getting credit index measures the 
strength of credit reporting systems, as well as the effective-
ness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending.
3  Here reference to the Caribbean is characteristic of coun-
tries that are members of the Caribbean community in gen-
eral and, specifically for this study, Antigua and Barbuda, 
the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Grena-
da, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
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affected the decision to implement a particu-
lar type of innovation.4 Further, this separation 
of innovation into different components made it 
possible to make specific comments on the type 
of innovation being pursued. Also, by deductive 
reasoning, it was possible to make some infer-
ences about the relative cost of the types of inno-
vation being pursued in the Caribbean given that 
there was no data to quantify this.
There are many studies on topics related to 
innovation and access to financing in the devel-
oped world. Most of these studies reported that 
constrained access to financing and innovation 
are negatively related. For example, Mohnen et al. 
(2008) pointed out that financial constraints neg-
atively affected research and development (R&D) 
and were a major problem for firms wanting to pur-
sue R&D.
Recent studies using the third Community 
Innovation Survey for the United Kingdom and 
Europe have shown that financial constraints are 
the second greatest constraint to innovating. These 
studies also highlighted that credit constraints 
are a key deterrent to firms deciding to innovate 
and the intensity of innovation (Savignac, 2008). 
Furthermore, financial constraints have been shown 
to be highly complementary to other impediments 
to innovation, such as perceived risk, innovation 
costs, limited skill in the workforce, limited collab-
oration within firms, and general obstacles in the 
business environment (Mohnen and Röller, 2005).
Based on this line of research, the policy pre-
scription is that the modularity in which the obsta-
cle is redressed is important since, if two obstacles 
complement each other, removal of one may atten-
uate the other. As such, there might be less reason 
to remove both at the same time. To be precise, 
Mohnen and Röller (2005) suggested that, when 
it comes to turning non-innovators into innovators, 
it is important to remove obstacles at the same 
time, such as easing access to financing and sup-
porting an innovation ecosystem, or increasing the 
skilled labor force and reducing the regulatory bur-
den. On the contrary, when it comes to increasing 
the amount of innovation, one policy at a time is 
sufficient.
With regard to developing countries, exist-
ing evidence is sparse, and includes only three 
4  Product and process innovations certainly do not cover 
the universe of innovation output, but available data were 
restricted.
FIGURE 3.1. Distance to the Frontier Score for Getting Credit in Caribbean Economies
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published studies that have examined the rela-
tionship between innovation and access to financ-
ing in developing countries. Specifically, Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2012) investi-
gated the role of financing in undertaking inno-
vation among 19,000 firms across 47 developing 
economies. They found that access to external 
financing was associated with greater firm inno-
vation and that having highly educated managers; 
ownership by families, individuals, or managers; 
and exposure to foreign competition were asso-
ciated with greater firm innovation. A noticeable 
shortcoming of this study was that, due to data 
limitations, techniques and approaches to manag-
ing endogeneity were limited.
Similarly, Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 
(2013) used a broad array of sectors and coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States and found that financial con-
straints reduced the ability of domestically owned 
firms to innovate and export, hence retarding their 
ability to catch up technologically. In addition, they 
found that innovative firms were more likely to be 
affected by financial constraints and used instru-
mental variable techniques to identify the impacts 
of such constraints.
With regards to Latin America, Alvarez and Crespi 
(2015), using data on 10,000 Chilean firms in 2007, 
found that being credit constrained significantly and 
negatively affected innovation activity. Subsequent 
to dealing with several econometric problems 
associated with the endogeneity of the credit 
constraint indicator and the binary nature of the 
innovation variable, they also found that financial 
constraints were particularly severe for small firms 
and firms operating in the services sector, and were 
more restrictive when a firm was attempting to 
accumulate intangible assets.
Within this context, the study described in this 
chapter makes some important improvements in 
the analysis as it relates to developing countries. 
Specifically, it is the first study to focus on Small 
Island Developing States, which are known to have 
relatively inefficient input and output markets. So, 
it may be that results and relationships derived 
in the developed world do not hold for these 
economies. These are important understandings 
that may help to improve economic governance in 
policy development.
Further, the data source and variables are 
most closely related to Ayyagari et al. (2012) but 
differ in that the study used a panel dataset that 
employ econometric techniques proven to reduce 
the influence of unobserved firm heterogeneity.
In summary, the results showed that financial 
constraints reduced the propensity of all innovation 
output in Caribbean firms. This negative relation-
ship was robust to various measures of access to 
financing and econometric techniques. Moreover, 
endogeneity is a strong influencer of the relation-
ship between innovation and access to financing, 
and so efforts to reduce its impact are critical when 
estimating this relationship.
Literature Review
The main finding in the existing literature is that 
innovation is a key investment for firms to make 
if they are to achieve higher productivity and 
ultimately long-term viability (Mulkay, Hall, and 
Mairesse, 2001). Studies exploring this relation-
ship have suggested that deliberate R&D leads to 
the discovery of new products and processes that 
ultimately shift the global technological frontier. 
Such studies present a clear link between innova-
tion and national development. A third connect-
ing dimension in this puzzle is the link between 
innovation and access to financing. Ayyagari et al. 
(2012) pointed out that the established connection 
between innovation and national development is 
borne out of its connection to the financial market. 
If innovation cannot be financed, then there is no 
developmental impact to be had from its fruition.
Within this context, Ruprah, Melgarejo, and 
Sierra (2014) suggested that restricted innovation 
might be to blame for the stagnating rates of growth 
in the Caribbean. Nevertheless, firms in the region, 
like the rest of the developing world, are far from 
the technology frontier and their innovative activi-
ties are not well understood (Ruprah et al., 2014). 
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As a means of identifying what is known about 
the relationship between innovation and access to 
financing, the study for this chapter explored the lit-
erature on the determinants of innovation and then 
reviewed existing knowledge about the relationship 
between innovation and access to financing.
Determinants of Innovation Output
Existing theoretical evidence shows that firms 
dedicate a differentiated proportion of resources 
to different types of innovation output (Cohen and 
Klepper, 1996). Nevertheless, empirical studies of 
innovation have been slow to differentiate between 
product and process innovations, focusing pre-
dominantly on product innovation (Hall, 2010). 
Notwithstanding, a few studies have attempted to 
distinguish between firm-level process and prod-
uct innovation. For example, Cabagnols and Le Bas 
(2002) found that horizontal linkages were posi-
tively related to product innovation but not pro-
cess innovation. One significant drawback to this 
analysis was that it investigated only innovating 
firms, without considering non-innovators.
On a broader level, studies that have tried to 
identify the determinants of firm-level innovation 
were more common in academic circles. Mostly, this 
topic has been looked at from an industrial organi-
zation or a business management perspective.
Industrial organization studies have hypothesized 
that the structural features of the industry in which a 
firm operates is the most useful explanatory variable 
for its level of innovation and possible persistence. 
Souitaris (2002) highlighted that analysis of these 
structural features requires researchers to analyze 
the effect of specific industry characteristics on a 
firm’s innovation activities. Some of the most notable 
industry characteristics employed in the literature 
are market opportunities, technology opportunities, 
and appropriability conditions. A particular focus 
has been on the structure of the market from which 
firms derive their input and to which they sell their 
output as possible determinants of innovation. In 
fact, a great deal of attention has been placed on 
issues related to competition. For example, Aghion 
et al. (2005) found that competition and firm entry 
positively influenced innovation in industries that 
were close to the technology frontier. Nevertheless, 
there have been no conclusive results from these 
studies. Specifically, some studies have validated the 
classical Schumpeterian hypothesis, which suggests 
that firms in a monopolistic market structure 
and larger firms tend to have better innovative 
performance, while other studies contradict these 
positions (Schumpeter, 2013).
Business management studies have targeted 
identifying internal characteristics, structures, and 
strategies as determinants of firm-level innovation, 
known widely as the resource-based view. This line 
of research argues that the efficiency of a firm’s 
operation is directly related to the unique blend of 
resources and capacities that it possesses (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). Researchers have evaluated a wide 
array of variables, with the most influential being 
found to be physical and human capital, size, corporate 
ownership, and financial resources (Andersson and 
Loöf, 2009). Recent resource-based research has 
focused on the experience of top managers. Some 
studies have found that, when a firm operates in a 
weak institutional environment, the knowledge about 
institutions acquired by their upper level management 
reduces the riskiness of business decisions.
Innovation and Access to Financing
One very popular driver found in the developed 
world literature is accessible capital. Specifically, 
firms either finance innovation from internal or 
external sources. External sources predominantly 
refer to bank loans or external equity, although some 
evidence suggests that government grants play 
a minor, though not insignificant, role (Czarnitzki, 
Hanel, and Rosa, 2011). Internal sources are mainly 
retained earnings. In their seminal paper, Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) pointed out that, in perfect 
markets, investment decisions are indifferent to 
capital structure. This suggests that, in perfect 
markets, the source of financing does not matter.
Nonetheless, since Arrow (1962) showed that 
the source of financing matters, several studies 
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have illustrated that this is even more true for invest-
ments in innovation. In particular, research has 
highlighted that information asymmetries arise as 
a result of the specificities involved with each inno-
vation project and thus lenders demand a premium 
rate of return. It is these information asymme-
tries, and more broadly the intangible and uncer-
tain nature of most types of innovation, that have 
driven the idea that financial constraints inhibit 
innovation. While internal sources of financing 
have been found to be the first choice to invest in 
innovation, these resources are not inexhaustible. 
As such, there is certainly a threshold above which 
external sources of financing must be called upon 
(Anton and Yao, 2002).
Historically, the relationship between innova-
tion and financial constraints has been evaluated by 
assessing the sensitivity of R&D investment to differ-
ent measures of the financial sector. In this regard, 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) found that internal 
financing had a positive relationship with R&D in high 
tech industries in the United States. Similarly, Mohnen 
et al. (2008) showed that financial constraints nega-
tively affected R&D and were a major problem for 
firms wanting to pursue R&D. Furthermore, finan-
cial constraints have been shown to be highly com-
plementary with other impediments to innovation, 
such as perceived risk, innovation costs, limited skill 
in the workforce, limited collaboration within firms, 
and general obstacles in the business environment 
(Mohnen and Röller, 2005).
As an extension, some recent research 
has looked at the effect of relationship bank-
ing on innovation in Italian manufacturing firms. 
Specifically, Herrera and Minetti (2007) pointed 
out that the longer a firm maintained a customer 
relationship with a particular bank, the higher 
the probability of introducing innovation. They 
also highlighted that this was more acute for 
product innovation. Benfratello, Schiantarelli, 
and Sembenelli (2008) adopted a similar strat-
egy and also found contradictory evidence for 
Italian firms. In particular, they found that bank-
ing development affected the probability of pro-
cess innovation, particularly for small firms, but 
found no robust evidence that it affected product 
innovation.
There are two major differences and contro-
versies related to the existing literature on the rela-
tionship between innovating and financing. The 
first such controversy relates to the proxy used for 
access to financing. Some studies adopted a mea-
sure constructed from perception indexes. Almost 
all of these studies confirmed the negative relation-
ship between innovation and access to financing. 
Some studies adopted a more quantitative mea-
sure of access to financing, using proxies such as 
debt ratios, gearing ratios, and other capital flow 
indicators. A few such studies found no significant 
relationship between financing and innovation.
The second controversy relates to the question 
of whether firms are capital constrained in general 
or specifically constrained for innovation projects. 
Although making this distinction is useful, the study 
did not consider it due to data limitations. Further, 
this was not a major concern given that most of the 
firms in the sample were small and medium sized. 
As such, being financially constrained in general or 
for specific investment projects should not have 
affected management decisions. Essentially, the 
asumption was that small firms treat all investment 
decisions with equal weight or, at least, that inno-
vation may be the last investment choice. So, if a 
firm is constrained from making other investment 
choices, it will also be constrained from investing in 
innovation.
Finally, Alvarez and Crespi (2015) pointed 
out that the next big difference in the existing lit-
erature arises due to the identification challenge 
caused by the fact that access to financing is an 
endogenous variable when related to innovation. 
This is made clear when considering that innova-
tion and access to financing may be determined 
simultaneously. In particular, more innovative firms 
may be less credit constrained because of persis-
tence in innovation and, similarly, less credit con-
strained firms may be more innovative because 
they can invest in innovation. Moreover, the iden-
tification challenge may arise because there are 
specific unobserved characteristics of a firm that 
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drive its relative innovativeness and are also cor-
related with its relationship to capital markets. 
In this regard, panel data allowed for the use of 
econometric techniques that take the time series 
characteristics of innovation into consideration. 
Unfortunately, this kind of data has only been used 
in a few studies in the developed world and not in 
developing countries.
Data and Methodology
Data
Two datasets were used for this analysis: the 
World Bank’s 2010 Latin American and Caribbean 
Enterprise Survey (LACES) and Compete 
Caribbean’s 2014 Productivity, Technology, and 
Innovation (PROTEqIN) survey. They were com-
bined using unique firm identifiers common to 
both surveys. The resulting dataset was an unbal-
anced panel with 4,387 firm-level observations, of 
which 1,539 firms were sampled twice. With the 
exception of Jamaica (618 firms; 14 percent) and 
Trinidad and Tobago (710 firms; 16  percent), the 
surveyed firms were relatively evenly distributed 
across the countries, with about 6 percent of the 
firms in the sample in each country, as shown in 
Table 3.1.
The sample was comprised of more firms in the 
services sector than in the manufacturing sector. 
Specifically, there were 3,364 (77 percent) services 
firms and 1,023 (23 percent) manufacturing firms. 
There was a lot of variation in the legal classifica-
tion of the firms in the sample: 40 (1 percent) pub-
licly listed companies, 1,461 (33 percent) privately 
held limited liability companies, 1,668 (38 percent) 
sole proprietorships, 557 (13 percent) partnerships, 
and 642 (15 percent) limited partnerships.
In terms of size, as shown in Table 3.2, micro-
sized companies (five or less employees) accounted 
for a small proportion of the surveyed firms (7 per-
cent). At the other extreme, there were roughly 
twice this number of large firms (more than 100 
employees). As such, the sample was predominantly 
small- and medium-sized firms (between 20 and 
100 employees), at 79 percent of the usable sample. 
Ruprah et al. (2014) argued that small and medium 
firms are the engines of growth in the Caribbean 
TABLE 3.1. Distribution of Firms by Country
Firms
Total 2010 2014 Manufacturing Services
Antigua and Barbuda 282 151 131 56 221
Bahamas, The 277 150 127 75 202
Barbados 272 150 122 106 166
Belize 273 150 123 107 165
Dominica 276 150 126 50 226
Grenada 282 153 129 45 237
Guyana 285 165 120 100 185
Jamaica 618 376 242 123 494
Saint Lucia 278 150 128 120 158
St. Kitts and Nevis 275 150 125 57 218
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 287 154 133 91 196
Suriname 272 152 120 109 163
Trinidad and Tobago 710 370 340 158 552
Total 4,387 2,421 1,966 1,023 3,364
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN data.
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and thus that understanding their experience as it 
relates to innovation is key to policy development.
Variables
In the study, innovation was represented by two 
dichotomous variables illustrating product and 
process innovation. Product and process innova-
tion were each given the value 1 if a firm’s man-
ager self-reported that the firm had undertaken a 
product or process innovation in the previous three 
fiscal years. Of the 2,767 observations on prod-
uct innovation, 857 (31  percent) firms reported a 
product innovation. Similarly, of the 2,763 observa-
tions on process innovation, 562 (20 percent) firms 
reported a process innovation.
To illustrate the idea of constrained access to 
financing, six questions related to a firm’s finances 
were available from the surveys. Answers to these 
questions were transformed into variables as 
described below:
 • Binary variable A2F1 was constructed based 
on firms’ rankings of access to financing as 
a constraint on their operations on a Likert 
scale ranging from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (severe 
obstacle). Variable A2F1 took the value of 1 if a 
manager self-reported that access to financing 
was an obstacle, and 0 otherwise.
 • Dummy variable A2F2 was constructed based 
on three questions:
1. What proportion of fixed asset purchases 
were financed using the following financ-
ing options: bank loans, savings, retained 
earnings, among others?
2. Did you apply for a loan in the past three 
fiscal years?
3. If no to (2), why? Did not need one, the 
interest rates were too high, collateral 
requirements were too high, among others.
Dummy variable A2F2 took the value 
1 if the firm did not use any bank financing 
for its most recent fixed asset purchase, 
did not apply for a loan, and gave a reason 
other than that they did not need one, and 
0 otherwise.
 • Dummy variable A2F3 was constructed using 
three questions:
1. What proportion of working capital was 
financed using the following financing 
options: bank loans, savings, retained 
earnings, among others?
2. Did you apply for a loan in the past three 
fiscal years?
TABLE 3.2. Innovation Output by Selected Firm Characteristics
Firms Process Product A2F
Micro (5 or less employees) 296 28 50 185
Small (6–19 employees) 1,842 196 287 1,125
Medium (20–99 employees) 1,628 207 336 926
Large (more than 100 employees) 614 131 184 283
Subsidiary 681 141 178 329
Exporter 1,070 201 286 579
Publicly Listed 40 21 24 12
Limited liability company 1,461 222 338 800
Proprietorship 1,668 165 258 1,033
Partnership 557 69 114 322
Limited partnership 642 75 114 341
Other 19 10 9 11
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN data.
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3. If no to (2), why? Did not need one, the 
interest rates were too high, collateral 
requirements were too high, among others.
Dummy variable A2F3 took the value 
1 if the firm did not use any bank financ-
ing for working capital, did not apply for 
a loan, and gave a reason other than that 
they did not need one, and 0 otherwise.
 • Dummy variable A2F4 took the value 1 if the 
firm wanted a loan but did not apply for one, 
and 0 otherwise.
 • Dummy variable A2F5 took the value 1 if the 
firm did not have a line of credit but would 
have liked one, and 0 otherwise.
 • Dummy variable A2F6 took the value 1 if the 
firm did not have an overdraft facility but 
would have liked one, and 0 otherwise.
As a baseline strategy, the study developed a 
six-tier index (A2F) that increased in intensity the 
more categories (A2F1 to A2F6) under which a firm 
qualified as constrained. To be precise, the index took 
a value of 1 if the firm only qualified as credit con-
strained under A2F1, 2 if it qualified under both A2F1 
and A2F2, and so on. The resulting variable had 1,889 
(43 percent) of the firms in the sample categorized 
as unconstrained, thus 57 percent of the firms were 
constrained. This index inevitably had a lot of varia-
tion given the nature of the underlying variables.
A lot of attention has been placed on competition 
as an explanatory factor in innovation (see Aghion et 
al., 2005; Aghion and Durlauf, 2014; and Ayyagari et al., 
2012). Although there is no conclusive evidence from 
this line of research, the study included measures of 
competition in its estimations, though more focus was 
placed on informal competition given the assumed 
large informal private sector in the Caribbean. Similarly, 
it included measures of human capital, size, export 
activity, business climate, and managerial experience 
as highlighted by Cohen and Klepper (1996).
Empirical Strategy and Endogeneity
Uncovering a robust association between credit 
constraints and innovation would be a valuable 
result, but even more desirable would be a causal 
link in this association. In this regard, endogeneity 
issues associated with firm heterogeneity must be 
addressed. As highlighted by Bernard and Jensen 
(1999), firms are heterogeneous in terms of mana-
gerial ability, management effort, entrepreneurial 
orientation, and in the degree to which new tech-
nology is adopted and innovation generated. These 
are definitely features of a firm that may affect 
both innovation activities and outcomes, gener-
ating endogeneity in cross-sectional estimations, 
even after the adoption of sector or even industry 
fixed effects.
The study attempted two alternative strategies. 
First, I took advantage of the panel data structure to 
control for firm heterogeneity bias using firm fixed 
effects.5 Nevertheless, the estimation technique 
(essentially differencing the data) would not control 
time variant, unobserved firm heterogeneity. This is 
of particular concern given that the period of analy-
sis spanned a rather prolonged recessionary period 
for the region (2008–2014) that was marked by high 
debt and a heterogeneous business environment 
across the surveyed countries. To try to minimize 
any such influence, the study employed time fixed 
effects in all of its estimations. Even after this, it was 
not certain whether the results were not biased by 
time variant unobserved factors. However, this esti-
mation was considered to be a credible first step in 
deciphering the nature of the relationship between 
innovation and access to financing.
Hence, as a formal representation of the esti-
mations, the study specified the model as follows:
Sit = A2Fit
' + Sizeit
' + Skillit
' +Websiteit
' +
Experienceit
' +Competitionit
' + Exportit
' +
Regulationit
' + i + i + it
where i indexes firms such that i = 1,...,N and t indexes 
time (t = 2010,2014). In Equation 1, Sit is innovation 
5  The study also, in unreported results, used the random ef-
fects estimator and performed a Hausman test to see which 
estimator was best for completeness. In all relevant cases, 
the test confirmed that the fixed effects estimator was best.
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outcome (process or product innovation) and A2F 
is access to financing as described earlier. The other 
variables included in the model were size, propor-
tion of skilled workers in the workforce, ownership 
of a website, senior manager’s years of managerial 
experience in the sector, extent of informal com-
petition in markets, export intensity, and impact of 
government regulations that could potentially influ-
ence innovation outcome. Similarly, 
Sit = A2Fit
' β+Sizeit' ϕ+Skillit' δ+Websiteit' φ+
Experienceit
' ϒ+Competitionit' θ+Exportit' γ+
Regulationit
' ψ+αi+ τi+ εit is a firm fixed 
effect, 
Sit = A2Fit
' β+Sizeit' ϕ+Skillit' δ+Websiteit' φ+
Experienceit
' ϒ+Competitionit' θ+Export t' γ+
Regulationit
' ψ+αi+ τi+ εit is a time fixed effect, and 
Sit = A2Fit
' β+Sizeit' ϕ Skillit' δ+Websiteit' φ+
Experienceit
' ϒ+Competitionit' θ+Exportit' γ+
Regulationit
' ψ+αi+ τi+ εit  is a result-
ing error term with the usual properties. The base-
line model was estimated using a linear probability 
model to exploit firm fixed effects.6
A limitation of the above strategy is that, if 
there are variables not included in the model (unob-
servables) that vary over time and are correlated 
with A2F, the coefficient on A2F will be biased and 
inconsistent, since in such case:
E(∈itx, w) ≠ 0
where, for simplicity, the study used x to represent 
all observed covariates in Equation 1 and w is an 
unobserved variable.
Further, if A2F was imprecisely measured or 
simultaneously determined with the decision to 
innovate, it was assumed to be endogenous and 
thus the estimates were biased. To assess the extent 
of this being an issue and to some extent address 
the problems caused by it, the study employed an 
instrumental variables technique.7 This technique 
is based on the fact that most commercial bank 
loans in the Caribbean are backed by collateral of 
over 100 percent of the loan value. Further, Pagés 
(2010) pointed out that fixed assets (land, build-
ings, and equipment) dominate as the collateral 
of choice for bank loans. This is even more notice-
able in the Caribbean, where on average collateral 
requirements exceed 180  percent (Ruprah et al., 
2014). Within this context, the data sample made it 
possible to obtain an estimate of the approximate 
value of land owned by the firm, which was used as 
an instrument for access to financing. The rationale 
was that this asset should have a strong influence 
on innovation but only through its impact on the 
firm’s ability to access capital, either internally or 
externally.
To be precise, the higher the value of land held 
by a firm, the less likely the firm would be con-
strained financially. As a further attempt to clean 
this variable, the study used the lagged value of 
land. Essentially, the assumption was that this 
instrument was not correlated with error process 
in a regression on innovation output but was nega-
tively correlated with constrained access to financ-
ing. For this reason, the value of existing material 
was not included since process innovation is highly 
correlated with material acquisition (Alvarez and 
Crespi, 2015).8 While it was possible to test the cor-
relation between lagged land value and access to 
financing (its validity is discussed later in the chap-
ter), it was not possible to test for the correlation 
with the error process.
To examine if the results were robust to biases, 
the study undertook an instrumental variables 
strategy according to the following reduced form 
regression:
A2Fi = 0 + Landit-1
'
1 + i
6  The limitations of the linear probability model are that re-
sulting predicted values may be outside the [0,1] interval and 
a violation of homoskedasticity. As noted by Wooldridge 
(2012), these limitations are overstated since using robust 
standard errors solves the heteroskedasticity problem, and 
the occurrence of the predicted values outside [0,1] inter-
vals in simulations does not seem to pose a big problem. 
In this study, less than 3 percent of such occurrences were 
recorded.
7  Wooldridge (2012) noted that, unlike the fixed effects esti-
mator, instrumental variables methods do not rely on strict 
exogeneity of the inputs for consistent estimation. Further, 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) pointed out that, to achieve 
consistency of the instrumental variables estimator, three 
requirements have to be met. First, instruments need to be 
correlated with the endogenous regressors (in this case ac-
cess to financing). Second, the instruments should not form 
part of the model directly or, more precisely, should not be 
related to the dependent variable other than through its in-
fluence on the endogenous independent variable. Finally, 
the instruments cannot be correlated with the error term.
8  A more appropriate instrument here would be the value of 
land not used in the production process; however, the data-
set did not make it possible to make this distinction.
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where Landit−1 is the estimated value of land owned 
by the firm in the last period. The predicted values 
from this regression were then used as an instru-
ment for A2F in Equation 1.
Results
The main results are presented in Tables  3.3 and 
3.4. This is only the third study on this topic in 
developing countries. Despite advances, there 
remains a myriad of challenges with data collec-
tion and reporting in the developing world that 
must be overcome before endogeneity can be con-
trolled sufficiently in firm-level studies. Specifically, 
the dataset contained a total of 4,387 observa-
tions, with many missing observations related to 
variables for access to financing. Also, there were 
many missing observations that did not allow for 
adequate data transformation, such as the gearing 
ratio and financial debt. In particular, information 
on sales, the monetary value of collateral, liabili-
ties, costs, and profitability, among others, are very 
rarely reported, thus making it difficult to identify 
instruments for access to financing. As such, and 
being mindful of multi-collinearity issues, the rela-
tionship for product and process innovations were 
estimated independently. It is crucial to exercise 
caution with strict interpretation of magnitudes as 
we documented significant variability in the eight 
regressions related to each dependent variable.
Nevertheless, both Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present 
eight columns of numbers. Column 1 is the baseline 
model, which differs from the next six only in how 
the A2F variable was constructed. In this model, 
A2F is an index that increased in intensity depend-
ing on the number of ways that a firm was identified 
as credit constrained. The next six columns dissect 
the index into its individual components and re-esti-
mate the model accordingly. All these models were 
estimated using a linear probability model corre-
sponding to Equation 1. The final column (Column 
8) was estimated after implementing the previ-
ously described instrumental variables approach. 
Table  3.5 shows that the correlation between the 
A2F measures and land value was relatively small, 
indicating a weak instrument problem, but this was 
the best attempt to find an available instrument 
from the existing dataset. A more precise instru-
ment would be the value of collateral not used in 
the production process; however, such information 
was not available within the dataset. Further, given 
that the model was exactly identified (one instru-
ment for one endogenous variable), it is not pos-
sible to confirm the validity of this instrument with 
formal tests. For these reasons, the study adopted 
this strategy as a comparative check.
Consistent with Alvarez and Crespi (2015), the 
study removed those firms in the dataset that did 
not report being credit constrained using any of 
the measures and at the same time did not inno-
vate. The rationale for this strategy was that only 
those firms that try to innovate discover that they 
are constrained in obtaining innovation financ-
ing. There were just over 5 percent of firms that fit 
this description. As illustrated in the tables, there 
was strong evidence that innovation and access to 
financing were negatively related, which is consis-
tent with earlier work (Hall, 2010; Savignac, 2008; 
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013; Mohnen et al., 
2008; Alvarez and Crespi, 2015). In particular, firms 
that were credit constrained were significantly less 
likely to innovate with magnitudes larger for pro-
cess innovation than product innovation. A poten-
tial justification for this, as suggested by Alvarez 
and Crespi (2015), is that process innovation is 
strongly related to purchasing machines and equip-
ment—fixed assets that can be repossessed by 
banks in the event of default on debt. An interest-
ing observation is that the coefficient on the index 
for A2F (column 1) is a lower bound on the magni-
tudes reported and an upper bound on the instru-
ment (column 8). This finding is not surprising from 
two perspectives.
First, the coefficient on A2F is consistent with 
that found in previous research, specifically Alvarez 
and Crespi (2015), as it relates to magnitudes. In 
their study, Alvarez and Crespi (2015) found magni-
tudes related to process and product innovation of 
0.038 and 0.119, respectively. Second, as indicated 
earlier, the instrument may be weak, inducing an 
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upward bias in the coefficient. Nevertheless, the 
focus on the direction of the relationship and, thus, 
the indication of a negative relationship is some 
justification for persistence with an instrumental 
variable strategy.
Among the other variables that exerted a sig-
nificant effect on innovation in the study, there 
was some evidence that increasing the proportion 
of skilled workers increased the likelihood of both 
process and product innovation. The more severe 
the competition from informal firms, the less likely a 
firm would, on average, innovate. Further, firms that 
adopted basic information communication technol-
ogies, in this case having or using a website, were 
TABLE 3.3. Estimation Results with Product Innovation as the Dependent Variable
(1)
product1
(2)
product2
(3)
product3
(4)
product4
(5)
product5
(6)
product6
(7)
product7
(8)
product
A2F –0.096** –0.531*** –0.521*** –0.361*** –0.355*** –0.460*** –0.697*** –1.136***
(0.043) (0.059) (0.107) (0.079) (0.055) (0.065) (0.098) (0.299)
size 0.052 0.035 0.005 0.070 0.091** 0.069 0.067 0.006
(0.045) (0.048) (0.032) (0.060) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.016)
skill 0.449*** 0.409*** –0.043 0.202 0.381*** 0.377*** 0.107 0.357***
(0.131) (0.143) (0.101) (0.142) (0.130) (0.136) (0.102) (0.122)
website 0.115* 0.194*** –0.001 0.099* 0.085 0.018 0.069 –0.032
(0.066) (0.066) (0.049) (0.055) (0.068) (0.063) (0.048) (0.034)
man_experience 0.002 0.000 0.002 –0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 –0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
informal_competition –0.110* –0.027 –0.134** –0.030 –0.073 –0.101 –0.071* –0.015
(0.063) (0.058) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.089) (0.042) (0.030)
export_intensity 0.002 –0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 –0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
gov_reg –0.009* –0.010*** –0.000 –0.007 –0.010* –0.004 0.007 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
time 0.229*** 0.185*** –0.013 0.101* 0.212*** 0.171*** 0.023 –0.097
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.055) (0.041) (0.054) (0.036) (0.084)
_cons 0.054 0.564*** 1.013*** 0.551*** 0.189 0.502*** 0.644*** 0.743***
(0.172) (0.185) (0.144) (0.211) (0.161) (0.192) (0.187) (0.194)
N 2,463 1,925 890 1,129 2,179 1,700 1,015 2,464
R-squared 0.132 0.259 0.598 0.316 0.231 0.418 0.677 –1.292
F 6.065 16.396 5.240 4.590 12.590 15.846 14.744 7.829
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 
percent level.
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process innovation, albeit only marginally. A pos-
sible reason for this is that more experienced man-
agers are less affected by asymmetric information 
problems and, since process innovation is so closely 
related to acquiring fixed assets, are more likely to 
invest in process innovation. On the contrary, firms 
that consider government regulations burdensome 
more likely, on average, to innovate. Nevertheless, 
there was at least one noticeable difference in the 
drivers of process and product innovation based 
on the study’s estimations. In particular, managerial 
experience had no effect on the likelihood that a 
firm introduced a new product or service but posi-
tively influenced the likelihood that it engaged in 
TABLE 3.4. Estimation Results with Process Innovation as the Dependent Variable
(1)
process1
(2)
process2
(3)
process3
(4)
process4
(5)
process5
(6)
process6
(7)
process7
(8)
process
A2F –0.165*** –0.747*** –0.746*** –0.649*** –0.637*** –0.798*** –0.662*** –1.517***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.101) (0.091) (0.062) (0.062) (0.118) (0.341)
size –0.041 –0.018 –0.002 –0.058 –0.027 –0.095* –0.028 –0.027
(0.038) (0.044) (0.055) (0.088) (0.037) (0.050) (0.040) (0.018)
skill 0.394*** 0.208 0.288* 0.433** 0.478*** 0.156 0.207 0.513***
(0.122) (0.128) (0.152) (0.217) (0.137) (0.157) (0.174) (0.140)
website 0.192*** 0.176** –0.043 0.091 0.126* 0.079 0.000 –0.038
(0.074) (0.071) (0.059) (0.104) (0.070) (0.071) (0.066) (0.039)
man_experience 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.004 –0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.009*** –0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
informal_competition –0.197*** –0.075 –0.036 –0.039 –0.195*** –0.152** 0.132 –0.077**
(0.063) (0.068) (0.089) (0.110) (0.067) (0.061) (0.123) (0.035)
export_intensity –0.000 –0.001 –0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 –0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
gov_reg –0.003 –0.006 0.008 –0.003 –0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
time 0.084** 0.059* 0.024 0.080 0.087** 0.035 –0.037 –0.337***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.070) (0.039) (0.045) (0.051) (0.096)
_cons 0.202 0.773*** 0.882*** 0.956*** 0.619*** 1.220*** 0.732*** 0.989***
(0.141) (0.149) (0.211) (0.327) (0.150) (0.193) (0.171) (0.221)
N 2,431 1,813 630 899 2,114 1,546 758 2,460
R-squared 0.153 0.418 0.730 0.427 0.314 0.600 0.635 –3.159
F 9.861 38.358 15.022 6.451 19.272 40.505 6.621 3.580
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 
percent level.
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are less likely to undertake product innovation, but 
there is no such evidence for process innovation.
Policy Implications
The results suggest several policy implications to 
enhance innovation in the Caribbean region. Study 
results indicate that, overall, credit constraints 
retard innovation and thus policy efforts can be 
generalized. In this regard, policy options that 
increase private sector credit will likely have a spill-
over effect on innovation outcomes. Further, with 
regards to debt financing, since most loans in the 
region must be collateralized with fixed assets, pol-
icies that help to reduce the risk profile and allow 
the use of moveable assets should be enhanced. As 
an alternative or complimentary approach, greater 
effort is needed to introduce new ways of financ-
ing investments in general, and for innovation in 
particular. Investment options could include peer-
to-peer lending and crowd-funding, while not com-
promising risk management.
Similarly, governments across the region, 
being mindful of the high levels of public debt, 
should explore public sector funding options for 
highly innovative projects that have higher levels of 
risk, as these projects are most likely to suffer from 
asymmetric information problems and may not be 
funded by the financial sector.
Further, while not a direct finding of this study, 
there needs to be greater emphasis on increasing 
equity-related capital as an alternative for financ-
ing innovation in the region. Some studies have 
identified that equity financing is much more con-
cerned with the overall value of the business model, 
which reduces the focus on collateral, and cash 
flow related indicators when evaluating projects 
(Savignac, 2008). Governments have a key role to 
play in this regard by providing the regulatory envi-
ronment and institutional infrastructure to enable 
and develop the equity market in the region.
As regards those factors that have an effect 
on the decision to innovate, the other significant 
variables in this study provide some interesting 
TABLE 3.5. Correlation Matrix
Process Product A2F Size Skill Website
Managerial 
experience
Informal 
competition
Export 
intensity 
Government 
regulations Land
Process 1
Product 0.3166 1
A2F –0.0802 –0.0566 1
Size 0.0479 0.1082 –0.0907 1
Skill 0.0615 0.0674 –0.0309 0.0743 1
Website 0.0664 0.0446 –0.077 0.2426 –0.052 1
Managerial 
experience
0.0613 0.0733 –0.0369 0.1118 0.047 0.1118 1
Informal 
competition
–0.0531 –0.0136 0.0496 –0.0498 –0.044 –0.0516 0.0518 1
Export intensity 0.0178 0.0378 –0.0232 0.1374 0.0293 0.119 0.0002 –0.1576 1
Government 
regulations
0.0329 0.0491 0.0055 0.0731 0.0777 0.0693 0.0727 0.0617 0.0055 1
Land 0.165 0.1631 –0.1135 0.1917 0.039 0.0453 0.0566 0.0433 –0.0651 0.0229 1
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insights into the heterogeneous effect of other 
market and firm-level characteristics on innovation. 
For instance, the higher the proportion of skilled 
workers in a firm, the more likely the firm under-
took innovation. Thus, policies that stimulate job 
training and skills upgrading may be very beneficial 
to firms that are considering innovating.
Similarly, the higher the number of informal 
competitors, the less likely a firm innovated. This is 
probably a result of the high sunk costs of innovat-
ing. When firms accept the sunk costs, competitors 
can imitate the innovation at a significantly lower 
investment. In an environment where an informal 
firm operates at a lower cost margin than a formal 
firm to begin with, it is not difficult to understand 
why formal firms would not innovate. In this regard, 
governments should push policies that encourage 
firms to formalize and create an enabling environ-
ment for firms to grow.
The results point to some crucial areas for 
future research. First, given the significant policy 
implications of this issue, it is important to expand 
the dataset to examine the extent to which these 
results are robust. Such a data expansion should 
account for internal funds for investing on inno-
vation, which would give greater insight about 
how firms are financing innovation in the region. 
Similarly, a differentiation of financial constraints 
for innovation as opposed to other investments 
would allow a more detailed analysis of the link 
between innovation and credit restrictions.
Second, future data collection may greatly 
benefit researchers and policymakers by intro-
ducing an element that would allow analysis to 
be consistent with the ideal experiment sug-
gested by Hall (2010). In this modification, firms 
should be asked how they would spend addi-
tional funds amounting to 10 percent of the pre-
vious year’s turnover. Responses to this type of 
question would allow researchers to categorically 
estimate various econometric models related to 
firm-level investment studies. As it relates to this 
study, these responses would have made it pos-
sible to better categorize credit constrained firms 
that want to innovate and, therefore, have made it 
possible to conduct a more rigorous examination 
of the relationship.
Third, it is also important to extend this analy-
sis to other developing countries to understand the 
extent to which the results are generalizable.
Finally, from a policy development perspec-
tive, it is vital to understand the importance of these 
findings on firm performance (e.g.,  sales growth, 
productivity, employment growth, and survival).
Conclusions
The existing economic thought is almost unani-
mous in its acceptance that innovation is an 
essential driving force for firm-level productivity, 
competitiveness, and economic growth, and ulti-
mately development. The source and availability 
of financing is important for innovation in so far 
as it affects the decision to undertake and sustain-
ably pay for innovation activities. Albeit, financ-
ing constraints may not affect all firms in the same 
way and to the same extent since the decision to 
innovate may be made after knowledge about the 
source of financing is already determined. Further, 
existing empirical evidence shows that highly inno-
vative firms tend to have higher levels of intangi-
ble assets that are not very attractive as collateral 
in traditional banking (Hall, 2010). Consequently, 
both policymakers and industry leaders need to 
know if and to what extent financing constraints 
reduce investments in innovation. This chapter has 
shed some light on this issue for firms operating in 
the Caribbean.
Using an unbalanced panel dataset with 4,387 
firms, the results, after controlling for endogeneity, 
unambiguously confirm that financial constraints 
retard innovative propensity. The evidence compli-
ments earlier findings and extends them in several 
dimensions. Moreover, endogeneity is a major influ-
encer of this relationship. Specifically, the failure to 
address it adequately could lead to the counterin-
tuitive argument that firms with restricted access 
to financing innovate more than other firms.
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Productivity growth is essential for sustained economic development. While in the short run it may be possible to achieve econom-
ic growth by incorporating previously underem-
ployed factors of production, it is necessary to in-
crease output per unit of input over the long or even 
middle horizons. Krugman (1994:13) stated that: 
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it 
is almost everything. A country’s ability to improve 
its standard of living over time depends almost en-
tirely on its ability to raise its output per worker.”
In this way, a whole literature has developed 
to search for the main determinants of productiv-
ity. One factor that has received much attention is 
innovation. Overall, empirical literature shows that 
innovation leads to higher productivity, especially 
product innovation, as evidenced in the empirical 
surveys of Hall (2011) and Hall and Mohnen (2013). 
Although innovation is crucial for productivity 
growth, the main channels for innovation improve-
ments are still not fully evidenced in the literature. A 
relatively recent and promising avenue of research 
focuses on the effects of competition. 
For a long time, economists believed in a nega-
tive relationship between productivity and compe-
tition based on the Schumpeterian effect, where 
competition dissipates ex post economic rents, 
thus discouraging innovative efforts. This theo-
retical result has, nonetheless, been at odds with 
many empirical studies, such as Blundell, Griffith, 
and van Reenen (1999), who focused on manufac-
turing firms in England; Schmitz (2005), who ana-
lyzed the US and Canadian Iron Ore Industries; and 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006), who stud-
ied the United States retail trade sector. Building 
on the insights of these previous results, Aghion 
et al. (2005) constructed a model with a positive 
“escape competition” effect besides the negative 
Schumpeterian effect, where firms in neck-and-
neck industries try to innovate to differentiate 
themselves from their rivals and to increase their 
margins, profits, and market share. The net impact 
of competition on the rate of innovation depends 
on the interaction of these two effects, which argu-
ably depends endogenously on the initial degree 
of competition in the industry: more competition 
fosters innovation when the initial level of com-
petition is low, but the opposite occurs when the 
initial level of competition is high. Thus Aghion et 
al. (2005) derived an important theoretical result, 
which is tested empirically: competition and innova-
tion relate in the form of an inverted-U.
4
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Following Aghion et al. (2005), many papers 
have tested whether this inverted-U relationship 
could be corroborated (see Literature Review). But 
most of these studies are based on firm-level data 
from developed countries, and finding channels to 
improve productivity are most valuable to devel-
oping countries.1 
This chapter attempts to address these questions 
using firm-level data from the Caribbean. Innovation 
in the developing world is scant and in small coun-
tries, like the Caribe, is even more rare. Thus, inves-
tigating how competition might impact innovation in 
this region could provide evidence of the effects of 
competition on innovation in other small developing 
countries. Moreover, there are at least two different 
types of competition in the developing world: for-
mal and informal. Thus, we investigate how these two 
forms of competition are related to innovation. 
The results back up the literature by showing 
an inverted-U shape relationship, especially when 
looking at informal competition. These results 
have important implications for public policy. For 
instance, knowing which sectors are in the ascend-
ing part of the U and which are in the descending 
part could play a crucial role in designing appropri-
ate regulations and policies to support competition.
Literature Review
Competition has long been identified as an impor-
tant mechanism for productivity. Ahn (2002) 
showed that its effects are mainly felt in three 
ways: static incentives, selection, and innovation. 
Static incentives occur when rents in a monopolis-
tic firm are partially captured by managers and/or 
workers and thus competition can discipline these 
agents and improve efficiency. For instance, com-
petition may improve the chances of bankruptcy 
and so induce greater effort. The selection chan-
nel involves better allocation of resources. When 
competition increases, technologically advantaged 
or better managed firms displace firms with inferior 
technology or substandard management. 
The third component, innovation, is particu-
larly important for productivity growth but is one 
where the impact of competition seems unclear. 
In fact, many theories have predicted a negative 
effect of competition on innovation, the rationale 
being ex post, where some degree of expected 
market power is necessary to provide incentives 
for innovators (the Schumpeterian effect), or ex 
ante, where rents obtained in concentrated mar-
kets are useful to finance innovations in a world of 
incomplete capital markets. But the empirical liter-
ature had been at odds with this result, identifying 
positive effects of competition as in Nickell (1996) 
or non-linear relations like Scherer (1967).
A hypothesis that has received much empirical 
support recently is the inverted-U shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation. 
A rationalization for this relationship was provided 
by Aghion et al. (2005).2 In their model, industries 
can be levelled, with a low technological spread, 
or unlevelled, with a high technological spread. 
A levelled industry may become unlevelled if 
one of the neck-and-neck firms innovates. The 
reverse could occur if a laggard firm innovates, 
assuming there is a technological distance of at 
most one degree between firms, so leaders have 
no incentive to innovate. Thus, competition induces 
innovation in levelled industries, where each 
1  One example of a study of a developing country is Aghion, 
Braun, and Fedderke (2008), who investigated South Africa.
2  There are other models that can explain the inverted-U 
relationship between competition and innovation. For in-
stance, in Rauch (2008), the rationale for the decreasing 
part of the inverted-U is the same Schumpeterian effect as 
Aghion et al. (2005), but the increasing part is explained 
by a business stealing argument. If competition means more 
substitutability in a differentiated market, the more substi-
tutability there is, the more the incentive to reduce price—
reducing costs of producing by process innovation—and 
increase market share. Another example is Vives (2008), 
where the increase in the number of competitors in an in-
dustry lowers the residual demand for each firm (inhibit-
ing innovation) but increases the elasticity of the residual 
demand (stimulating innovation). Most oligopolistic models 
show that the first effect tends to predominate, but the sec-
ond one gains importance when non-innovating firms go 
bankrupt and there are termination costs. In this way, the 
elasticity effect may initially be predominant and become 
dominated only when the number of firms grows very large, 
generating the inverted-U relationship.
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firm has the incentive to differentiate itself, but 
inhibits innovation in unlevelled industries, where 
competition reduces rents for laggard innovative 
firms (the traditional Schumpeterian effect). 
But with a low initial degree of competition, 
industries should be levelled, since there are rents 
to stimulate innovation by laggards and not much 
pressure for competitive firms to differentiate from 
each other. So an increase in competition should 
induce more innovation in the aggregate. By a sim-
ilar rationale, when competition is originally high, 
industries should be unlevelled—low rents would 
stimulate innovation by laggards and put pressure 
on competitive firms to differentiate themselves 
from the competition. So, in the aggregate, an 
increase in competition would induce less innova-
tion. In this way, the model generates an inverted-
U relationship between competition and innovation 
by a composition effect between levelled and 
unlevelled industries.
A first-order difficulty in testing this conjec-
ture is how to properly measure competition and 
innovation. For innovation, there are problems with 
output measures. For example, with regards to pat-
ents, it is usually difficult to assess the economic 
importance of each one, and many innovations 
are non-patented. There are also challenges with 
measuring input measures. For instance, measures 
of research and development (R&D) may be dis-
torted given tax incentives and the flexibility avail-
able in classifying many expenditures as R&D costs. 
Although both measures can be challenging, input 
measures seem more appropriate since competi-
tion primarily affects the incentive to innovate, not 
the degree of success.
The main problem, however, seems to be finding 
a good proxy for competition, as shown by Ahn 
(2002); Boone, van Ours, and van der Wiel (2007); 
and Holmes and Schmitz (2010). The measures 
typically used are market concentration measures, 
such as the Herfindahl Index, price cost margins 
(PCMs), and import penetration. But each of these 
has serious disadvantages. Concentration and import 
penetration measures may be misleading in the 
presence of potential entrants. For instance, a highly 
concentrated market may behave competitively if 
the exercise of market power stimulates entry. In the 
same way, a poorly concentrated market may not be 
competitive or sustained by dysfunctional market 
regulations. So, as competition increases, there may 
be an increase in concentration, as the strongest 
firms increase their market share. This is typically the 
case with the entrance of a large competitor, such 
as Wal-Mart, in a particular location where initially 
many small firms prevailed. As for PCMs, since costs 
may change for reasons other than competition, 
changes in this measure may not be indicative 
of competitive pressures. Even if these spurious 
changes in costs can be controlled for, other caveats 
remain. In a low competition environment, such as a 
monopoly, workers may benefit from higher rents, 
so when competition increases, profits might remain 
the same while the benefit to workers declines. 
There is also a problem of composition because 
when competition increases and strong firms (which 
should have higher PCMs) displace weak ones and 
so increase their weight in the industry, the industry-
level PMC may rise accordingly. Besides, as marginal 
costs are generally unknown, PCMs are constructed 
as the ratio of sales minus costs over sales, and 
capital cost measures are usually hard to obtain. 
These shortcomings are just some examples of why 
these measures might not properly represent the 
degree of competition. 
Bearing in mind these challenges, Boone et al. 
(2007) proposed a different measure of the degree 
of competition that overcomes most of these criti-
cisms: profit elasticity (PE). Estimated at the sec-
tor level, PE is defined as the percentage decline in 
profits due to a percentage increase in costs. The 
idea is that, the more competition increases, the 
more a firm is punished for being inefficient. The 
main conclusion of Boone et al. (2007) was that, 
although PE is not a perfect measure of competi-
tion, in highly concentrated markets, where public 
policy is particularly welcomed, PE tends to point 
in the right direction, whereas PCMs can increase 
with more intense competition.
Despite these problems, a large empirical liter-
ature has developed to corroborate the inverted-U 
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relationship between competition and innovation. 
Although there have been some exceptions,3 most of 
the literature supports the hypothesis. One of the first 
tests was the seminal paper by Aghion et al. (2005), 
who showed an inverted-U relationship between 
innovation (measured by patents weighted by cita-
tions) and competition (measured as 1−PCMs, with 
PCMs computed as operating profits minus finan-
cial costs over sales) at the industry level. Results 
remained when competition was instrumented to 
control for possible endogeneity problems. 
Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2004) focused 
on firms in transition economies to overcome the 
difficulty in ascertaining if variations in innovations 
were due to differences in the responsiveness to 
opportunities or differences in opportunities per 
se. Firms in these economies should simultaneously 
face opportunities and be under pressure to escape 
from inherited structures from a command economy. 
The main result showed an inverted-U relationship 
between firm growth and competition, measured as 
the number of competitors reported by the firm.
More recently, Tingvall and Karpaty (2011) 
tested the inverted-U hypothesis, focusing on 
Swedish firm-level data from the services sector. 
To measure competition, they used the Herfindahl 
Index and PE. Their results pointed to an inverted-
U relationship between innovation (R&D) and com-
petition, although there were some exceptions. The 
relationship was not valid for non-exporting firms 
and, when R&D was disaggregated, the relation-
ship was valid for intramural R&D and training, but 
not for extramural (outsourced) R&D.
Drawing on firm- and industry-level data 
from the Netherlands, Polder, and Veldhuizen 
(2012) used investment in R&D over value 
added as their measure of innovation, and 1−
PCM (at the micro and macro levels) and PE as 
proxies for competition. They found a consistent 
inverted-U relationship between innovation and 
competition, especially when using PE, the most 
indicative measure of competition. Two other 
results are worth mentioning. First, the majority of 
observations were concentrated in the ascending 
part of the inverted-U, indicating that, for most 
industries, competition is favorable to innovation. 
Second, Polder and Veldhuizen (2012) specifically 
tested, and found support for, the hypothesis that 
the marginal effect of competition changes from 
positive to negative as the technological spread 
in the industry increases. This corroborates the 
specific mechanism of the inverted-U relationship 
proposed by Aghion et al. (2005) (see footnote 2). 
Hashmi (2013), using the same competition 
measure as Aghion et al. (2005), showed that the 
inverted-U relationship obtained for UK firms was 
not preserved when a much larger dataset of pub-
licly listed United States manufacturing firms was 
considered. In that case, there was a negative effect 
of competition over innovation. Hashmi (2013) 
extended the Aghion et al. (2005) model, relaxing 
the assumption that the maximum technological 
gap between the leader and laggard in any industry 
could be only one step. He argued that both results 
can be explained in the modified model when the 
greater technology spread in the United States is 
considered. In that case, the relationship was neg-
ative, which is consistent with the Aghion et al. 
(2005) idea that competition discourages innova-
tion in unlevelled industries.
Methodology
This study investigated how competition affects 
innovation using firm-level data. According to the 
literature, innovation can be classified as inputs 
and outputs. Expenditures on R&D or any aspect 
of a business that might lead to innovation, such 
as acquisition of machinery, are considered inno-
vation inputs. As evidenced in Crespi and Zuñiga 
(2012), expenditures on innovation as a whole are 
much more relevant than just R&D in developing 
countries because firms in these countries tend to 
3  Using the same data as Aghion et al. (2005), Correa (2012) 
found a positive relationship between innovation and com-
petition from 1973 to 1982 and no statistically significant in-
novation–competition relationship from 1983 to 1994. Cor-
rea (2012) argued that a structural break in the early 1980s 
was the reason for the inverted-U relationship found by 
Aghion et al. (2005).
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adopt existing technologies rather than cutting-
edge technologies. Innovation inputs may or may 
not lead to innovation outcomes, such as a new 
product or process. Innovation outcomes are rep-
resented by whether there is an innovative product 
and/or process and the percentage of new prod-
ucts in a firm’s sales. 
This chapter focuses on innovation input as 
measured by how much a firm spends on innova-
tion, which consists of expenditures on R&D and 
on acquisition of machinery. Aghion et al. (2005) 
based their empirical investigation on the number 
of patents as a measure of innovation, but that mea-
sure has been criticized in the literature. Boldrin et 
al. (2011), for instance, argued that patents do not 
promote innovation, but rather retard it. Therefore, 
how much a firm spends on innovation might bet-
ter represent innovation efforts. 
As mentioned previously, empirical literature 
suggests that competition is positively correlated 
with innovation. Yet previous theoretical models and 
recent evidence have questioned whether innova-
tion might be negatively related to innovation after 
a certain level of competition. This study followed 
the hypothesis that competition has an inverted-U 
relationship with innovation, as evidenced in the lit-
erature review. In summary, the basic econometric 
specification took the following form:
Yit = a + b.Xit + c.X
2
it + d.Zit + eit (1)
where Y is innovation, X is competition, Z is a vec-
tor of controls, i is the firm, and t is time.
In this empirical model, the validation of the 
inverted-U relationship theory requires b > 0 and c 
< 0. Moreover, if results confirm this pattern, innova-
tion begins to be negatively related to competition 
when competition reaches the value −b/2c. This 
may provide valuable information for public policy 
regarding regulating competition in the countries 
studied, which may constitute an important stimu-
lus for innovation and productivity growth.
In the study’s dataset, only a few firms invested 
in innovation, which led to a considerable number 
of zeros in the dependent variable. This limitation 
made it necessary to use techniques other than ordi-
nary least squares (OLS). A Tobit model censored 
at zero was the alternative to deal with this short-
coming. The dataset also provided an advantage 
over other innovation datasets, such as the innova-
tion module from the World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES), because it is a longitudinal study instead 
of a cross-section. The longitudinal nature of the 
data made it possible to estimate using panel data 
methods, which might cancel out any unobservable 
time-invariant characteristics, such as managerial 
ability. In addition, it was possible to combine panel 
data techniques with the Tobit approach. In sum, the 
results are presented in increasing order of sophisti-
cation with each procedure, starting from the most 
naïve, OLS, then pure Tobit, followed by pure panel 
fixed effects, and finally, Tobit with random effects.4
To measure competition, we focused on two 
types: formal and informal. For the latter, firms 
were asked to rank informality as an obstacle to 
their business in five categories: no obstacle (0), 
minor obstacle (1), moderate obstacle (2), major 
obstacle (3), and very severe obstacle (4). The 
main advantage of this information is that it shows 
how much each firm sees informality as competi-
tion to its business. When a firm reports that infor-
mality is not an obstacle to its operations, it really 
means that informal firms are not competitors. If 
a firm states informality is a very severe obstacle, 
informal businesses are real competitors. Having a 
competition variable vary discretely from zero to 
four has been used in the literature, as in Carlin, 
Schaffer, and Seabright (2004) for a firm’s free-
dom to raise prices.5 Regarding formal competi-
tion, the analysis was focused on price elasticity 
4  An alternative would be to estimate Type II Tobit selection 
to control for censorship, but results have not converged 
because of the limited number of observations. To provide 
some evidence about the decision to innovate, we estimated 
a Probit using whether a firm invested in innovation or not as 
the dependent variable. Results are available in Table A4.1 in 
the Appendix.
5  We also considered this measure averaged at the ISIC sec-
tor level to provide a more exogenous independent variable. 
Results using the most advanced method are available in 
Table A4.2 in the Appendix.
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(PE) because it is the most robust measure of com-
petition in the literature.6
PE is measured by estimating how much profit 
(in log) responds to changes in costs (also in log), 
as defined in the following equation: 
ln(pit) = a – b.ln(cit) + eit (2)
where pit is the profit of firm i and cit is the cost of 
firm i, both at time t, with b being the measure of 
PE. Ideally, PE is estimated at the sector level, such 
as the ISIC two-digit level, but the number of firms 
in each country did not made it possible to estimate 
it at this disaggregated sector level. Therefore, we 
calculated it for each country at the ISIC one-digit 
level, which provided two PEs for each country 
annually (one for manufacturing and the other for 
services). Since PE is estimated at the sector level, 
it is a more exogenous competition measure than 
others mentioned in the literature review.7
Data Description
This study used the firm-level data from two sur-
veys recently done in the Caribbean: Latin American 
and Caribbean Economic Survey (LACES) and 
Productivity Technology and Innovation (PROTEqIN). 
LACES was an enterprise survey implemented 
jointly by the Compete Caribbean Program and 
The World Bank. This survey interviewed top 
managers or business owners of a representative 
sample of private firms in the Caribbean in 2010. 
LACES followed the standardized methodology 
implemented by the WBES, with information on 
performance as well as a wide range of business 
environment topics. It also included a new module 
on innovation, with information on firms’ abilities to 
create new products, incorporate new processes, 
and other related issues. 
The PROTEqIN survey was completed in 2014. 
It aimed to provide further information about 
Caribbean firms interviewed with LACES, drawing 
more than 1,500 firms from that survey. The addi-
tional information from PROTEqIN included each 
firm’s main characteristics, such as size by sales or 
by number of employees—factors related to inno-
vation. Thus, PROTEqIN provided an extra year of 
information about Caribbean firms, which made it 
possible to construct a panel structure. 
Although there are many similarities between 
the surveys, there are also differences. For exam-
ple, LACES provides firm-level information for 14 
countries, while PROTEqIN excluded the Dominican 
Republic. Table 4.1 shows the number of firms inter-
viewed for both surveys in each country, as well as 
the total number of observations in both surveys. In 
total, there are more than 4,500 firm-level obser-
vations, with 1,890 firms being surveyed twice (cor-
responding to 78 percent of the firms surveyed in 
13 countries selected from LACES and PROTEqIN).8 
Descriptive Statistics
This study investigated how much a firm invested in 
innovation, either in R&D or in acquiring machinery, 
splitting the sample into two categories: firms that 
spent funds on innovation (spent) and firms that 
did not (not spent).9 Table  4.2 shows how these 
two groups were distributed among the surveyed 
countries, including splitting LACES into three sub-
groups: all firms in the survey, including those from 
the Dominican Republic, a group excluding firms 
from the Dominican Republic (no DR), and a group 
including only those firms surveyed twice (only 
panel firms).
As expected, only a tiny fraction of Caribbean 
firms spent resources on innovation, with more 
than 80  percent not investing, regardless of the 
6  Two other alternatives were also considered: Price Margin 
Cost and Mark Up. Results, which remained qualitatively 
similar, are available on request.
7  As an alternative, we also estimated the most advanced 
method using PE estimated at ISIC sector classification but 
considering the Caribbean as a single country. Outcomes 
are presented in Table A4.3 in the Appendix.
8  This creates an additional problem as the percentage of 
firms surveyed twice ranges from 42 percent in Guyana to 
more than 90 percent in Trinidad and Tobago. This short-
coming is discussed in Results.
9  We refrained from using the term innovators and non-in-
novators as these generally refer to firms that have either 
innovated or not.
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subsample or survey. One particular issue that 
should be noted is that the restricted LACES 
samples (no DR and only panel firms, the middle 
columns) showed an even lower share of firms having 
invested in innovation. While nearly 18 percent of all 
LACES firms (all 14 countries) invested in innovation, 
only 13 percent of those in the restricted samples 
invested. This means that the subsample used for 
the panel had a lower percentage of firms investing 
in innovation than all firms in LACES. Percentages 
from all firms in LACES and in PROTEqIN were much 
more alike. We concluded that more firms invested 
in innovation over the three years between surveys. 
Although this seems interesting, it is important to 
emphasize that we do not know what happened 
to the firms that did not complete the PROTEqIN 
survey. It may be that those not surveyed twice went 
bankrupt, creating a selection bias. Considering 
LACES surveyed a representative sample of firms 
in these countries but PROTEqIN might not have, 
we believed that it was important to explore all the 
LACES subsamples to evaluate whether they might 
have distorted the results.
Firms do not spend on innovation at the 
same magnitude because of their size or any 
other specific characteristic. Table  4.3 presents 
innovation expenditures to total sales and to the 
number of employees to compare the magnitude 
of spending across firms.10
The magnitude of spending based on sales 
shows that firms invested less in 2014 than in 2010. 
On average, they invested nearly 5 percent of sales 
on innovation based on the LACES survey, declin-
ing to less than 2  percent in the period used for 
the PROTEqIN survey. In other words, investment 
in innovation on average declined by more than 
half. However, the ratio of innovation expenditures 
10  Averages across firms were calculated by simple means in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 because sample weights were construct-
ed at the country level.
TABLE 4.1.  Number of Firms in Each Survey and Total 
Number of Observations
Country LACES PROTEqIN
Number of 
observations
Antigua and Barbuda 151 131 282
Bahamas, The 150 127 277
Barbados 150 123 273
Belize 150 122 272
Dominica 150 126 276
Dominican Republic 360 — 360
Grenada 153 129 282
Guyana 165 70 235
Jamaica 376 242 618
Saint Lucia 150 128 278
St. Kitts and Nevis 150 125 275
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
154 133 287
Suriname 152 94 246
Trinidad and Tobago 370 340 710
Total 2,781 1,890 4,671
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on LACES and PROTEqIN.
TABLE 4.2. Number of Firms that Spent on Innovation in the Caribbean 
Surveys LACES LACES PROTEqIN
Subsamples
All firms No DR Only panel firms
# % # % # % # %
Not spent 2,285 82.20 2,093 86.50 1,640 86.80 1,560 82.50
Spent 496 17.80 328 13.50 250 13.20 330 17.50
Total 2,781 100 2,421 100 1,890 100 1,890 100
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on LACES and PROTEqIN.
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to number of employees showed no specific result. 
On one hand, all firms interviewed for LACES 
invested less than US$400 per employee. On the 
other hand, the panel firms invested more than 
US$550 per employee in 2010, declining to less 
than US$500 per employee in 2014. We viewed 
these comparisons cautiously, as there may be a 
selection bias in the PROTEqIN data.
This study focused on the relationship between 
firms’ investments in innovation and competition, 
thus we compared how the degree of competition 
differed between firms investing and not investing, 
as shown in Table 4.4. 
Overall, the degree of formal competition, 
measured by PE, decreased over time, while infor-
mal competition increased. The values in LACES 
were higher in PE and lower in informality com-
pared to the respective figures in PROTEqIN.11 Of 
note, the differences between those investing and 
not investing vanished over time, since figures in 
PROTEqIN were practically equivalents. Two dif-
ferent patterns can be seen for LACES. On one 
hand, those investing in innovation appear to have 
faced lower competition from the formal sector. 
On the other hand, informality appears to have 
been a greater obstacle for those investing com-
pared to those not investing. This initial analysis 
suggests that competition had a greater impact 
on innovation in 2010 than it had four years later. 
Additionally, formal competition appears to have 
been negatively related to firms’ decisions to invest 
in innovation, while informal competition was pos-
itively related. However, these insights needed to 
be corroborated under scrutiny of the econometric 
investigation.
Results
We used an econometric approach to further inves-
tigate the link between innovation and the degree 
of competition firms face. We estimated the econo-
metric specification described in equation 1 from 
the most naïve method (OLS) to the most sophisti-
cated (panel effects jointly with Tobit). 
In this section, we present results using inno-
vation expenditures divided by total sales as the 
dependent variable.12 For measures of competition, 
we used PE and perceived competition from the 
informal sector. 
Table 4.5 shows the outcomes estimating 
equation 1 by OLS. Column 1 presents both surveys, 
while columns 2 to 4 only LACES and column 5 only 
PROTEqIN. Columns 2 to 4 differ in terms of the 
subsamples mentioned previously. As explained 
TABLE 4.3. Amount of Innovation Spending
Surveys LACES LACES LACES PROTEqIN
Subsamples All firms No DR Only panel firms
Innov 
expenditures/
sales (%)
4.9 4.3 4.8 1.9
Innov 
expenditures/
workers (US$)
337.71 490.12 566.85 496.55
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on LACES and PROTEqIN.
TABLE 4.4. Degree of Competition
Surveys LACES LACES LACES PROTEqIN
Subsamples All firms No DR Only panel firms
PE
Not spent 1.051 1.062 1.060 1.028
Spent 0.984 1.016 0.994 1.028
Total 1.039 1.056 1.051 1.028
Informality
Not spent 1.384 1.34 1.299 1.602
Spent 1.679 1.537 1.48 1.6
Total 1.437 1.366 1.323 1.602
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on LACES and PROTEqIN.
11  Most of the averages are statistically different across those 
spending or not on innovation.
12  Outcomes using innovation expenditures over number of 
employees provide similar results and are available upon re-
quest. Moreover, results using other measures of competition, 
such as PCM and Mark Up, are also available upon request.
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previously, the restricted sample from LACES 
might have introduced some bias that should be 
considered in the estimation approach.
Looking at the controls, most show the 
expected sign, yet consistent differences emerge 
between the two datasets. Surprisingly, size is 
positively related to innovation expenditures 
only based on PROTEqIN data. One possible 
explanation is that the size effects are being cap-
tured by other covariates correlated to size in the 
LACES data—for instance exports. Export status 
and use of internal funds are positively related 
to innovation in all subsamples of LACES, while 
foreign status is negatively correlated only when 
using all firms. Looking at the estimation using 
both surveys, export status and internal funds 
TABLE 4.5.  Estimating Equation 1 by OLS using PE and Informality  
(dependent variable: innovation expenditures/total sales)
 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms and 
surveys
LACES  
All firms 
LACES  
No DR 
LACES  
Panel firms 
PROTEqIN  
All firms 
PE 0.0214
(0.051)
0.1106*
(0.065)
0.1272**
(0.063)
0.1720**
(0.078)
0.0717
(0.087)
PE squared −0.0084
(0.022)
−0.0450
(0.031)
−0.0556*
(0.029)
−0.0736**
(0.036)
−0.0203
(0.039)
Informality 0.0033***
(0.001)
0.0046***
(0.002)
0.0028*
(0.001)
0.0030*
(0.002)
0.0024
(0.002)
Informality squared −0.0009***
(0.000)
−0.0012***
(0.000)
−0.0007**
(0.000)
−0.0008*
(0.000)
−0.0005
(0.000)
Log(size) 0.0006
(0.001)
−0.0001
(0.001)
−0.0007
(0.001)
−0.0006
(0.001)
0.0017*
(0.001)
Log(age) −0.0006
(0.001)
−0.0014
(0.001)
−0.0003
(0.001)
−0.0004
(0.001)
0.0014*
(0.001)
Export 0.0039**
(0.002)
0.0037*
(0.002)
0.0025*
(0.001)
0.0030*
(0.002)
0.0042**
(0.002)
Foreign −0.0014
(0.002)
−0.0037**
(0.002)
−0.0008
(0.001)
−0.0004
(0.002)
0.0008
(0.004)
Internal funds 0.0077***
(0.001)
0.0117***
(0.002)
0.0090***
(0.002)
0.0098***
(0.002)
−0.0007
(0.002)
Constant −0.0141
(0.028)
−0.0614*
(0.035)
−0.0676**
(0.034)
−0.0929**
(0.043)
−0.0594
(0.048)
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes No No No No
Observations 4,480 2,640 2,307 1,804 1,840
R-squared 0.0968 0.1319 0.1553 0.1568 0.1515
Source: Authors. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level;  
*** at the 1 percent level.
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remain positive, yet the effect of size encountered 
in PROTEqIN vanishes.
Outcomes related to the degree of compe-
tition provide interesting insights. First, infor-
mal competition seems to be more correlated to 
innovation expenditures than formal competi-
tion, since informal is positive when both surveys 
are considered, while formal is not. This suggests 
that formal competition was relevant for innova-
tion expenditures, but its effect declined over 
time. Second, although the degree of competition 
is positively related to innovation expenditures, its 
effects decline as competition rises, since the val-
ues squared are negative. Moreover, informal com-
petition achieves its maximum value a little before 
being considered a moderate obstacle, yet it only 
reduces competition when a firm considers it a 
very severe obstacle.13
As the dependent variable was inflated with 
zeros, we needed to use Tobit to eliminate the 
bias. Table  4.6 shows the outcomes using the 
same structure as in Table 4.5. The first difference 
occurs in the controls, which become much more 
relevant in explaining innovation expenditures 
than estimates by OLS. For instance, firm size is 
now positively related to the dependent variable 
in both surveys, either isolated or jointly (column 
1). This result confirmed the initial interpretation in 
the descriptive statistics, thus differences in inno-
vation according to firm size (measured by the 
number of employees) remained even after con-
trolling for total sales. Age also became significant 
to explain innovation expenditures when using 
LACES, yet its signal was negative, which means 
that younger firms were more inclined to spend 
financial resources on innovation than older firms. 
Export status and use of internal funds to invest 
remained qualitatively the same.
As for the degree of competition faced by 
firms, results remained qualitatively similar to 
previous results, yet values changed. Looking at 
the figures using both surveys (column 1), infor-
mal competition remains positive at a declining 
rate, while formal competition remains irrelevant. 
Considering each survey, formal competition shows 
a positive relation to innovation at a declining rate 
for LACES, regardless of the subsample, while out-
comes with informal competition has a declining 
rate only when considering all firms. In PROTEqIN, 
the relationship between formal competition and 
innovation is encountered, although when combin-
ing it with LACES, it vanishes. This is a surprising 
result since formal competition seems to matter for 
both surveys individually, but not jointly. Evaluating 
when informal competition achieves its maximum, 
we observe that the value rises to 2.14 using values 
from column 1. The implication of this new value is 
that all levels of informal competition are positively 
related to innovation expenditures even in extreme 
cases (very severe).14 This suggests that competi-
tion increases innovation expenditures over sales 
even when competition achieves its maximum 
value. As for formal competition, the hump was 
estimated to be around 1.2, considering significant 
parameters.
Although results in Table 4.6 (Tobit) are more 
accurate than Table 4.5 (OLS), they might still be 
biased since there are unobservable firm character-
istics, such as management, that may be correlated 
to the independent variables. Therefore, Table 4.7 
presents the results of estimating equation 1 using 
a panel structure. The first column of results shows 
estimations using the balanced panel by consider-
ing fixed effects.15 Tobit with random effects esti-
mations are presented in the last two columns of 
this table with unbalanced and balanced panels. 
13  The maximum value was obtained by –b/2c, which is 
−0.0033 / (−0.0009 × 2) or 1.8 when using both surveys.
14  While we found negative values using the estimated pa-
rameters shown in Table 4.5 for firms reporting informal-
ity as a very severe obstacle (4), using the Tobit model, we 
encountered a positive value, more precisely 0.0167 × 4 − 
0.0039 × 16, which is 0.0044.
15  To provide further results, we also estimated using PE in 
a more disaggregated sector classification considering the 
Caribbean as a whole country. In total, we had 15 sectors 
for each year. Additionally, we estimated using ISIC sector 
average in informality to have more exogenous explanatory 
variable. However, results are similar to those obtained in 
Table 4.7 and are available upon request.
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Overall, controls show similar results from 
previous methods, the only difference being that 
foreign firms appear to be positively related to 
innovation. Looking at the values for competi-
tion, formal remains not significant in explaining 
innovation, while informal maintains its influence. 
Looking at these values, we infer the hump is 
1.6 using fixed effects and roughly 2 using Tobit 
random effects. Although the values are differ-
ent, firms that reported competition was very 
severe might invest less in innovation due to 
competition considering the hump estimated by 
FE (Table  4.8). As noted in this table, as infor-
mal competition increases, its effects on innova-
tion expenditures over sales rises until reaching 
informality as a moderate obstacle. After that, the 
impact of informality declines yet is positive for 
major obstacle, eventually reaching negative val-
ues when very severe obstacle is using FE, yet not 
using Tobit RE.
TABLE 4.6.  Estimating Equation 1 by Tobit using PE and Informality  
(dependent variable: innovation expenditures/total sales)
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms and 
surveys
LACES  
All firms 
LACES  
No DR 
LACES  
Panel firms 
PROTEqIN  
All firms 
PE −0.1462
(0.253)
1.8476***
(0.453)
1.6693***
(0.415)
2.6287***
(0.553)
1.1573*
(0.604)
PE squared 0.0850
(0.116)
−0.7681***
(0.202)
−0.6608***
(0.185)
−1.0600***
(0.242)
−0.4643*
(0.273)
Informality 0.0167***
(0.006)
0.0249***
(0.008)
0.0182**
(0.008)
0.0198*
(0.011)
0.0011
(0.008)
Informality squared −0.0039***
(0.001)
−0.0055***
(0.002)
−0.0034
(0.002)
−0.0038
(0.003)
−0.0001
(0.002)
Log(size) 0.0108***
(0.002)
0.0054*
(0.003)
0.0043
(0.003)
0.0077*
(0.004)
0.0177***
(0.003)
Log(age) −0.0037
(0.004)
−0.0083*
(0.005)
−0.0045
(0.005)
−0.0053
(0.006)
0.0055
(0.005)
Export 0.0285***
(0.006)
0.0323***
(0.008)
0.0295***
(0.009)
0.0326***
(0.011)
0.0238***
(0.007)
Foreign −0.0018
(0.007)
−0.0190*
(0.011)
−0.0032
(0.011)
0.0081
(0.014)
0.0045
(0.009)
Internal funds 0.0643***
(0.006)
0.1072***
(0.009)
0.0932***
(0.009)
0.0991***
(0.012)
0.0006
(0.008)
Constant −0.1129
(0.136)
−1.2423***
(0.254)
−1.1443***
(0.234)
−1.6999***
(0.316)
−0.8255**
(0.330)
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes No No No No
Observations 4,480 2,640 2,307 1,804 1,840
Source: Authors. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level;  
*** at the 1 percent level.
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Conclusions
This chapter evaluates how competition affects 
innovation expenditures in the Caribbean. Since 
this is a developing region, we argued that compe-
tition could come from the formal and the informal 
markets. Looking at both types of competition, 
we found that when competition rose, innovation 
expenditures increased, especially when competi-
tion came from the informal market. Nevertheless, 
its power to affect innovation expenditures 
declined after a certain threshold, which cor-
roborates the idea of an inverted-U relationship 
between competition and innovation. Firms fac-
ing more than a moderate level of informal com-
petition continued to be affected positively, but 
TABLE 4.7.  Estimating Equation 1 by FE and Tobit RE using PE and Informality
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Balanced – FE Unbalanced – Tobit RE Balanced – Tobit RE
PE 0.0091
(0.054)
−0.1712
(0.249)
−0.2206
(0.261)
PE squared −0.0058
(0.025)
0.0963
(0.115)
0.1179
(0.121)
Informality 0.0042**
(0.002)
0.0172***
(0.006)
0.0134**
(0.006)
Informality squared −0.0013***
(0.000)
−0.0041***
(0.001)
−0.0033**
(0.002)
Log(size) −0.0009
(0.002)
0.0106***
(0.002)
0.0124***
(0.003)
Log(age) 0.0035
(0.003)
−0.0038
(0.004)
−0.0011
(0.004)
Export 0.0163***
(0.006)
0.0285***
(0.006)
0.0273***
(0.006)
Foreign 0.0317***
(0.008)
−0.0015
(0.007)
0.0112
(0.008)
Internal funds 0.0027
(0.002)
0.0635***
(0.006)
0.0474***
(0.007)
Constant −0.0333
(0.030)
−0.0985
(0.134)
−0.0618
(0.140)
Country dummy No Yes Yes
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy No Yes Yes
Observations 3,644 4,480 3,644
R-squared 0.0871
Number of UNIQUEID_LACES 1,851 2,687 1,851
Source: Authors. 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 
percent level.
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higher levels of competition reduced their efforts 
in innovation. 
Based on these results, policymakers face a 
tradeoff. On one hand, innovation rates in the man-
ufacturing sector are superior to those in the ser-
vices sector. While manufacturing firms on average 
invested nearly US$600 per employee, or 1 percent 
of sales on innovation, firms in services spent less 
than half of that (US$298 per employee, or 0.4 per-
cent of sales). Therefore, to increase innovation 
expenditures in their countries, policymakers would 
want to incentivize more innovation in the services 
sector. However, it is important to highlight that 
Criscuolo (2009) found that investment in inno-
vation is generally higher in manufacturing than in 
services because the elasticity of innovation and 
productivity tends to be higher in manufacturing 
than in services. 
On the other hand, firms in services face more 
competition than those in manufacturing, not only 
in the formal market but also in the informal mar-
ket. Firms in the services sector are elastic in terms 
of formal competition (average PE of 1.07), while 
the manufacturing sector is inelastic (average PE of 
0.97). Firms in services perceive the informal mar-
ket as more of a threat, on average at 1.52, than 
those in manufacturing, at 1.48. Therefore, increas-
ing competition in the manufacturing sector, where 
the degree of competition is perceived as lower, 
might have a higher impact than increasing it in the 
services sector.
Although attempting to discern which sec-
tor might lead to higher innovation expenditures 
in the Caribbean region due to increased competi-
tion is challenging, the results show that the level 
of competition is still below the maximum degree 
of competition estimated. In terms of competition 
in the formal sector, when we found some non-sig-
nificant estimates for both PE and its square, the 
maximum level of competition is around 1.2, which 
means that there is still room for increases in inno-
vation expenditures through increases in competi-
tion. In terms of informal competition, the estimates 
suggest the same. Most of the estimates suggest 
that the maximum level of informal competition 
is moderate (around 2). Caribbean firms face lev-
els at around 1.5 on average, which indicates that 
combating informality might reduce innovation 
expenditures. Therefore, informality might still be 
important for competition and any policy to com-
bat them might reduce innovation expenditures in 
the short run. However, it is important to empha-
size that expansion of the formal sector in the long 
run could reduce informality, since informal firms 
are less productive, as pointed out by La Porta and 
Shleifer (2014). As a consequence, formal compe-
tition might become more influential in promoting 
more innovation in the long run. Thus, the aim is to 
create a business environment that promotes the 
expansion of the formal sector, which will eventually 
raise innovation rates due to increased competition 
in the most efficient and productive firms: formal.
TABLE 4.8. Informal Competition Effects on Innovation Expenditures
Informality values Balanced – FE Unbalanced – Tobit RE Balanced – Tobit RE
0 – No Obstacle 0 0 0
1 – Minor 0.0029 0.0131 0.0101
2 – Moderate 0.0032 0.018 0.0136
3 – Major 0.0009 0.0147 0.0105
4 – Very Severe −0.004 0.0032 0.0008
Source: Authors. 
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Appendix
TABLE A4.1. Estimating Decision to Spend on Innovation by Probit using PE and Informality
 
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All firms &  
surveys
All firms in  
LACES
No DR in  
LACES
Panel firms in 
LACES
All firms in 
PROTEqIN
PE −2.7810
(2.614)
25.0997***
(4.751)
24.4683***
(4.880)
34.1475***
(6.056)
12.4114
(8.087)
PE squared 1.5290
(1.207)
−10.5438***
(2.105)
−9.8402***
(2.152)
−14.0899***
(2.622)
−4.9305
(3.670)
Informality 0.1249**
(0.060)
0.2185**
(0.089)
0.1931*
(0.102)
0.1576
(0.119)
−0.0874
(0.098)
Informality 
squared
−0.0257
(0.016)
−0.0404*
(0.023)
−0.0271
(0.027)
−0.0176
(0.032)
0.0261
(0.025)
Log(size) 0.1600***
(0.023)
0.0847**
(0.034)
0.0700*
(0.040)
0.1093**
(0.045)
0.2932***
(0.038)
Log(age) −0.0237
(0.038)
−0.0446
(0.052)
−0.0293
(0.058)
−0.0343
(0.068)
0.0569
(0.068)
Export 0.3527***
(0.059)
0.4618***
(0.094)
0.5009***
(0.103)
0.4459***
(0.118)
0.3212***
(0.088)
Multinational −0.0035
(0.080)
−0.1305
(0.121)
−0.0903
(0.135)
0.0951
(0.154)
0.0237
(0.124)
Internal funds 0.8210***
(0.060)
1.5365***
(0.098)
1.3187***
(0.108)
1.2625***
(0.128)
0.0706
(0.106)
Constant −0.5488
(1.408)
−16.5041***
(2.658)
−16.3622***
(2.756)
−21.6029***
(3.467)
–8.9129**
(4.389)
Observations 4,497 2,503 2,160 1,679 1,838
Source: Authors.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level;  
*** at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE A4.2. Estimating Equation 1 by FE and Tobit Random Effects using PE and Informality Average
 
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Balanced – FE Unbalanced – Tobit RE Balanced – Tobit RE
PE 0.0086
(0.055)
−0.1910
(0.252)
−0.2079
(0.263)
PE squared −0.0060
(0.025)
0.1002
(0.116)
0.1053
(0.122)
Informality ISIC Avg 0.0048
(0.004)
0.0300**
(0.015)
0.0452***
(0.016)
Informality ISIC Avg squared −0.0022*
(0.001)
−0.0109**
(0.004)
−0.0158***
(0.005)
Log(size) −0.0009
(0.002)
0.0103***
(0.002)
0.0122***
(0.003)
Log(age) 0.0053*
(0.003)
−0.0031
(0.004)
−0.0006
(0.004)
Export 0.0154***
(0.006)
0.0276***
(0.006)
0.0273***
(0.006)
Multinational 0.0312***
(0.008)
−0.0024
(0.007)
0.0114
(0.008)
Internal funds 0.0024
(0.002)
0.0626***
(0.006)
0.0465***
(0.007)
Constant −0.0378
(0.031)
−0.0929
(0.137)
−0.0860
(0.143)
Observations 3,644 4,480 3,644
R-squared 0.0864
Number of UNIQUEID_LACES 1,851 2,687 1,851
Source: Authors.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level;  
*** at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE A4.3. Estimating Equation 1 by Fixed Effects and Tobit Random Effects using PE ISIC and Informality
 
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Balanced – FE Unbalanced – Tobit RE Balanced – Tobit RE
PE ISIC −0.0336
(0.228)
0.1855
(1.084)
0.6404
(1.177)
PE ISIC squared 0.0090
(0.108)
−0.1180
(0.513)
−0.3303
(0.556)
Informality 0.0044**
(0.002)
0.0174***
(0.006)
0.0137**
(0.006)
Informality squared −0.0013***
(0.000)
−0.0041***
(0.001)
−0.0034**
(0.002)
Log(size) −0.0008
(0.002)
0.0106***
(0.002)
0.0124***
(0.003)
Log(age) 0.0054
(0.003)
−0.0038
(0.004)
−0.0011
(0.004)
Export 0.0165***
(0.006)
0.0286***
(0.006)
0.0275***
(0.006)
Multinational 0.0309***
(0.008)
−0.0016
(0.007)
0.0113
(0.008)
Internal funds 0.0027
(0.002)
0.0638***
(0.006)
0.0475***
(0.007)
Constant −0.0114
(0.120)
−0.2460
(0.572)
−0.4786
(0.621)
Observations 3,644 4,480 3,644
R-squared 0.0879
Number of UNIQUEID LACES 1,851 2,687 1,851
Source: Authors.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level;  
*** at the 1 percent level.
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5
Foreign Direct Investment 
and Innovation and Productivity 
in the Caribbean
Preeya Mohan, Eric Strobl, and Patrick Watson
Innovative firms are more generally technolog-ically advanced and have higher productivity. The presence of such firms in a given country 
may lead to greater diversification and improved 
international competitiveness of the economy, 
resulting in sustainable long run growth and de-
velopment of that country (Hall and Jones, 1999; 
OECD, 2009; Rouvinen, 2002; Schumpeter, 1939; 
Griliches, 1986; Freeman, 1994; Griffith et al., 2006; 
Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) is potentially an important channel 
through which innovation and productivity among 
local firms in host countries may be transmitted. 
It may serve to add directly to innovative activi-
ty locally, as well as to transfer knowledge to the 
host economy through positive externalities in the 
form of various technology and knowledge spill-
over effects from foreign to local firms (Görg and 
Strobl, 2001). These knowledge transfers and spill-
overs may then ultimately increase the innovation 
and productivity of domestic firms through their 
own innovation activities and absorptive capacity 
(Griffith, Redding, and van Reenen, 2000; Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989). 
This chapter investigates whether FDI boosts 
innovation and productivity in 13 Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) in the Caribbean using 
Compete Caribbean’s 2014 Productivity, Technology, 
and Innovation (PROTEqIN) survey. More precisely, 
the study examined the following:
 • Own-firm effect of increased innovation and 
productivity by foreign firms operating in 
Caribbean SIDS 
 • Spillover effect on innovation and productiv-
ity for local firms in the host country due to 
the presence of FDI in the same or a related 
industry 
 • Foreign influence on innovation and produc-
tivity for domestic firms in the region 
The effect of FDI on innovation and productiv-
ity is relevant to policy since governments in the 
Caribbean actively seek to attract FDI (Mohan and 
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Watson, 2014). Mohan, Strobl, and Watson (2014) 
found that foreign firms were less likely to under-
take innovative activity in the region than else-
where and that only 25 percent of innovative firms 
were foreign owned.
While much of the earlier literature focused on 
the own-firm and spillover effects of FDI on pro-
ductivity, there has been increasing interest in the 
impact of FDI on innovation (Kathuria, 2008; Beers, 
2004). Some have argued that the link between 
FDI and productivity is not direct, as previously 
assumed, but that the two are connected through 
innovation. In particular, some researchers have 
argued that FDI not only enhances productivity 
by directly increasing innovative activity because 
of the presence of foreign firms, but that it also 
enhances the possibility of local firms in the host 
country engaging in research and development 
(R&D) and other innovation activities. Nevertheless, 
foreign firms may not be willing to carry out inno-
vative activities in host countries, and technology 
diffusion, knowledge transfer, and spillover effects 
are not automatic consequences of FDI. Such con-
sequences require that firms be able to absorb and 
adopt the outside knowledge and technology. It 
may also require complementary assets locally and 
appropriate government policy. 
This study differed from previous studies on 
foreign firms and their spillover effects. First, we 
looked at the impact of FDI on innovation and its 
consequent impact on productivity. We also used 
a wider definition of innovation activities. We took 
into account a firm’s decision to invest in innova-
tion activities. We included any action by a firm 
that aimed to increase its knowledge, such as new 
concepts, ideas, processes, or methods, as innova-
tion activities. Further, we included R&D expendi-
tures as well as other expenditures, such as those 
associated with product design, marketing, staff 
training, new machinery, and patents and other 
trademark licensing. Finally, we examined both 
manufacturing and service firms, since most firms 
operating in SIDS are service providers, while the 
majority of studies in the existing literature focused 
on manufacturers. 
Literature Review
FDI and the presence of foreign firms contribute 
to innovation and productivity in host countries by 
directly increasing innovation. FDI brings techno-
logical, managerial, and marketing knowhow and 
allows for the transfer of advanced foreign technol-
ogy to host countries (Dunning, 1994; Lall, 1992). 
Foreign firms have internal incentives to directly 
transfer knowledge and technology across coun-
tries and to share technology between parent com-
panies and their subsidiaries (Markusen, 2002). FDI 
injects funds into the local economy for innovation, 
which is costly and risky. Additionally, foreign firms 
may carry out R&D and set up research labs in host 
countries, which has the potential to increase the 
research capabilities and technological inputs of 
those host countries (Pearce, 1999). 
FDI can also contribute to innovation and pro-
ductivity through foreign influence on domestic 
firms. Technology transfer may result from the use 
of imported machinery, equipment, and materials 
by local firms operating in the host country. Using 
materials and inputs from foreign suppliers or sell-
ing output from foreign producers may enable 
local firms to produce a higher quality output and 
more efficiently use resources.
Spillover effects from FDI, which may take the 
form of horizontal or vertical spillovers, can also 
contribute to innovation and productivity in host 
countries (Griliches, 1992; Crespo and Fontoura, 
2007; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Meyer and 
Sinani, 2009; Smeets, 2008; Wooster and Diebel, 
2010). Horizontal technology spillovers occur when 
foreign firms invest in domestic firms in the same 
industry in the same country through demonstra-
tion effects and the movement of trained labor 
(Caves, 1974; Fosfuri, Motta, and Ronde, 2001). 
Vertical technology spillovers occur through for-
ward and backward linkages between foreign firms 
and local suppliers and customers within the value 
chain (Javorcik, 2004; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2007; Pietrobelli and Saliola, 2008). These knowl-
edge spillovers can be transferred through the 
supply chain (Saxenian, 1991; Breschi and Lissoni, 
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2001); joint ventures (Almeida and Fernandes, 
2006; Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001); mobility of 
skilled labor (Cheung and Lin, 2004; Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999; Motta, Fosfuri, and Ronde, 1999; Kim, 
1997; Greenaway, Upward, and Wright, 2002); dem-
onstration effects (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; 
Cheung and Lin, 2004); innovation management 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Bessant, Caffyn, and 
Gilbert, 1996; Cosh, Fu, and Hughes, 2004); and 
competitive pressure (Geroski, 1990; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Aghion 
et al., 2005; Fu, 2004, 2007; Cohen and Levin, 
1989; Symeonidis, 2001; Hu and Jefferson, 2002). 
Nevertheless, FDI may not always increase the 
innovation and productivity of local firms. First, 
foreign firms may choose not to innovate in host 
countries, but to instead use them as outlets to 
expand operations and sales since foreign firms 
have access to innovation and technology through 
their parent companies and because innovation 
activities are risky, with high sunk costs and ges-
tational lags (Beers, 2004; Kathuria, 2008). Also, 
technologically advanced foreign firms have posi-
tive effects on innovation only if local firms are suf-
ficiently close to the technology frontier (Aghion et 
al., 2009; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2006). 
Further, spillovers from FDI only occur if there 
are local firms and research institutions with suf-
ficient R&D and absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; Girma, 2005; Teece, 1986; Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Cosh, Fu, and Hughes, 
2005; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2002; Cantwell and 
Santangelo, 1999; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998; 
Griffith, Redding, and van Reenen, 2003). In addi-
tion, there must be effective linkages between for-
eign and domestic firms and research institutions 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996). 
Furthermore, the technology gap between domes-
tic and foreign firms must not be too large (Glass 
and Saggi, 1998; Aghion and Griffith, 2005; Kokko, 
1996; Meyer, 2004). Trade openness also facilitates 
linkages and directs resources to the right sec-
tors, creating a competitive and dynamic environ-
ment (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). Lastly, foreign firms will not bring 
core technology into their subsidiaries or carry out 
innovation activities in countries with weak intel-
lectual property protection (Pietrobelli and Saliola, 
2008). 
Empirical studies of the benefits of FDI to inno-
vation and productivity in host countries have pro-
vided mixed findings and therefore the impact of 
FDI remains inconclusive. Several studies of firms 
in the manufacturing and service sectors in vari-
ous countries have found that FDI and foreign own-
ership positively affected innovative activity and 
productivity. Firms operating locally with foreign 
investors have more researchers and learn more 
from more sources such as suppliers and custom-
ers, universities and their intra-firm global infor-
mation (Love, Ashcroft, and Dunlop, 1996; Erdilek, 
2005; Wagner, 2006; Blind and Jungmittag, 2004; 
Bertschek, 1995; Lofts and Loundes, 2000; Masso, 
Roolaht, and Varblane, 2010; Griffith, Redding, and 
van Reenen, 2004; Criscuolo, Haskel, and Slaughter, 
2005). Other studies have shown that FDI may 
have no effect on innovation (Lööf, Ebersberger, 
and Jahansson, 2006; Balcet and Evangelista, 
2005; Bertrand and Zuñiga, 2006; Almeida and 
Fernandes, 2006; Falk and Falk, 2006; Bishop and 
Wiseman, 1999).
Studies from developed and developing 
countries have shown that FDI spillovers lead 
to substantial productivity gains and increased 
innovation activities by domestic firms (Keller and 
Yeaple, 2009; Javorcik, 2004; Zhang et al., 2009; 
Liu and Zou, 2008; Chang and Xu, 2008; Girma 
and Görg, 2007; Sinani and Meyer, 2004; Vahter, 
2010; Eden, Levitas, and Martinez, 1997; Kokko, 
1996; Buckley, Clegg, and Wang, 2002; Haskel, 
Pereira, and Slaughter, 2007). Other studies have 
found no positive spillover effects on innovation 
and productivity (Damijan and Knell, 2005; Vahter 
and Masso, 2007; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; 
Zukowska-Gangelmann, 2000). Lastly, studies 
have found a negative impact of FDI spillovers on 
innovation and productivity in local firms (Djankov 
and Hoekman, 1998; Girma, Gong, and Görg, 2006; 
Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Sasidharan, 2006; Fu, 
2008, 2004; Zhou, 2006).
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public funding, benefited from patent protection, 
exported its products, had an R&D department, or 
faced competition within the industry. These vari-
ables are explained in the Appendix.
IDi = 1 if IDi * = wi’α + ei > 0, 
0 if IDi * = wi’α + ei 0 (1)
where ID* is a latent variable, w is a vector of vari-
ables influencing the innovation investment deci-
sion, including the FDI variables, α is a vector of 
parameters of interest,1 and e is the error term.
Equation 2 explains a firm’s innovation inten-
sity. Conditional on firm i engaging in innovation 
activities, we observed the amount of resources 
invested in innovation (IE) activities:
IEi = IEi* = zi’ β + εi if IDi = 1 IEi = 0 if IDi = 0 (2)
where IE* is a latent variable representing a firm’s 
innovative effort, z’ is a set of determinants of inno-
vation expenditures, and ε is the error term. The for-
eign ownership, FDI spillover, and influence variables 
were included, as well as other explanatory variables 
indicating whether or not the firm exported, bene-
fited from patent protection, co-operated on R&D, 
faced competition, had an R&D department, or ben-
efited from public financial support.
Assuming the error terms e and ε were bivari-
ate normal with a zero mean, variances σε
2 = 1 and 
σe
2 and correlation coefficient ρεe, the system com-
prising Equations 1 and 2 was estimated as a gener-
alized Tobit model by maximum likelihood.
The second step in the estimation exercise 
involved estimating Equation  3, which links inno-
vative activity to innovation output with an inno-
vation/knowledge production function, using the 
predicted values of the innovation effort from step 
one as one of the independent variables.
TIi = IEi*γ + xi’ δ + ui  (3) 
Methodology and Data
The Econometric Model
The econometric model was adapted from Crépon, 
Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) (the CDM model). 
Crépon et al. (1998) were the first to study the rela-
tionship between innovation and productivity using 
a recursive equation system based on innovation 
inputs and outputs, where this relationship was 
originally proposed by Pakes and Griliches (1984). 
The model was further developed by Crespi and 
Zuñiga (2012) to include a wider measure of inno-
vative activity based not only on a firm’s R&D deci-
sion and expenditures, but also on expenditures on 
other innovative activities, such as product design, 
staff training, and purchasing new equipment. 
The model is a system of five equations that 
link a firm’s R&D expenditures to its innovation out-
put and its innovation output to its productivity. 
We extended the model by employing three 
foreign-related and spillover factors as explana-
tory variables: ownership of the firm (foreign or 
local), the share of total employment by foreign-
owned firms within a given industry, and the use of 
material inputs of foreign origin by domestic firms. 
These added variables made it possible to investi-
gate whether FDI and the presence of foreign firms 
contributed to innovation and productivity in host 
countries by directly increasing innovation through 
spillovers and through foreign influence. 
The model was estimated in three steps. First, 
we used a two-equation system to model (1)  a 
firm’s decision to innovate and (2) the size of the 
innovation effort. Both equations used a general-
ized Tobit model and were estimated by maximum 
likelihood. Equation 1 was used to indicate whether 
a firm decided to undertake innovation activities or 
not and employed an observable indicator function 
(ID) that took the value of 1 if a firm carried out 
innovation activities, and 0 otherwise. Equation  1 
also used various explanatory variables that might 
have affected a firm’s decision to undertake inno-
vation activities, such as firm size, and sundry vari-
ables to reflect whether or not a firm received 
1  Ideally the knowledge spillover variable should be lagged 
given that what foreign firms do in the period t−1 would affect 
what local firms do in t; however, this data was not available.
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where TI is a binary variable equal to 1 if there were 
knowledge outputs, and 0 otherwise. This variable 
measured the knowledge output of a firm result-
ing from its innovation activities (introduction of 
a new product or process) and knowledge spill-
over effects. The predicted value of the innovation 
effort, IE*, from step one is entered as an explana-
tory variable, x is a vector of other determinants 
of knowledge production, γ and δ are vectors of 
parameters of interest, and u is an error term. The 
explanatory variables included in x are firm size and 
the firm’s exporting status, as well as the foreign 
ownership and FDI spillover and influence vari-
ables. Equation 3 was estimated as a Probit model, 
with the predicted value of log innovation expendi-
tures as the main explanatory variable rather than 
reported innovation efforts. Importantly, this cor-
rected for potential endogeneity in the knowledge 
production equation. 
The final step in the estimation exercise was 
the output production function/productivity 
equation, which links the firm’s innovation out-
put to productivity by including it as an input in 
an augmented Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. Equation 4 was estimated using the predicted 
values from the Probit model in the second step 
since they accounted for endogeneity of the inno-
vation output variables. We assumed that a firm’s 
productivity depended on its own investment and 
external knowledge. Firms produce output on a 
constant returns-to-scale basis, with labor, capital, 
and knowledge inputs as follows:
yi = θi ki + θ2 TIi + vi (4)
where output y is labor productivity, measured as 
log of sales per worker; k is capital, measured as 
the log of physical capital per worker (with physi-
cal investment per worker as the proxy); TI refers 
to the impact of technological innovation on pro-
ductivity levels predicted from Equation  3; and 
v is the error term. Other independent variables 
are firm size, the firm’s exporting status, and the 
foreign ownership and FDI spillover and influence 
variables.
Data
We used the data from Compete Caribbean’s 
PROTEqIN survey, which was carried out in 2014 
at the firm level in 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua 
and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
The main task was to examine innovation and 
productivity in the Caribbean as it related to inno-
vation activities by foreign firms operating in the 
region, and foreign/FDI spillovers and influence 
on domestic firms, while controlling for all other 
relevant and available factors. In this regard, we 
considered a firm’s innovation, whether it was a 
product or process, as the output from its own 
innovative activity, including expenditures on R&D, 
product design, staff training, and new equipment, 
as well as its absorptive capacity to make use of 
foreign ownership, knowledge spillovers, and for-
eign-related variables. 
To capture these FDI channels, we used three 
foreign-related and foreign spillover and influence 
variables available in the PROTEqIN data:
1. Foreign ownership, which is a measure of own-
ership of firms by foreigners and gives the own-
firm effect of FDI (since foreign firms contribute 
to innovation and productivity in host countries 
by directly increasing innovation intensity). 
Foreign ownership may also be used as a proxy 
for intra-firm spillovers from FDI, since FDI may 
also impact firm innovation and productivity 
more indirectly through spillover effects. 
2. The share of total employment by foreign-
owned firms within a given industry as a 
proxy for foreign presence in the sector and 
to reflect the degree of intra-industry, or hori-
zontal technology/knowledge spillovers, from 
the presence of FDI in other companies in the 
same industry. 
3. The use of material inputs of foreign origin by 
domestic firms to measure foreign influence 
on local firms.
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Results
Descriptive Analysis
Of the 1,966 firms in the PROTEqIN survey, only 
16  percent were foreign owned. Figure  5.1 shows 
that Trinidad and Tobago had the largest num-
ber of foreign firms (14  percent of all foreign 
firms), followed by the Bahamas (10 percent), and 
Dominica and Jamaica (9 percent). Countries with 
the fewest foreign firms were Antigua and Barbuda 
(4  percent), Guyana and Suriname (4.5  percent), 
and Belize (5 percent).
Only 26 percent of the firms surveyed engaged 
in innovation activities. Figure  5.2 shows that 
Trinidad and Tobago had the highest number of 
innovative firms (4  percent of all firms surveyed) 
followed by Suriname (4 percent), Guyana (3.5 per-
cent), and Jamaica (2.5 percent). Countries with the 
fewest innovative firms (less than 1.3 percent of all 
firms surveyed) were Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Saint 
FIGURE 5.2. Percentage of Innovative Local and Foreign Firms in Caribbean Countries
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Lucia. Only 19 percent of innovative firms were for-
eign owned. In all countries, the proportion of inno-
vative firms that were locally owned was far higher 
than those which were foreign owned. Trinidad and 
Tobago had the highest number of foreign-owned 
innovative firms, (0.66 percent of all firms surveyed), 
followed by Guyana with (0.61 percent), Jamaica and 
Suriname (0.56  percent), and Barbados (0.51  per-
cent). Antigua and Barbuda had just one firm that 
was both innovative and foreign owned. 
Table 5.1 presents the main characteristics of 
foreign and local firms. Firm size was measured 
by the number of employees, where a small firm 
had less than 20 employees, a medium firm had 
between 20 and 99 employees, and a large firm 
had 100 or more employees. Table 5.1 shows that 
26 percent of the foreign-owned companies were 
large compared to 12 percent of local firms, whereas 
45 percent of foreign firms and 37 percent of local 
firms were medium sized. On the other hand, a 
large share of local firms were small (51 percent) 
compared to foreign firms (29 percent). Therefore, 
it appears that foreign firms are generally larger 
than domestic firms in the Caribbean. In terms 
TABLE 5.1. Characteristics of Foreign and Local Firms 
Firm characteristics
Local firms Foreign firms
# % # %
Size (number of employees)
Small (< 20 employees) 846 51 91 29
Medium (≥ 20 and < 100) 617 37 140 45
Large (≥ 100) 192 12 80 26
Exporter/non-exporter
Exporter 305 18 108 35
Non-exporter 1,350 82 203 65
Industry
Manufacturing 553 33 107 34
   Other manufacturing 153 9 21 7
   Food 161 10 35 11
   Textiles 4 0 2 0.5
   Garments 35 2 6 2
   Chemicals 38 2 13 4
   Plastics and rubber 16 1 2 0.5
   Non-metallic mineral products 39 2 10 3
   Basic metals 24 2 3 1
   Fabricated metal products 30 2 5 2
   Machinery and equipment 41 2 4 1
   Electronics 12 1 6 2
(continued on next page)
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of exports, foreign firms had the larger share of 
exporters at 35  percent, while only 18  percent of 
local firms exported. Foreign firms were more likely 
to be part of a larger organization at 31  percent, 
compared to local firms at 15 percent. For gender 
of top management, 23 percent of local firms had 
a female manager compared to 18 percent of for-
eign firms.
To assess the extent to which local and foreign 
firms differed with respect to economic sector, we 
used two different levels of aggregation. First, we 
explored the percentage of firms in manufactur-
ing as opposed to services. A larger percentage of 
firms, both foreign (66 percent) and local (67 per-
cent), were in services than in manufacturing. Then, 
we looked at the 18 sector classification used in 
TABLE 5.1. Characteristics of Foreign and Local Firms 
Firm characteristics
Local firms Foreign firms
# % # %
Services 1,102 67 204 66
   Construction 123 7 13 5
   Services for motor vehicles 72 4 6 2
   Wholesale 80 5 15 5
   Retail 409 25 57 18
   Hotel and restaurants 257 16 82 26
   Transport 127 8 27 9
   Information technology 34 2 4 1
Part of a larger firm 
Yes 241 15 95 31
No 1,414 85 216 69
Gender of top management
Male 1,279 77 256 82
Female 376 23 55 18
Competitors
Registered/formal firms
None 13 1 3 1
1 17 1 6 2
2–5 323 19 70 22
>5 1,302 79 232 75
Unregistered/informal firms
Yes 1,018 62 127 41
No 637 38 184 59
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN data.
(continued)
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the PROTEqIN survey and found only very minor 
differences between local and foreign firms. For 
local firms, the sectors with the largest number of 
firms were retail (25 percent), hotel and restaurant 
(16 percent), food (10 percent), other manufactur-
ing (9 percent), and transport (8 percent). For for-
eign firms, the sectors with the largest number of 
firms were hotel and restaurant (26 percent), retail 
(18  percent), food (11  percent), transport (9  per-
cent), and other manufacturing (7 percent). In the 
information technology sector, local firms had a 
slightly higher proportion of firms (2 percent) com-
pared to foreign firms (1 percent), which was some-
what surprising.
We also examined the intensity of competition 
faced by local and foreign firms from registered 
(formal) and unregistered (informal) businesses. 
Both local and foreign firms reported a relatively 
high level of competition from registered busi-
nesses, with 79 percent of local firms stating that 
they faced more than five competitors (the largest 
category in the survey) compared to 75 percent of 
foreign firms. With regard to informal competition, 
the PROTEqIN data showed that local and foreign 
firms were affected differently. A larger proportion 
of local firms reported that they faced informal 
competition, at 62  percent, compared to 41  per-
cent of foreign firms.
Tables  5.2 and 5.3 provide some preliminary 
evidence about the relationship between FDI, inno-
vative activity, and innovative output for Caribbean 
firms. Table 5.2 displays differences between for-
eign and local firms in terms of various innova-
tive inputs, including spending on innovation, the 
existence of an R&D department, co-operation on 
innovation, the use of licensed technology, and 
patents. The proportion of foreign firms under-
taking each of these activities was higher than 
that of local firms. In terms of innovation expendi-
tures, 24 percent of foreign firms responded that 
they funded an innovation activity, while the corre-
sponding figure for local firms was just 18 percent. 
TABLE 5.2. Innovation Input Indicators by Foreign and Local Firms 
Variable
Local firms Foreign firms
# % # %
Innovation expenditure 295 18 74 24
R&D department 165 10 36 12
Co-operate on innovation 204 12 47 15
   Supplier 19 1 8 3
   Client 15 0.5 2 0.5
   Competitor 13 0.5 2 0.5
   Other company in sector 59 4 14 4
   Laboratory 50 3 9 3
   University 46 3 12 4
   Parent company 1 0 — —
   Consultant 1 0 — —
Licensed technology 205 12 46 15
Patents 80 5 28 9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN data.
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Among foreign firms in the survey, 12 percent had 
an R&D department, while the figure for local firms 
was 10 percent. When looking at co-operation on 
innovation, 15  percent of foreign firms co-oper-
ated, while 12 percent of local firms co-operated. 
Foreign firms co-operated mostly with other firms 
in the sector and universities (4  percent each). 
Local firms co-operated mostly with other compa-
nies in the sector (4 percent). Among foreign firms, 
15  percent used a licensed technology compared 
to 12 percent of local firms, and 9 percent owned 
patents compared to 5 percent of local firms. 
Table 5.3 shows the differences between the 
innovation output—product, process, marketing, 
and organizational innovations—of foreign and 
local firms. A higher percentage of foreign firms 
than local firms reported innovation output in all 
four categories. Product innovations were the 
most common, with 24  percent of foreign firms 
and 21  percent of local firms responding that 
they had an innovative product. The percentage 
of firms with process and marketing innovations 
was similar, with 17  percent of foreign firms and 
12 percent of local firms having a process of inno-
vation, and 15 percent of foreign firms and 14 per-
cent of local firms having a marketing innovation. 
Organizational innovations were the least com-
mon, at 10 percent for foreign and 9 percent for 
local firms. 
Table  5.4 provides summary data on cost, 
knowledge, market, and policy barriers to innova-
tion activities for local and foreign firms. In general, 
innovation barriers appear to affect a larger pro-
portion of local firms compared to foreign firms:
 • 70 percent of local firms and 67 percent of for-
eign firms experienced cost barriers; 
 • 91 percent of both local and foreign firms expe-
rienced knowledge barriers; 
 • 52 percent of local firms and 50 percent of for-
eign firms experienced market barriers; and 
 • 83  percent of both local and foreign firms 
experienced policy barriers. 
Further, local firms reported that direct public 
funding and the flexibility/openness of other com-
panies in the sector to collaboration were major and 
severe barriers to innovation (49 percent each), fol-
lowed by protection against copycats (46 percent), 
and time to market (45 percent). Similarly, the bar-
riers that affected the largest proportion of foreign 
firms were direct public funding (49 percent), flex-
ibility/openness of other companies in the sector 
to collaboration and protection against copycats 
(47 percent), and time to market (44 percent).
Econometric Results
The econometric results for the modified CDM 
model are provided in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. Three 
separate regression specifications were used, each 
containing one of the following FDI or foreign-
related variables:
 • Foreign ownership; 
 • The sectoral share of foreign employment to 
total industry employment using PROTEqIN’s 
18 sector classification; or 
 • The use of foreign inputs by domestic firms. 
Column 1 in all three tables provides the results 
for the foreign ownership variable and includes 
both domestic and foreign firms since it investi-
gates innovation and productivity of foreign firms 
operating in the region and their spillover effects on 
domestic firms. Column 2 in all three tables provides 
the results for the share of employment by foreign 
TABLE 5.3.  Innovation Output by Foreign and Local 
Firms 
Innovation 
output
Local firms Foreign firms
# % # %
Product 342 21 76 24
Process 198 12 53 17
Marketing 227 14 47 15
Organizational 152 9 31 10
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN data.
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firms as a percent of total employment. In this case, 
the econometric analysis included domestic firms 
only, since we were interested in the horizontal FDI 
spillover effect on domestic firms. Column 3 shows 
the use of foreign material inputs by domestic firms. 
Again the econometric analysis in this case included 
domestic firms only since we wanted to examine for-
eign influence on domestic firms. A summary of the 
list of variables employed in the econometric analy-
ses and their definition is provided in the Appendix.
TABLE 5.4. Innovation Barriers: Local versus Foreign Firms
Barriers
Local firms Foreign firms
# % # %
Financing and costs
Level of available financial resources 714 43 126 41
Direct public funding for innovation 804 49 151 49
Total 1,152 70 207 67
Knowledge 
Qualification of employees 590 36 118 38
Technical uncertainties 545 33 90 29
Level of information about available technologies 371 22 68 22
Level of information about new trends in the market 599 36 113 36
Linkages with public universities and tertiary institutions 617 37 120 39
Technical capacity in key institution responsible for innovation promotion 355 21 70 23
Flexibility/openness of laboratories/research centers to collaborative approaches 707 43 116 37
Flexibility/openness of other companies in the sector to collaborative approaches 819 49 145 47
Total 1,503 91 283 91
Market 
Client flexibility and openness to new goods or services 231 14 41 13
Time to market 749 45 138 44
Total 858 52 154 50
Policy and regulation 
Requirements to comply with international standards 555 34 97 31
Current organizational and managerial culture 524 32 98 32
Internal remuneration policy and incentive structure 244 15 47 15
Protection against copycats 764 46 147 47
Investment and policy framework to foster innovation 394 24 67 22
Degree of self-confidence for innovation 374 23 63 20
Total 1,373 83 258 83
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN data.
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TABLE 5.5. Probability of Investing in Innovation (ID) and Intensity of Innovation Expenditure per Employee (IE)
(1) (2) (3)
ID (probability of investing in innovation IE > 0)
Exporting .0729031***
(.02445)
.0615578**
(.02497)
.0630961**
(.02501)
Patent protection .4321815***
(.06398)
.3953614***
(.07323)
.394894***
(.07342)
Size .0398775***
(.00703)
.0316511***
(.00652)
.0319103***
(.00656)
R&D department .4176615***
(.04729)
.4262314***
(.0521)
.4325312***
(.05212)
Competition .0506155**
(.02119)
.0510614**
(.02005)
.0519763**
(.02011)
Foreign ownership .0100364
(.02271)
Foreign sectoral employment −.000109
(.00048)
Foreign inputs –.0307288
(.03376)
IE (log innovation expenditure per employee)
Exporting .4730923***
(.16171)
.3854548**
(.16668)
.3970267**
(.16697)
Patent protection 2.61746***
(.38767)
2.407507***
(.44894)
2.405595***
(.44992)
Co-operation in R&D −.0027935
(.02576)
–.0081837
(.02355)
−.0091267
(.02348)
Public support .0099204
(.03019)
.0211456
(.02687)
.0228003
(.02684)
R&D department 2.608157***
(.31044)
2.740001***
(.35353)
2.782963***
(.35575)
Competition .3549834***
(.13493)
.3637849***
(.12959)
.369543**
(.13013)
Foreign ownership .0800477
(.1479)
Foreign sectoral employment −.0009434
(.00331)
Foreign inputs −.2179763
(.22539)
Observations 1,966 1,655 1,655
Wald-Test 123.14*** 105.68*** 105.16***
Wald test of independence () 37.62*** 31.90*** 29.23***
Log pseudo likelihood −1221.012 −994.7476 −994.2748
Source: Authors.
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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The decision to invest in innovation and the 
intensity of innovation expenditures
Table 5.5 presents the results of the estimation of 
the Heckman equation with a selection model for a 
firm’s engagement in innovation activities and the 
outcome equation for the intensity of innovation 
expenditures as the log of innovation expenditure 
per employee for foreign ownership, the sectoral 
share of foreign employment, and the use of for-
eign inputs by domestic firms. The reported esti-
mates are the marginal effects. 
Table 5.5 shows that, for all three econometric 
specifications (foreign ownership, sectoral share 
of foreign employment, and use of foreign mate-
rials by domestic firms), the traditional determi-
nants that increase the likelihood of a firm deciding 
to engage in innovation activities were firm size, 
whether the firm exported, the existence of an 
R&D department, competition from other firms, 
and whether or not the firm benefited from pat-
ent protection. Thus, firms that exported, had an 
R&D department, faced competition, had pat-
ents, and were larger were more likely to carry out 
innovation activities. All three FDI/foreign-related 
variables were insignificant. The results therefore 
suggest that foreign ownership, which measures 
own-firm innovative effort by foreign firms in the 
host country and acts as a measure of intra-firm 
spillover from foreign to domestic firms, does not 
influence a Caribbean firm’s decision to innovate. 
The insignificant coefficient for the sectoral share 
of foreign employment indicates that horizontal 
FDI spillover (i.e., stronger competitive pressure or 
knowledge flows from FDI firms to other firms that 
result from the mobility of labor and demonstration 
effects) did not influence a domestic firm’s decision 
to innovate. Similarly, the insignificant coefficient 
for the use of foreign inputs by domestic firms sug-
gests that foreign influence did not affect a firm’s 
decision to innovate in the Caribbean.
Examining the results of the determinants of 
log innovation expenditures per employee revealed 
that exporting, having an R&D department, com-
petition from other firms, and patent protection 
were significant, and as such predicted innovation 
expenditures. On the other hand, public financial 
assistance and cooperation on innovation did not 
seem to predict innovation expenditures. Again, 
the three FDI variables were insignificant deter-
minants of firm innovation expenditures in the 
Caribbean (Table 5.5, columns 1, 2, and 3). Hence, 
own-firm innovative effort and intra-firm spillover 
from foreign to domestic firms, horizontal FDI spill-
over from foreign to domestic firms, and foreign 
influence did not affect innovation expenditures.
The impact of innovation investment on the 
probability of technological innovation 
Table 5.6 provides the summary results for the esti-
mation of the knowledge production function for 
a product and process innovation dummy variable 
that was used as the technological innovation out-
put variable for foreign ownership (column  1), for-
eign sectoral employment (column 2), and the use 
of foreign inputs by domestic firms (column  3). 
The coefficients reported are the marginal effects. 
Accordingly, the results in columns 1, 2, and 3 illus-
trate that those Caribbean firms that spent more 
on innovation were more likely to introduce a prod-
uct or process innovation. More specifically, as the 
coefficient on the predicted innovation expenditure 
shows, a unit increase in log innovation expenditure 
per employee increased the probability of techno-
logical innovation by about 52 percent when the for-
eign ownership variable was used, 43 percent for the 
sectoral share of foreign employment variable, and 
42 percent for the use of foreign inputs by domestic 
firms variable. Additionally, results showed that the 
larger the firm, the higher the probability of intro-
ducing a product or process innovation. 
The coefficient for foreign ownership was neg-
ative and significant (Table  5.6, column  1), which 
suggests that foreign ownership reduces the prob-
ability of implementing a product or process inno-
vation. A foreign-owned firm was 6  percent less 
likely to introduce a technological innovation. It is 
likely that foreign firms operating in the Caribbean 
choose not to innovate locally, but instead to use 
the region as an outlet to expand operations and 
sales since foreign firms have access to innovation 
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and technology through their parent companies 
and because innovation activities are risky, with 
high sunk costs and gestational lags. Thus, foreign 
firms have to be willing to bring core technologies 
into their subsidiaries and to carry out innovation 
activities. They may be unwilling to do so in devel-
oping countries with weak intellectual property 
protection, such as in Caribbean SIDS.
On the other hand, the use of foreign material 
inputs by domestic firms was positive and signifi-
cant, meaning that domestic firms that used for-
eign inputs were more likely to introduce a product 
or process innovation. Foreign technology trans-
fer into the Caribbean is therefore likely a result 
of local firms using imported machinery, equip-
ment, and materials since there is sufficient trade 
openness to facilitate these types of linkages. The 
results show that a firm that used foreign inputs 
was 9 percent more likely to undertake technolog-
ical innovation.
The share of foreign sectoral employment did 
not significantly affect a firm’s technological inno-
vation. The presence of FDI in the industry was 
therefore not associated with an increase in innova-
tion output because of stronger competitive pres-
sures and knowledge flows from labor mobility and 
demonstration effects. Positive spillover effects on 
innovation from foreign to local firms occur only if 
local firms are sufficiently close to the technology 
frontier; the technology gap between foreign and 
domestic firms is not too large; there is sufficient 
R&D, absorptive capacity, and complementary 
assets in the way of local firms and research institu-
tions; and there are effective linkages between for-
eign and domestic firms and research institutions. 
These may not be present in the Caribbean. 
TABLE 5.6. Probability of Technological Innovation (TI: introduction of product or process innovation)
(1) (2) (3)
IE_p (predicted Innovation expenditure per employee) .5248787***
(.0349948)
.4260891***
(.0350188)
.4180566***
(.0353951)
Size .0396761***
(.0106294)
.0370767***
(.0111468)
.0370892***
(.0112551)
Exporting −.0166701
(.1176991)
.0320624
(.2329404)
.0089583
(.0328308)
Foreign ownership −.0601588**
(.0283003)
Foreign sectoral employment .0009751
(.0007535)
Foreign inputs .0918117*
(.0350373)
Observations 1,966 1,655 1,655
Wald 463.05*** 330.88*** 345.47***
Log pseudo likelihood −732.33003 −635.19222 −637.69617
Pseudo R2 0.3468 0.3161 0.3134
Observed probability .2573754 .2489426 .2489426
Predicted probability (values at means) .2286034 .2175168 .2173379
Source: Authors.
Notes: Coefficients reported are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. 
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The impact of innovation on productivity 
Finally, Table  5.7 shows the results of the pro-
ductivity equation, where the coefficients were 
reported as elasticities or semi-elasticities since 
the dependent variable was the log of sales per 
employee. Here we found that firm size positively 
affected labor productivity in all three regression 
specifications. Similarly, non-technical innova-
tion had a positive and significant impact on labor 
productivity in all three regression specifications; 
however, this result must be considered cau-
tiously. Unlike with technological innovation, we 
assumed no selection bias and no endogeneity for 
non-technical innovation. We found that innova-
tion expenditures did not have a significant impact 
on labor productivity in any of the three regres-
sions. Finally, foreign ownership and the sectoral 
share of foreign employment did not have a sig-
nificant impact on labor productivity; however, 
the use of foreign inputs positively affected labor 
productivity.
Conclusions
FDI is a key channel that can potentially increase 
innovation and productivity among local firms in 
host countries. It increases the possibility of local 
firms in the host country engaging in R&D and 
other innovation activities and benefiting from 
various technology and knowledge transfer and 
spillover effects. However, the empirical evidence 
about FDI, innovation, and productivity is mixed 
and inconclusive since technology diffusion, knowl-
edge transfer, and spillover effects are not an auto-
matic consequence. 
This chapter investigated whether FDI and its 
spillover effects boosted innovation and produc-
tivity in firms in 13 Caribbean SIDS using Compete 
TABLE 5.7. The Impact of Innovation on Labor Productivity (Y: log sales per employee)
(1) (2) (3)
IE_p (predicted Innovation expenditure per employee) .0484124
(.1151089)
.0829141
(.1154168)
.0561747
(.1145323)
Size .0978239**
(.0417294)
.1022162***
(.0390586)
.0913619**
(.0394309)
Non-technological innovation 268.508**
(109.4622)
262.9089*
(150.2173)
291.1912*
(153.6217)
Capital per employee −268.050**
(109.4445)
−262.4613*
(150.1888)
−290.7403*
(153.5936)
Foreign ownership .0180618
(.120428)
Foreign sectoral employment .0006529
(.0028058)
Foreign input .4955465*
(.267978)
Observations 1,966 1,655 1,655
Wald test 969.56*** 514.18*** 549.18***
R2 0.1576 0.1547 0.1397
Source: Authors.
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (100 replications). The variable used as a proxy for physical capital was investment 
made during the period considered the stock of physical capital. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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Caribbean’s 2014 PROTEqIN survey. The data indi-
cated that foreign firms operating in the Caribbean 
were generally larger than domestic firms, were 
more likely to be exporters and part of a larger 
organization, and were less likely to face informal 
competition. Additionally, while we might have 
expected that a larger number of foreign firms 
would operate in knowledge intensive services, the 
data showed that local firms had a slightly higher 
proportion of firms in the information technology 
sector compared to foreign firms.
The data also showed that the proportion 
of innovative foreign firms in the Caribbean was 
quite low. Of the 506 firms that were innovative, 
only 19  percent were foreign owned, the other 
81 percent being locally owned. Moreover, in all 13 
Caribbean countries in the study, the proportion of 
innovative firms that were locally owned was far 
higher than the proportion of innovative firms that 
were foreign owned. However, the proportion of 
foreign firms that engaged in innovation activities 
(spent on innovation, had an R&D department, co-
operated on innovation, used a licensed technol-
ogy, or had patents) was higher than local firms. 
Also, a higher proportion of foreign firms had inno-
vative outputs (product, process, market, or orga-
nizational innovation) compared to local firms. 
Further, cost, knowledge, market, and policy barri-
ers affected a larger proportion of local firms than 
foreign firms.
The econometric results suggest that own-
firm innovative effort by foreign firms in the host 
country and intra-firm spillover from foreign to 
domestic firms do not influence a Caribbean firm’s 
decision to innovate. Also, horizontal FDI spillover 
(i.e.,  stronger competitive pressure or knowledge 
flows from FDI firms to other local firms from the 
mobility of labor and demonstration effects) do 
not influence a domestic firm’s decision to inno-
vate. Foreign influence also does not affect a firm’s 
decision to innovate in the Caribbean. Similarly, 
own-firm innovative effort and intra-firm spillover 
from foreign to domestic firms, horizontal FDI spill-
over from foreign to domestic firms, and foreign 
influence do not affect innovation expenditures.
The econometric results also show that foreign 
ownership reduces the probability of implement-
ing a product or process innovation. Therefore, it is 
likely that foreign firms operating in the Caribbean 
choose not to innovate in host countries, but to 
instead use them as outlets to expand operations 
and sales since foreign firms have access to inno-
vation and technology through their parent com-
panies and because innovation activities are risky, 
with high sunk costs and gestational lags. Also, 
foreign firms may be unwilling to carry out inno-
vation activities in developing countries such as 
the Caribbean because of weak intellectual prop-
erty protection. The use of foreign material inputs 
increased a domestic firm’s likelihood of intro-
ducing a product or process innovation. Foreign 
technology transfer into the Caribbean is there-
fore likely a result of local firms using imported 
machinery, equipment, and materials since there is 
sufficient trade openness to facilitate these types 
of linkages. FDI horizontal spillover effects in the 
industry did not increase product or process inno-
vations by local firms. This may be because local 
firms in the Caribbean are not sufficiently close to 
the technology frontier; that the technology gap 
between foreign and domestic firms is too large; 
that there is insufficient R&D, absorptive capac-
ity, and complementary assets in the way of local 
firms and research institutions; and that there are 
ineffective linkages between foreign and domestic 
firms and research institutions.
Lastly, own-firm innovation by foreign firms 
and intra-firm spillover and horizontal FDI spill-
over did not have a significant impact on labor pro-
ductivity. However, foreign influence through the 
use of foreign inputs by domestic firms positively 
affected labor productivity.
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Appendix: Variables and Definition
Variable (abbreviation) Definition
Technological innovation (TI): Dummy equal to 1 if the firm introduced a product or process innovation.
Expenditures on innovation activities per employee (IE): Firm innovation expenditures divided by the number of employees.
Productivity (Y): Total sales divided by the number of employees.
Firm size (EM): Number of employees.
Exporter/non-exporter (EX): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm exported.
Non-technological innovation (NTI): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm introduced marketing or organizational 
innovation.
Foreign ownership (FO): Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign capital was above 10 percent.
Patent protection (PA): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had or had filed for a patent.
Research and development (R&D): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had an R&D department.
Competition (COM): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm faced competition from industry competitors.
Co-operation (CO): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm collaborated on innovation.
Public funding (FIN): Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm received public financing for innovation activities.
Capital per employee (INV): Firm capital divided by the number of employees.
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The Gender Gap in the Caribbean: 
The Performance 
of Women-Led Firms
Winston Moore, Andrea F. Presbitero, and Roberta Rabellotti
While several Caribbean countries have largely endorsed and ratified many United Nations conventions on gender equi-
ty—such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and 
the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women—there remain significant deficien-
cies in implementation (Bailey, 2003).
Studies on gender issues that focus on the 
Caribbean are scarce, but some general conclusions 
can be drawn from the Gender Inequality Index 
calculated by the United Nations Development 
Programme and based on gender gaps in literacy, 
life expectancy, and income.1 A cursory glance at 
the 2014 rank of the 13 countries presented in this 
chapter2 provides a very heterogeneous picture: 
The Bahamas ranked highest at 55th, followed by 
Barbados (57th) and Antigua and Barbuda (58th), 
with Guyana ranked lowest at 124th (Suriname 
ranked 103rd and Belize 101st).
In the Caribbean, the expected years of school-
ing for women are always higher than for men, and 
the percentage of the female population with at least 
some secondary education is also higher than for the 
male population (except in Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago, where the percentage of men with some 
secondary education is slightly higher than women).
Flabbi et al. (2014) used International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) data to calculate the average 
share of women in the labor force in the Caribbean. 
At 46  percent, the share was only 2  percentage 
points lower than in the United States and higher 
than the average for Latin American countries 
(40 percent). Nevertheless, the World Development 
Indicators3 show that the average rate of female 
unemployment in the Caribbean is more than 5 per-
centage points higher than that of men. Females are 
also less likely to be promoted or elected into posi-
tions of authority. As reported in Flabbi et al. (2014), 
1  Data are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/
GDI (accessed on January 5, 2016).
2  Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago.
3  Data are available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators (accessed on January 5, 2016).
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in 2012, 433 of the top 500 Latin American compa-
nies had no women senior executives and only nine 
had a woman CEO. This was confirmed in a report 
by ILO (2015) stating that in Jamaica and Saint 
Lucia the share of women-managers in businesses 
was higher than men but that women were mainly 
concentrated in middle management positions and 
under-represented in the most senior positions.
The statistics presented above suggest that, 
while women are well represented in the workforce, 
in the Caribbean there are still important dispari-
ties in top management. This chapter aims to inves-
tigate whether this under-representation is justified 
by poorer productivity in firms managed or owned 
by women. Thanks to the wealth of information avail-
able in the Productivity, Technology, and Innovation 
(PROTEqIN) database and following some recent 
evidence that showed that definitions matter when 
estimating the gender gap (Presbitero, Rabellotti, 
and Piras, 2014), this study adopted a set of more 
precise measures of female ownership and manage-
ment of a firm than those traditionally used in cross-
country investigations. Accordingly, we expected 
the results to differ depending on alternative (more 
or less restrictive) measures of gender composition 
in a firm’s management and ownership.
The empirical analysis pooled all available 
countries to estimate a single model for identify-
ing a common pattern in the Caribbean. Moreover, 
it investigated possible differences across countries 
and industries. The results showed no gender gap in 
performance considering the gender composition 
of firm ownership; however, women-managed firms 
were less productive than similar firms. While most 
of the gender gap was not explained by differences 
in observable characteristics, the results suggest 
that some firm characteristics for which there was 
evidence of a significant gender gap—such as size 
and access to financing—mattered for productivity.
The Literature on Gender Gap and Firm 
Productivity
There has been considerable research investigat-
ing gender differences in firm performance, using a 
variety of indicators, mainly focused on advanced 
economies (Wolfers, 2006; Smith, Smith, and 
Verner, 2006; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2015; 
Flabbi et al., 2014). Klapper and Parker (2011) 
reviewed the related empirical literature and con-
cluded that the underperformance of women-led 
businesses is usually explained by the lack of con-
trols for the size or scale of the firm’s operations. Of 
note, companies led by women are usually younger, 
less productive, less innovative, and operate on a 
smaller scale as well as in less capital-intensive and 
less efficient industries compared to male-led firms 
(Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone, 2013; Bruhn, 2009; 
Sabarwal and Terrell, 2008).
With a focus on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Flabbi et al. (2014) analyzed a large 
dataset of publicly traded companies and found 
that companies with more female members on the 
board were significantly more likely to have one 
female among the firm’s executives and that, when 
women were at least 30 percent of the executives, 
there was a positive association with firm perfor-
mance, therefore confirming the existence of a 
“critical mass” effect (Kanter, 1977).
Ferdinand (2001) examined the factors affect-
ing female entrepreneurship in small and cottage 
industries in three Caribbean countries (Barbados, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago). The study 
found that female-owned businesses dominated 
the microenterprise segments of retail and distribu-
tion, agriculture, and light manufacturing (e.g., tex-
tiles and garments)—activities with reduced 
potential for growth and profit.
Some studies (e.g.,  Aterido et al., 2013; 
Presbitero et al., 2014) have suggested that access 
to financing is a possible cause of the productiv-
ity gap between women- and men-led businesses. 
Other studies (e.g.,  Orser et al., 2010; Marques, 
2015) have suggested that different export propen-
sity between firms led by women and men may be a 
reason for the gender gap. Chen, Leung, and Evans 
(2015), among others, indicated that the innovative 
potential of a firm and the propensity to invest in 
research and development and introduce innova-
tion may be affected by the gender composition 
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of ownership and management. Finally, women-led 
businesses could be at a disadvantage compared 
to similar men-led firms when it comes to access to 
government-sponsored support programs that can 
foster firm productivity. All of these determinants 
are investigated in the empirical analysis that fol-
lows to see whether women-led businesses were 
particularly exposed to such constraints.
Gender Gap in the Caribbean
For a broad general picture of the gender compo-
sition of ownership and management within firms, 
the following analysis was based on the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES),4 which included 
130,000 private firms in 135 countries. The survey 
provided two indicators:
1. The presence of at least one woman among 
the owners (female owner).
2. Firms where the top manager is a woman 
(female top manager).
While certainly informative, these two mea-
sures had some limitations. With regard to owner-
ship, they did not make it possible to disentangle 
different levels of female ownership involvement. 
In particular, it was not possible to single out those 
firms in which women-owned the majority of the 
firm. Moreover, in determining the gender of man-
agement, the WBES only took into consideration 
those firms with a female top manager, therefore 
discounting the different levels of female involve-
ment in managerial responsibilities (Presbitero et 
al., 2014). Nevertheless, the advantage of these 
indicators was that they provided empirical evi-
dence about the role of women within the firms in a 
large sample of countries, therefore making it pos-
sible to benchmark the Caribbean countries.
Considering the proportion of firms with female 
participation in ownership, the Caribbean countries 
had relatively high ratios (above 40  percent) 
relative to the average for all countries in the 
survey (35.3 percent). Nonetheless, it is important 
to note the wide heterogeneity in the region, with 
countries like Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda, and 
Saint Lucia well below the regional average.
Taking into account the proportion of firms 
with a woman as the top manager, a female led 
more than 30  percent of firms in Belize, Guyana, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, slightly over 
the WBES average (29  percent). But again there 
was a wide heterogeneity within the region, with 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Suriname, having less than 20 percent 
of firms with top female managers.
To benchmark female participation in owner-
ship and top management in the Caribbean based 
on the large sample of countries included in the 
WBES, we estimated a gender frontier. The basic 
model presupposed that countries that had made 
the most progress in gender issues thanks to some 
structural characteristics would be on the gender 
frontier. In contrast, when a country having a simi-
lar level of structural endowments is less advanced 
in gender issues, it would lie below the gender 
frontier.
Using a tool similar to that outlined by Hussainy 
et al. (2011) in relation to financial development, we 
estimated the following regression equation:
 GDi = βXi + εi (1)
where GDi is the measure of gender outcomes 
(ownership and top manager)5 for country i, Xi is a 
matrix of structural conditions in the country, and 
is an error term that is assumed to have normal 
properties.
The structural factors included in the model 
specification were real gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, age dependency, educational 
attainment, health, and survival. Real GDP per capita 
was included to capture the potential benefits that 
economic prosperity might bring to women. The 
4  More information about the WBES is available at http://
www.enterprisesurveys.org (accessed January 11, 2016).
5  The two outcomes are calculated as indicated above and 
are the average values over 2002 and 2015 or for the period 
available for the different countries included in the WBES.
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age dependency ratio captured the social pressures 
for women to stay at home to take care of children 
and older members of the family, as well as the 
pressure to enter the labor force. Improved health 
(i.e.,  life expectancy) and educational outcomes 
(i.e.,  enrollment ratios) should result in greater 
female participation in business.6
Equation 1 was used to predict the benchmark 
level of gender outcomes for each country in 
the WBES. Then, the gender gap was defined as 
the difference between the benchmark and the 
actual level. A positive (negative) gap value would 
therefore indicate that the country was under (over) 
performing relative to the rest of the countries in the 
survey.
The results from estimating Equation 1 are pre-
sented in Table  6.1, which provides the results for 
both gender indicators: (1)  percent of firms with 
female participation in ownership; (2)  percent of 
firms with a female top manager. In both cases, the 
model explains almost 10 percent of the variation in 
the two gender variables examined. The coefficient 
estimates were broadly in line with a priori expec-
tations, with a higher enrollment ratio in secondary 
school being positively associated with both higher 
female ownership and participation in top manage-
ment. Surprisingly, however, the coefficient on the 
GDP per capita suggested that wealthier countries 
had comparatively lower ratios of female ownership 
in business and female participation in management. 
This result does not mean that the absolute values of 
the ratios in these relatively more developed coun-
tries were lower, but it suggests that, relative to less 
developed counterparts, a higher rate of participa-
tion of females in business ownership and top man-
agement would be expected. In the regression on 
firms with a female top manager, the most important 
explanatory factor was the age dependency ratio.
Based on the regression results presented in 
Table 6.1, the predicted and actual values were used 
to estimate the gender gap in each country included 
in the database. The results (Table  6.2) suggest 
that the Caribbean was overperforming relative to 
other countries included in the survey, as the gender 
gap was negative for most Caribbean countries for 
which data were available. The gender gap indicator, 
which was derived from the share of firms with a 
female top manager, showed that nine out of the 10 
countries considered presented a negative value. 
The measure of over- or underperformance was also 
similar considering the share of firms with female 
participation in ownership: six of the 10 countries 
had a negative value for the gender gap indicator.
The results presented above suggest that, 
based on their fundamental economic and social 
characteristics, Caribbean businesses are likely 
to have a relatively higher ratio of female partici-
pation in management and in ownership. In the 
following sections, we investigate the potential 
impact of female participation on firm productiv-
ity using data from the PROTEqIN database, which 
making it possible to more precisely measure the 
presence of women in firms.
TABLE 6.1. The Gender Frontier
Percent of firms 
with female 
participation in 
ownership
Percent of firms 
with a female 
top manager
Ln (GDP per capita) −0.146
(0.086)*
−0.174
(0.112)
Ln (dependency ratio) −0.074
(0.331)
−0.817
(0.441)*
Ln (enrollment ratio in 
secondary education)
0.416
(0.187)**
0.384
(0.252)
Ln (life expectancy at birth) 0.120
(0.538)
−0.730
(0.733)
Constant 2.751
(2.950)
9.046
(4.022)**
R-squared 0.071 0.113
Root MSE 0.535 0.639
F-statistic 2.330
[0.059]
3.230
[0.015]
Observations 127 107
Source: WBES.
Notes: *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.
6  Data are from the World Development Indicators Data-
base (see Footnote. 3). For each country, we considered the 
average values for 2002 and 2015.
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A Focus on the Gender Composition of 
Caribbean Firms
The following analysis was based on the micro 
data from the PROTEqIN survey completed in 13 
Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The survey was a follow-up 
to the Latin American and Caribbean Enterprise 
Survey (LACES) implemented jointly by the Inter-
American Development Bank, Compete Caribbean, 
and The World Bank. The PROTEqIN survey added 
new sections to WBES covering issues such as 
innovation and public program support. It targeted 
1,680 respondents drawn from LACES.
PROTEqIN provides a wealth of information 
to precisely measure the presence of women in 
ownership and management of Caribbean firms and 
to assess their role in a firm’s strategic decisions. 
The gender composition of a firm’s management 
and ownership is classified in five categories: all 
men, predominantly men, equally men and women, 
predominantly women, and all women. Based on 
this information, it is possible to look at the relative 
incidence of women in ownership and management 
across countries and industries (Figures 6.1 and 6.2).
In several countries (Antigua and Barbuda, 
The Bahamas, Dominica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
more than 50  percent of the firms included in 
the survey were exclusively owned by men. Only 
three countries (Grenada, Jamaica, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines) had at least 20  percent of 
TABLE 6.2.  Estimated Gender Gap for Select 
Caribbean Countries
Female 
participation in 
ownership
Firms with female 
top manager
Antigua and Barbuda 0.398 −0.134
The Bahamas −0.677 −0.712
Barbados −0.269 −0.389
Belize 0.050 0.644
Grenada −0.511 −0.387
Jamaica −0.134 −0.423
Saint Lucia 0.001 −0.401
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
−0.792 −0.790
Suriname 0.464 −0.021
Trinidad and Tobago −0.471 −0.194
Source: Authors’ calculations on WBES.
FIGURE 6.1. Gender Composition of Firm Ownership in the Caribbean, by Country
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firms with female predominance among owners. 
Regarding sector specialization, as expected, the 
textile industry had the highest presence of female 
owners. The food, retail, restaurant, and transport 
industries also showed a relatively high share of 
firms owned by or predominantly by women.
Looking at women in management, the data 
showed a lower share of firms managed only by men, 
but in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago the share of firms 
predominantly managed by men was over 60  per-
cent. The countries with at least 20 percent of com-
panies predominantly managed by women were The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. In terms of sector spe-
cialization, again the textile, food, retail, and restau-
rant industries had predominantly female managers.
Table 6.3 confirms the limited overlap between 
the two categories: ownership and management. 
FIGURE 6.2. Gender Composition of Firm Ownership in the Caribbean, by Industry
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TABLE 6.3. Gender Composition within Firm Ownership and Management (by number of firms)
Ownership
All men
Predominantly 
men
Equally men 
and women
Predominantly 
women
All 
women Total % of total
Ma
na
ge
m
en
t
All men 297 41 46 22 37 443 22.7
Predominantly men 411 153 111 46 81 802 41.2
Equally men and 
women
170 52 75 20 27 344 17.7
Predominantly 
women
109 47 37 15 22 230 11.8
All women 73 2 12 2 40 129 6.6
Total 1,060 295 281 105 207 1,948 100.0
 % of total 54.4 15.1 14.4 5.4 10.6 100.0
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
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TABLE 6.4.  Gender Composition in Ownership and Management across Firm Characteristics  
(by percent of firms)
Sole proprietorship Ownership Markets Sector
No Yes Domestic Foreign Local National International Manufacturing Services
Women-led 0.064 0.158 0.105 0.068 0.099 0.098 0.103 0.093 0.102
Dominant owner 0.120 0.228 0.169 0.110 0.166 0.147 0.194 0.150 0.165
Dominant manager 0.161 0.225 0.192 0.148 0.193 0.166 0.239 0.152 0.201
Female owner 0.589 0.239 0.449 0.524 0.490 0.431 0.445 0.474 0.454
Female top manager 0.191 0.268 0.228 0.177 0.233 0.201 0.239 0.178 0.241
Observations 1,246 720 1,655 311 953 858 155 660 1,306
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
In particular, women were more likely to be part 
of the management structure, rather than being 
one of the owners. Ownership was fully in the 
hands of men in 54.4 percent of firms, while only 
22.7 percent of firms were fully managed by men.
Table 6.4 presents five different indicators of 
gender composition in management and owner-
ship of firms based on the PROTEqIN survey.
Women-led refers to firms with a woman as the 
major owner or shareholder and, among these firms, 
selects those in which the owner is in charge of major 
strategic and financial decisions (Presbitero et al., 
2014). This dummy variable had restrictive conditions 
regarding the female presence in ownership and 
management so that we could be reasonably sure 
that the firm was actually led by a woman. By con-
trast, the standard variables used in the WBES did 
not identify firms with a woman as the main owner 
and decision maker unless the analysis was limited to 
sole proprietorships, where ownership and manage-
ment responsibilities coincide. In other firms, this is 
not necessarily the case. In the sample, 54 percent 
of women who were top managers worked in firms 
where either all owners or the majority of owners 
were men. Dominant owner and dominant manager 
are dummy variables to identify firms with predomi-
nantly female ownership or management. Female 
owner and female top manager are dummy variables 
to distinguish firms with at least one woman among 
the owners or managers. These five gender variables 
measure different aspects (and intensity) of the gen-
der composition of firms.
When looking at the structural features—sole 
proprietorship; domestic or foreign owned; local, 
national, or international market; and sector special-
ization (see Table 6.4)—along with the gender com-
position of firms, some key facts emerged and held 
across all indicators. First, women were more likely 
to play a greater role in management and owner-
ship in sole proprietorships, which is consistent with 
the common finding that women-led businesses are 
smaller than men-led ones. Second, women tended 
to operate more domestic firms rather than foreign-
owned ones. Third, there were no striking differ-
ences in export orientation or in specialization in the 
manufacturing or service sectors, even though there 
was a higher presence of women in managerial posi-
tions in services rather than in manufacturing.
Finally, the richness of the questionnaire made 
it possible to observe that women-led businesses 
perceived some barriers—access to financing 
(but not cost), crime, corruption, and the political 
environment—as more severe obstacles to their 
business activities than men-led firms (Figure 6.3).7
Gender Composition and Firm 
Characteristics
The component of women in ownership and man-
agement is likely to differ along different firm 
7  Similar findings held, with some minor differences, across 
the other four gender indicators. For brevity, results are not 
shown, but they are available on request from the authors.
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characteristics that can be associated with perfor-
mance. This section shows the results of a study 
of whether women-owned and/or managed firms 
were different from other firms in terms of:
 • Size: measured as the logarithm of the number 
of employees.
 • Age: calculated by the logarithm of the num-
ber of years since the firm’s inception.
 • Export: a dummy variable with the value of 1 if 
the firm sold abroad and 0 otherwise.
 • Innovation: a dummy variable with the value of 
1 if the firm had recently introduced a new or 
significantly improved product or service and 
0 otherwise.
 • Access to credit: two dummy variables: 
(1) Demand for bank credit, with a value of 1 
if the firm had asked a bank for credit and 0 
otherwise; (2) Financing as an obstacle, with a 
value of 1 if the firm perceived access to credit 
as a major obstacle and 0 otherwise.
 • Technical assistance: a dummy variable with a 
value of 1 if the firm had benefited from any 
technical assistance programs and 0 otherwise.
We ran a set of simple regressions, including, 
alternatively, each of the five gender indicators pre-
sented in the previous section, and country and 
sector fixed effects. As a second step, we augmented 
each model with a set of standard firm-level controls 
to better identify the gender gap and avoid attribut-
ing it to possible omitted variables. Depending on 
the nature of the dependent variable, the models 
were estimated as Linear or Probit.
Gender and firm size. Consistent with a large body 
of literature (Aterido et al., 2013; Bardasi, Sabarwal, 
and Terrell, 2011; Bruhn, 2009; Sabarwal and Terrell, 
2008), Table 6.5 shows that firms with some female 
participation defined according to the five alterna-
tive gender indicators previously introduced, are sig-
nificantly smaller than other firms. This finding was 
also robust when including firm-level variables, even 
though the point estimates were generally halved.
Gender and firm age. The results were less clear-cut 
for gender and firm age (Table 6.6). When women 
were predominant in management (dominant man-
ager), the coefficient was statistically significant, as 
was the case for women-led businesses, but the latter 
correlation did not hold once firm-level controls were 
included in the regression model, suggesting that the 
correlation was driven by an omitted variable (i.e., size).
Gender and export propensity. Consistent with what 
is shown in Table 6.4, the results for gender and 
exporting did not support the hypothesis that the 
gender composition of a firm is a significant predic-
tor of the likelihood of being present in international 
markets. This was true even without controlling for 
other firm characteristics (Table 6.7).
Gender and innovation. We considered the possibil-
ity of a gender gap in a firm’s propensity to inno-
vate, assuming women may be more risk averse 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011) 
and, therefore, less prone to innovate (Chen et al., 
2015). Table 6.8 shows that the empirical evidence 
did not support this assumption.8
FIGURE 6.3.  Major Obstacles for Women-Led 
Businesses in the Caribbean
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Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
8  Results (which, for brevity, are not shown, but are avail-
able on request from the authors) were confirmed when we 
measured the propensity to innovate with a dummy for firms 
that had a research and development department.
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TABLE 6.5. Gender Composition and Firm Size
Dependent 
variable: size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.401*** −0.193**
(0.085) (0.081)
Dominant 
owner
−0.328*** −0.194***
(0.069) (0.063)
Dominant 
manager
−0.262*** −0.138**
(0.069) (0.060)
Female owner 0.067 −0.173***
(0.054) (0.052)
Female top 
manager
−0.416*** −0.278***
(0.062) (0.057)
Age 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.475*** 0.479*** 0.470***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Export (0/1) 0.190*** 0.198*** 0.191*** 0.184*** 0.188***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Innovation 
(0/1)
0.178*** 0.171*** 0.175*** 0.182*** 0.165**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Foreign 
ownership 
(0/1)
0.426*** 0.421*** 0.423*** 0.425*** 0.410***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
Sole 
proprietorship 
(0/1)
−0.516*** −0.514*** −0.527*** −0.593*** −0.523***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.048)
Financing as 
an obstacle 
(0/1)
−0.152*** −0.154*** −0.163*** −0.160*** −0.159***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Technical 
assistance 
(0/1)
0.089 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.088
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
R-squared 0.112 0.296 0.112 0.297 0.109 0.296 0.102 0.298 0.123 0.303
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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Gender and access to credit. Tables  6.9 and 6.10 
confirm a gender gap in access to financing when 
considering the gender indicator women-led, sup-
porting what was found by Presbitero et al. (2014) 
on a smaller sample of Caribbean countries. We 
found robust evidence that women-led firms were 
less likely to ask for credit from a bank but also to 
consider access to financing as a severe obstacle to 
business activities than other firms, even control-
ling for firm characteristics. Demand for credit was 
also confirmed for female-owner firms (Table 6.9).
Gender and technical assistance. Finally, we con- 
sidered the possibility that firms with a significant 
TABLE 6.6. Gender Composition and Firm Age
Dependent variable: age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.090* −0.009
(0.052) (0.050)
Dominant owner −0.026 0.038
(0.042) (0.040)
Dominant manager −0.125*** −0.079**
(0.040) (0.038)
Female owner 0.025 0.008
(0.032) (0.032)
Female top manager −0.123*** −0.045
(0.036) (0.035)
Size 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.182***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Export (0/1) 0.066* 0.064* 0.068* 0.066* 0.067*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Innovation (0/1) 0.073* 0.074* 0.073* 0.073* 0.072*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Foreign ownership (0/1) −0.071* −0.071* −0.073* −0.071* −0.073*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.019 −0.023 −0.016 −0.016 −0.019
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031)
Financing as an obstacle 
(0/1)
−0.059* −0.060* −0.060* −0.059* −0.059*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.027 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.027
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
R-squared 0.083 0.186 0.082 0.186 0.087 0.188 0.082 0.186 0.087 0.186
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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Is There a Gender Gap in Firm 
Productivity?
The empirical analysis presented so far shows that 
the gender composition of a firm is significantly 
associated with some key firm characteristics—
notably size and access to financing—that are likely 
to affect firm performance (Van Biesebroeck, 2005a; 
Grazzi, Pietrobelli, and Szirmai, 2015; Beck and 
component of women in management or ownership 
might have had a disadvantage in accessing technical 
assistance programs. Results did not show any strong 
pattern, other than for firms with a predominant 
share of women in management. These firms were 
less likely to take advantage of technical assistance 
programs than comparable firms, even when we 
took into account differences along observable firm 
characteristics (Table 6.11).
TABLE 6.7. Gender Composition and Firm Propensity to Export
Dependent variable: export (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.017 0.123
(0.125) (0.129)
Dominant owner 0.104 0.237**
(0.094) (0.096)
Dominant manager 0.039 0.140
(0.092) (0.097)
Female owner 0.077 −0.050
(0.073) (0.080)
Female top manager −0.099 0.004
(0.089) (0.092)
Size 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.114***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 0.122** 0.121** 0.125** 0.122** 0.122**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Innovation (0/1) 0.436*** 0.441*** 0.437*** 0.441*** 0.438***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Foreign ownership (0/1) 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.256*** 0.257***
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.303*** −0.310*** −0.301*** −0.311*** −0.293***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.089) (0.084)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) −0.037 −0.039 −0.032 −0.033 −0.033
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.129 0.133 0.137 0.126 0.129
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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calculated TFP in 80 developing countries using micro 
data from the WBES, we estimated a log-linearized 
Cobb-Douglas function with the value of sales 
(question K1B in the PROTEqIN survey) as output, and 
total labor costs (question K2B), the replacement cost 
of machinery and equipment (question K7), and total 
intermediate costs (K1B) as inputs.
For each of the five gender variables, we 
estimated the model controlling only for sector and 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). To investigate the presence 
of a gender gap in firm performance, we estimated 
a simple model for the drivers of firm productivity, 
augmented with the different proposed measures of 
gender composition within the firm. We measured firm 
productivity by: (1) value added per worker, (2) sales 
per worker, and (3) total factor productivity (TFP), 
measured as the residual of the production function. 
In particular, following Saliola and Seker (2011), who 
TABLE 6.8. Gender Composition and Firm Propensity to Innovate
Dependent variable: innovation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led 0.056 0.126
(0.127) (0.130)
Dominant owner −0.089 −0.066
(0.102) (0.105)
Dominant manager −0.007 0.029
(0.094) (0.096)
Female owner 0.118 0.145*
(0.075) (0.081)
Female top manager −0.178* −0.127
(0.092) (0.094)
Size 0.096*** 0.093** 0.095*** 0.100*** 0.090**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Age 0.114* 0.113* 0.114* 0.116** 0.110*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Export (0/1) 0.414*** 0.419*** 0.415*** 0.418*** 0.417***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Foreign ownership (0/1) 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.011
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) 0.030 0.044 0.039 0.091 0.038
(0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.087) (0.082)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) −0.049 −0.039 −0.042 −0.043 −0.042
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.048 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.045
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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dummy variables to identify firms that (1) exported 
some of their production, (2) introduced a new or 
significantly improved product or service as a proxy 
for firm propensity to innovate, (3) were foreign 
owned, (4) were sole proprietorships, (5) considered 
access to financing a major or very severe obstacle 
to business activities, and (6) benefited from any 
technical assistance program.
country fixed effects. Then, we added a standard set 
of control variables to examine whether the gender 
gap in firm productivity (if found) could be explained 
by firm characteristics. In particular, following what 
was done in the previous section, we included firm 
size and age measured by the logarithm of the 
number of employees and the number of years since 
inception, respectively. We also included a set of 
TABLE 6.9. Gender Composition and Firm Demand for Bank Credit
Dependent variable: 
credit application (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.293*** −0.267**
(0.107) (0.108)
Dominant owner −0.259*** −0.237***
(0.085) (0.086)
Dominant manager −0.144* −0.124
(0.080) (0.081)
Female owner −0.104 −0.137**
(0.064) (0.068)
Female top manager −0.066 −0.039
0.065** 0.064** 0.067** 0.064** 0.068**
Size (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
0.022 0.026 0.019 0.024 0.022
Age (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
−0.087 −0.078 −0.085 −0.092 −0.089
Export (0/1) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
0.030 0.021 0.025 0.031 0.024
Innovation (0/1) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
−0.079 −0.085 −0.082 −0.078 −0.080
Foreign ownership (0/1) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
−0.030 −0.030 −0.045 −0.098 −0.049
Sole proprietorship (0/1) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072) (0.068)
0.020 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.023
Technical assistance (0/1) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
(0.076) (0.077)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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However, in line with evidence for advanced 
economies (Wolfers, 2006) and Latin America 
(Abrahams et al, 2016; Flabbi et al., 2014), once 
we controlled for firm characteristics other 
than industries and countries, we found that 
the productivity gap vanished for women-led 
businesses and for firms that were predominantly 
owned by women (dominant owner). The 
Tables  6.12–6.14 consistently show that there 
was a gender gap in productivity irrespective of 
the measure of gender composition, with the only 
exception being the dummy female owner, which 
identifies firms with at least one woman among the 
owners, and women-led business, which was not 
significant when firm performance was measured 
by TFP, even though the coefficient was negative.
TABLE 6.10. Gender Composition and Financing as an Obstacle to Firm Activity
Dependent variable: 
financing as an obstacle (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led 0.298*** 0.266**
(0.107) (0.109)
Dominant owner 0.154* 0.128
(0.088) (0.090)
Dominant manager −0.042 −0.074
(0.085) (0.087)
Female owner −0.008 0.010
(0.069) (0.075)
Female top manager 0.038 −0.013
(0.080) (0.082)
Size −0.093*** −0.095*** −0.100*** −0.098*** −0.099***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age −0.092* −0.093* −0.094* −0.091* −0.092*
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Export (0/1) −0.056 −0.060 −0.048 −0.051 −0.050
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Innovation (0/1) −0.058 −0.051 −0.053 −0.054 −0.054
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Foreign ownership (0/1) −0.004 0.001 −0.005 −0.002 −0.002
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.030 −0.016 −0.002 −0.001 −0.004
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.079) (0.073)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.067 0.066 0.059 0.063 0.063
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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export oriented are more productive, and access 
to financing is strongly associated with firm 
performance (Van Biesebroeck, 2005b).
Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition
We carried out the counterfactual decomposition 
of the difference in the average performance across 
performance gap survived only when considering 
the gender composition of firm management 
(dominant manager and female top manager).
The results for the other firm-level variables 
were in line with the evidence on the drivers of 
firm performance in the literature, supporting the 
fact that the overall model was well specified. 
In particular, firms that are larger, older, and 
TABLE 6.11. Gender Composition and Technical Assistance
Dependent variable: 
technical assistance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.087 −0.110
(0.126) (0.128)
Dominant owner −0.119 −0.139
(0.100) (0.102)
Dominant manager −0.210** −0.213**
(0.097) (0.098)
Female owner −0.146* −0.122
(0.075) (0.079)
Female top manager −0.075 −0.060
(0.088) (0.089)
Size 0.058 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Age 0.045 0.046 0.038 0.045 0.043
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
Export (0/1) 0.147 0.152 0.152 0.142 0.146
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Innovation (0/1) 0.063 0.059 0.063 0.068 0.060
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Foreign ownership (0/1) −0.150 −0.152 −0.155 −0.149 −0.153
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) 0.132 0.136* 0.131 0.082 0.124
(0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) 0.077 0.078 0.070 0.073 0.073
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Probit regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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in firm performance into two components: (1)  the 
explained part due to differences in characteristics 
across groups, and (2) the residual or the unexplained 
part, which can be interpreted as a measure of 
women-managed firms and other firms using the 
standard Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) approach. 
This technique is widely used in the literature on wage 
gaps across gender or race to decompose the gap 
TABLE 6.12. Gender Composition and Firm Productivity (value added per worker)
Dependent variable: value 
added per worker (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.152** −0.072
(0.075) (0.074)
Dominant owner −0.123** −0.073
(0.061) (0.060)
Dominant manager −0.163*** −0.124**
(0.057) (0.057)
Female owner 0.027 −0.018
(0.049) (0.053)
Female top manager −0.241*** −0.186***
(0.058) (0.059)
Size 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.069***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Age 0.087** 0.088** 0.083** 0.087** 0.083**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Export (0/1) 0.132** 0.135** 0.134** 0.130** 0.132**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Innovation (0/1) 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.031
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
Foreign ownership (0/1) 0.058 0.057 0.055 0.058 0.050
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.083* −0.083* −0.085* −0.096* −0.087*
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) (0.050)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) −0.159*** −0.160*** −0.165*** −0.162*** −0.163***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.039 0.038 0.034 0.039 0.038
(0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
R-squared 0.664 0.676 0.664 0.676 0.665 0.676 0.664 0.676 0.667 0.677
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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The results of the two-fold decomposition 
for the two gender variables showed a gender 
gap after controlling for firm characteristics, as 
shown in Table  6.15. Measuring performance by 
discrimination, even though it could include the 
effect of other unobserved heterogeneity (omitted 
variables that can differ across the two groups of 
firms and can contribute to predicting performance).
TABLE 6.13. Gender Composition and Firm Productivity (sales per worker)
Dependent variable: sales per 
worker (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.151** −0.064
(0.070) (0.070)
Dominant owner −0.131** −0.076
(0.058) (0.057)
Dominant manager −0.154*** −0.112**
(0.054) (0.053)
Female owner 0.033 −0.018
(0.047) (0.050)
Female top manager −0.222*** −0.162***
(0.054) (0.055)
Size 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.064***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Age 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.093** 0.097*** 0.093**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Export (0/1) 0.148** 0.151** 0.150** 0.146** 0.148**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
Innovation (0/1) 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.010
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Foreign ownership (0/1) 0.114* 0.112* 0.112* 0.114* 0.107
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.097** −0.096** −0.099** −0.109** −0.101**
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.047)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) −0.181*** −0.181*** −0.186*** −0.183*** −0.184***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.075 0.073 0.070 0.075 0.074
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Observations 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821 1,821
R-squared 0.693 0.706 0.693 0.706 0.693 0.707 0.692 0.706 0.695 0.708
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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Dissimilarly, in firms with a female top 
manager, the explained part of the gap accounted 
for almost half of the total gap and both 
components were statistically greater than zero. 
In particular, it is worth noting that size, age, 
and, to a lesser extent, access to financing were 
sales or value added per worker provided almost 
an identical picture. The performance of dominant 
manager firms was lower than that of other firms, 
and two-thirds of this gap was due to unobserved 
factors; the explained part of the gap was not 
statistically different from zero.
TABLE 6.14. Gender Composition and Firm Productivity (total factor productivity)
Dependent variable: TFP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Women-led −0.022 −0.010
(0.023) (0.023)
Dominant owner −0.032* −0.024
(0.019) (0.019)
Dominant manager −0.041** −0.036**
(0.017) (0.018)
Female owner 0.012 0.008
(0.016) (0.016)
Female top manager −0.060*** −0.053***
(0.017) (0.017)
Size 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.001 −0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Export (0/1) −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Innovation (0/1) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Foreign ownership (0/1) 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.029
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Sole proprietorship (0/1) −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 −0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Financing as an obstacle (0/1) −0.032* −0.032* −0.033* −0.033* −0.033*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Technical assistance (0/1) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770 1,770
R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.014
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: Linear regression with robust standard errors. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent 
level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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other Caribbean firms in several characteristics. 
In particular, a larger presence of women in 
management and ownership of a firm was often 
associated with smaller size, younger age, domestic 
ownership, and limited access to financing. Some 
of these stylized facts differed depending on the 
measure of gender composition within the firm, 
supporting the finding that having a different 
gender balance in ownership or in management 
was associated with different firm characteristics.
The main analysis focused on a gender gap 
in firm performance and showed that firms with 
female management (dominant manager and 
female top manager) were in fact less productive 
than comparable firms, even after controlling for 
country and sector fixed effects and for a large 
set of firm-level variables that drive productivity. 
This result, however, was not valid for women-led 
businesses and for firms that were predominantly 
the three observable variables that significantly 
contributed to explaining part of the difference in 
firm productivity across the gender composition 
of management. This was consistent with the 
previous evidence about the existence of a gender 
gap in firm size and age.
Finally, considering TFP, almost all of the 
difference between firms with a dominant manager 
or a female top manager and the others was 
unexplained, but this result was likely due to the 
fact that the TFP was estimated as a residual from 
an auxiliary regression.
Conclusions
Female participation in management and 
ownership of Caribbean firms is relatively high 
compared to international standards. This study 
found that women-led businesses differed from 
TABLE 6.15. Gender Composition and Firm Productivity: Blinder–Oaxaca Decomposition
E [YFEMALE=0]
(1)
E [YFEMALE=1]
(2)
Difference
(3)
Explained
(4)
Unexplained
(5)
% Unexplained
(6) Observations
Value added per worker
Dominant manager 11.640 11.462 0.178 0.057 0.120 67.8 1,821
(0.080) (0.503) (0.033)
Female top manager 11.686 11.325 0.360 0.176 0.184 51.2 1,821
(0.000) (0.030) (0.001)
Sales per worker
Dominant manager 12.354 12.189 0.165 0.058 0.107 65.0 1,821
(0.106) (0.510) (0.042)
Female top manager 12.391 12.080 0.311 0.150 0.161 51.8 1,821
(0.001) (0.068) (0.003)
TFP
Dominant manager 0.011 −0.028 0.039 0.003 0.036 93.3 1,770
(0.021) (0.543) (0.038)
Female top manager 0.015 −0.040 0.055 0.002 0.053 96.3 1,770
(0.001) (0.689) (0.002)
Source: Authors based on PROTEqIN data.
Notes: The table reports the two-fold Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition of the gender gap for alternative measures of firm productivity 
and for two measures of gender composition in the firm management (by row). Results are obtained using the Stata routine Oaxaca 
(Jann, 2008). Column 5 (Explained) reports the part of the difference in means (Column 4) that was due to group differences in the 
predictors (the ‘endowments effect’), while Column 6 reports the Unexplained part. Numbers in parentheses for Columns 4–6 report the 
p-values of the test when the expected values and the difference were equal to zero. See Jann (2008) for additional details.
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owned by women (dominant owner), which were as 
productive as comparable firms.
The evidence discussed in this chapter pro-
vides some novel insights on the role of gender 
in firm performance in the Caribbean. The results 
can help design effective policy interventions 
aimed at narrowing the gender gap in firm pro-
ductivity. In particular, we found that differences 
in firm size, age, and access to financing across 
gender explained a significant part of the pro-
ductivity gap of firms with women among the 
key managers. Thus, policies aimed at promot-
ing firm growth and access to financing for busi-
nesses managed by women are likely to be the 
most effective in narrowing the gender produc-
tivity gap.
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Firm Response to Erratic Power 
Supply: New Evidence from 
Caribbean Firms
Manuel Barron
A fast-growing body of literature assesses how rural electrification molds household behavior. Studies have found effects of ac-
cess to electrification on a wealth of socioeconom-
ic variables like employment (Dinkelman, 2011), in-
door air quality (Barron and Torero, 2015a), energy 
use, time allocation, and income (Barron and Torero, 
2015b; Bensch, Kluve, and Peters, 2010; Khandker, 
Barnes, and Samad, 2012, 2013; Chakravorty, Pelli, 
and Marchand, 2013), housing value and human 
development (Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham, 
2013). However, there is still scarce evidence on 
the role that access to electricity plays on firm per-
formance and industry development, two key ele-
ments of economic growth. A notable exception is 
the study by Rud (2012), who showed that electri-
fication boosted the development of the manufac-
turing sector in India. Ryan (2013) went a step fur-
ther and showed that quality of provision matters. 
He found that firms increase supply in response to 
a more integrated grid, leading to sizeable increas-
es in market surplus. Conversely, other studies have 
shown that intermittent, unreliable electricity, and 
unexpected outages or surges can hurt firm per-
formance. Power outages cost businesses in terms 
of lost sales (e.g.,  Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and 
O’Connell, 2015; Beenstock, Goldin, and Haitovsky, 
1997; Adenikinju, 2005) as well as equipment dam-
age, as documented by Foster and Steinbuks 
(2009). Alam (2013) provided evidence of hetero-
geneity in the effect of outages, showing that pow-
er outages lower profits and output of some elec-
tricity-intensive industries in India, but not across 
the board.
Several studies have found that firms strategi-
cally reallocate resources to cope with unreliable 
electricity supply; most saliently, self-generation. 
While access to a generator allows firms to con-
tinue their operations during power outages, self-
generation implies higher energy costs (Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2002) and sometimes even a weaker 
and more volatile power current. Furthermore, only 
some firms in developing regions have access to 
generators, depending on their size, degree of 
access to financing, and the dynamism of local 
markets (Steinbuks and Foster, 2010; Alby, Dethier, 
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Straub, 2011; Steinbuks, 2012). Other coping strat-
egies may be as simple as running machinery at 
faster speeds in periods when grid electricity is 
available, or more elaborately, outsourcing pro-
duction of intermediate inputs. Alam (2013) doc-
umented that some rice mills in India accelerated 
their production process by running the machines 
at higher speed when grid electricity was avail-
able. While this increased energy efficiency, it also 
increased wastage of unprocessed rice, the main 
variable input, thus reducing overall productivity. 
Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, and Wang (2015), in turn, 
documented the case of energy-intensive firms in 
China, which outsourced production of intermedi-
ate inputs in their production processes, effectively 
substituting energy for materials, as a response to 
severe blackouts in the early 2000s.
This chapter contributes to the literature on 
how firms react to unreliable electricity supply 
by analyzing the relationship between outages 
and firm behavior. The most salient message is 
that electricity reliability is directly associated 
with employment and innovation. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in power outages was 
linked to a 3 percent reduction in the labor force. 
Furthermore, most of the lost jobs were perma-
nent positions, not temporary. Firms may be firing 
more workers or hiring fewer if they are continu-
ously exposed to power outages, but at any rate, 
these are lost jobs. Analyzing data by gender 
showed that the jobs were lost almost exclusively 
among female workers. There was some variability 
across countries, but job shedding in the median 
firm amounted to roughly US$40,000 per year in 
lost wages. Workers, and apparently female work-
ers, footed the bill of power outages.
Next, I analyzed the effect on innovation. The 
main finding was that firms with higher exposure to 
outages were less likely to introduce innovations in 
goods or services, but this effect was concentrated 
among firms with access to generators. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in outages was associated 
with a 10 percent reduction in the likelihood of intro-
ducing innovation in goods or services among these 
firms. This is consistent with firms allocating resources 
to self-generation that would have been allocated 
to innovation. Given the importance of innovation 
on firm growth, this finding suggests that unreliable 
power supply may have long-term consequences on 
firm performance and industry development.
The usual problems of endogeneity arise, so, 
to estimate the effects on firm outcomes, I relied 
on the panel structure of the dataset and included 
firm fixed effects, together with evidence that 
showed outages in the study sample were not 
related to lagged firm characteristics. Since firms 
were exposed to outages irrespective of their 
main observable characteristics (e.g.,  revenues, 
wage bill, number of employees, and other expen-
ditures, as detailed in the main text), I argue that 
systematic differences reported in the follow-up 
survey arose, to a large extent, as a result of out-
ages. Although it is impossible to control directly 
for unobservable variables like manager skills, it is 
reasonable to argue that revenues are a function 
of such variables. Hence, revenues work as a proxy 
for these unobservable variables. This procedure, 
in the same spirit as the “treatment balance” test 
in experimental studies, gave some support to the 
argument that differences in current outcomes 
were largely due to outages.
Data and Context
The data for this study come from the 2010 Latin 
American and Caribbean Enterprise Survey (LACES) 
and its 2014 follow-up, the Productivity, Technology, 
and Innovation (PROTEqIN) Survey, which targeted 
1,680 LACES respondents to get new information 
on the original questions and to get additional 
information on firm performance, innovation, and 
management style, among other variables.
The main summary statistics are presented in 
Table 7.1. Of note, since the Dominican Republic was 
not included in the PROTEqIN survey, these firms 
were not taken into account for the main analysis. 
Including the Dominican Republic, two-thirds of the 
firms in the LACES survey reported experiencing 
power outages in 2010, with an average duration 
of 12.7  hours per month. Firms in the Dominican 
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Republic reported average outages of 61.2  hours, 
so restricting the sample to countries that appeared 
in both surveys, average power outages decreased 
to 5.6 hours per month. Perhaps as a result of this, 
37 percent of firms classified electricity as a major 
or very severe obstacle to their business operations 
in LACES (35  percent omitting the Dominican 
Republic). Surprisingly, this figure is higher than 
corruption (31  percent), access to financing 
(33  percent), crime (30  percent), and unfair 
competition from the informal sector (26 percent).
By 2014, 77% of firms in the PROTEqIN survey 
still reported experiencing outages, but average 
outage duration decreased to 5.3 hours per month. 
This represents a 5  percent reduction compared 
to the LACES figure, excluding the Dominican 
Republic. Perhaps partly due to this reduction, 
the share of firms reporting electricity as a major 
or very severe obstacle declined to 27  percent, 
suggesting that although some progress had been 
made, there was ample room for improvement.
Unreliable access to electricity negatively 
affects profits and productivity. For instance, it 
induced some firms to buy or share generators, 
which produce electricity at a higher cost than grid 
electricity. LACES data suggests that on average 
16 percent of electricity was generated by genera-
tor, and that 43 percent of firms owned or shared a 
generator. The PROTEqIN figure was slighting lower 
at 42 percent, but the share of electricity generated 
by this method decreased to 10 percent. This sug-
gests that firms may be holding on to their genera-
tors to insure against power outages, but that the 
generators are being used less frequently as a con-
sequence of improved reliability of electricity.
Empirical Approach
Estimating Equations
The main reduced-form estimating equation was:
 γit = α + δ outageit + γt + µi + εit (1)
where y indicates the outcome of interest for firm i 
in year t, outage is monthly hours of power outage, 
γt and µi, are time and firm fixed effects, respec-
tively, and εit is a disturbance term. Standard errors 
are clustered at the country level. This specification 
allowed all time-invariant firm characteristics to be 
controlled for.
Given that some questions were added in the 
PROTEqIN survey, analysis of covariance was used 
TABLE 7.1. Summary Statistics
LACES
2010
PROTEqIN
2014
Experienced outage (%) 77.48 77.01
SD 41.78 42.09
Outage hours per month 5.64 5.33
SD 15.87 16.92
Median 2 2
Hours of operation per week 62.65 73.64
SD 30.20 32.11
Median 50 65
Capacity utilization (%) 74.39 73.26
SD 11.88 14.10
Median 75 72
Employees 59.07 60.59
SD 132.27 124.55
Median 22 23
Permanent employees 53.00 55.56
SD 117.25 115.58
Median 20 21
Temporary employees 14.24 5.02
SD 48.77 22.56
Median 4 0
Female employees (permanent) 19.64 18.47
SD 49.77 50.67
Median 6 6
Male employees (permanent) 24.42 37.09
SD 53.06 76.17
Median 10 13
Access to generator (%) 43.02 41.66
SD 0.50 0.49
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
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instead of the fixed-effects model. The estimating 
equation was:
 γi = α + δ outagei + β1 Xi0 + β2 Ni0 + ε i  (2)
where Xi0 includes the lagged value of the outcome 
of interest y if that variable was available in LACES, 
and Ni0=1 if the firm was not included in LACES. In 
particular, Xi0 included lagged revenues, economic 
sector, and country fixed effects. Together, these 
variables accounted for the most important firm 
characteristics. In particular, controlling for country, 
sector, and differences in revenues was a proxy for 
differences in firm size, manager characteristics, and 
productivity, among others. The main advantage 
of this procedure was that it allowed variables 
that were not part of LACES to be included, while 
estimating the firm-fixed effects model would 
have required dropping them. Equation 1 was used 
for revenues and employment (total, permanent, 
temporary, male, and female). Equation 2, on the 
other hand, was used for regressions with hours 
of work, capacity utilization, and the innovation 
variables as dependent variables.
The Issue of Causality
Given the lack of plausibly exogenous variation in 
outages, the estimates provided in this chapter are 
not causal. However, I argue that, despite the fact 
that the model did not allow the magnitude of the 
coefficients to be specified, it is still possible to con-
clude that electricity shortages in fact affect firm 
outcomes. The conditional independence assump-
tion (Angrist and Pischke, 2008: 52) needs to be 
relied on to interpret the results as causal. This 
assumption is formally stated as:
 Yit ⊥ outageit  X
Controlling for a set of covariates Xit, potential 
outcomes of firm i are independent of the level 
of outages the firm experienced. To understand 
this expression intuitively, think of a firm in the 
PROTEqIN survey (2014), its employment level, and 
its exposure to outages. Now, imagine the value of 
employment the firm would have reported if it had 
been exposed to a different level of outages in the 
same year. This imaginary value is called a potential 
outcome. To infer causality, it is necessary to find 
firms with similar potential outcomes. Now, think of 
firms from the same country and economic sector. 
These firms share many common characteristics, 
but there are clearly wide differences among 
them, so they are unlikely to have similar potential 
outcomes. Beyond country and sector, firms differ in 
manager skills, labor force (in size as well as human 
capital), access to financing and to international 
markets, and so on. Two firms that share all these 
characteristics may indeed have similar potential 
outcomes. Though it is not possible to observe 
each of these variables individually, it is possible to 
observe one that summarizes them all: revenues. If 
revenues are a function of all these variables, it can 
be argued that firms from the same country and 
sector, and with the same revenues, have similar 
potential outcomes. Thus, controlling for revenues 
should satisfy the conditional independence 
assumption. Since revenues and outages are 
determined simultaneously, the regressions control 
for lagged revenues.
In addition, Table 7.2 shows that, controlling for 
country and sector, monthly outage hours in 2014 
were not related to lagged firm characteristics. This 
means that firms that in 2014 were highly exposed 
to outages looked almost the same in 2010 as firms 
that in 2014 would be less exposed to outages. 
Since there were no systematic differences in the 
earlier period, it could be argued that a substantial 
portion of the systematic differences in 2014 were 
to a large degree due to differential exposure to 
outages. Each cell in Table 7.2 shows the coefficient 
of a regression of lagged firm characteristics, 
as indicated in the column headers, on outages. 
The key message is that outages in 2010 had no 
relation to firm characteristics in 2014. Outages 
were uncorrelated with lagged revenues, hours of 
operation, capacity utilization, or the number of 
employees. In addition, outages were uncorrelated 
with the number of temporary or permanent 
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workers or their gender. Panel C shows the result 
of a test of additional firm characteristics. Lagged 
wages, fuel expenditures, and expenditures on 
materials showed no relation to outages. The only 
statistically significant relationship was between 
outages and lagged electricity bill. Firms that used 
more electricity in 2010 were more likely to suffer 
outages in 2014. To account for this difference, all 
analysis of covariance regressions (Equation  2) 
included lagged electricity expenditures as a 
control variable.
Despite being a somewhat encouraging result, 
the lack of systematic differences in lagged observ-
able characteristics by exposure to outages did not 
offer a solution to the problem of double causal-
ity, which was another potential source of bias in 
OLS. This issue was especially important because 
outages may have depended on current production 
and, hence, indirectly on the outcome variables of 
interest. However, this reverse channel of causality 
implies a positive relationship between employment 
and outages, since firms that produce more—and 
thus require higher employment—demand more 
electricity and cause outages. Since the results indi-
cate a negative relationship, reverse causality would 
be playing against the hypothesis, thus our esti-
mates would be interpreted as a lower bound of the 
true effects of outages on firm behavior.
Results
The sample standard deviation of outages was 
16.4 hours, but this was due mostly to a handful of 
large values (17 firms reported more than 50 hours 
TABLE 7.2. Power Outages and Lagged Firm Characteristics
Panel A: Main characteristics
(1)
Revenues
(2)
Hours of work
(3)
Capacity
(4)
Employees
Power outages 0.1615 −0.0035 −0.0426 0.0017
(0.1884) (0.0019) (0.0303) (0.0022)
Number of firms 1,720 214 205 1,886
Mean dep. var. 0.034 63.785 74.205 54.411
Panel B: Labor force
(1)
Temporary
(2)
Permanent, males
(3)
Permanent, females
(4)
Fem/male ratio
Power outages 0.0036 −0.0022 0.0168 0.1828
(0.0103) (0.0037) (0.0100) (0.1281)
Number of firms 812 1,617 1,617 1,601
Mean dep. var. 11.494 24.936 19.992 1.424
Panel C: Expenditures
(1)
Wages
(2)
Electricity
(3)
Fuel
(4)
Materials
Power outages 0.0596 0.7191** −0.2277 −0.2289
(0.2149) (0.2597) (0.2659) (0.3095)
Number of firms 1,729 620 543 576
Mean dep. var. 0.04 0.034 0.037 0.03
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
Notes: All regressions controlled for country and sector fixed effects. Power outages are measured as monthly hours of outages from 
the PROTEqIN data. The dependent variables are those indicated in the columns. Standard errors were clustered at the country level. 
Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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of outage). Hence, I used a conservative estimate 
of the standard deviation of the distribution after 
trimming values above two and above three 
standard deviations, which reduced the value of a 
standard deviation to 6.0 or 6.7 hours, respectively. 
To err on the modest side, a “standard deviation” 
unit was taken as 6.0 hours.
Table 7.3 shows that revenues were not altered 
significantly by power outages—consistent with 
Figure  7.1.1 Firms reacted to outages by reducing 
employment. The average outage duration was 
TABLE 7.3. Outages and Firm Outcomes
Panel A: Main regression
(1)
Revenues
(2)
Employment
(3)
Hours
(4)
Capacity utilization
Power outages 0.0005 −0.3356** −0.1618 −0.0869
(0.0005) (0.1464) (0.0477) (0.0487)
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes Yes
Lagged controls No No Yes Yes
Number of firms 2,395 2,458 890 872
Mean dep. var. −0.002 59.1 71.2 73.4
Panel B: By generator ownership
(1)
Revenues
(2)
Employment
(3)
Hours
(4)
Capacity utilization
Power outages −0.0009 −0.1554* −0.1216 0.0174
(0.001) (0.086) (0.0872) (0.1127)
Power outages × generator 0.0017 −0.2364 0.0747 −0.1327
(0.0011) (0.1627) (0.1106) (0.1034)
Firm FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes No No
Country FE No No Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes Yes
Lagged controls No No Yes Yes
Number of firms 2,395 2,457 889 871
Mean dep. var. −0.002 59.1 71.7 73.4
Marginal effect of outages for firms with 
access to a generator
0.001** −0.392** −0.047 −0.115***
(0.000) (0.152) (0.049) (0.014)
t-stat 2.186 −2.581 −0.959 −8.07
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
Notes: All regressions controlled for country and sector fixed effects. Power outages are measured as monthly hours of outages 
reported in PROTEqIN. The dependent variables are indicated in the columns. Lagged controls were the standardized values of revenues 
and electricity expenditures as reported in LACES. Regressions on Hours and Capacity Utilization in Panel B included an indicator for 
access to a generator. Standard errors were clustered at the country level. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; 
** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
1  All monetary variables were standardized by country and year.
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5.5  hours per month, implying that the average 
firm fired 1.8 employees as a direct consequence 
of power outages. This was equivalent to 3 percent 
of the labor force in the sample, a non-negligible 
figure. Consistent with this reduction, capacity 
utilization fell by 8.7  percentage points, suggest-
ing important contractions in production. Hours of 
operation did not change significantly as a result of 
power outages.
These effects were more marked among firms 
with access to electricity generators. The marginal 
effect of outages on revenues was −0.002, which 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
outages reduced revenues by 0.012 standard devi-
ations. The marginal effect on employment was 
−0.4, so a standard deviation increase in outages 
was associated with 2.4 fewer employees. These 
firms also cut capacity utilization more drasti-
cally: the marginal effect of outages was −0.115, 
and a one standard deviation increase was asso-
ciated with a reduction of 0.69 percentage points 
in capacity utilization, or 1 percent of the average 
capacity utilization in the sample.
To gain a deeper understanding of the 
effects on employment, Table  7.4 disaggregates 
employment between permanent and temporary 
positions. Given the nature of their contracts, it 
is possible that firms keep permanent employees 
and fire temporary ones; however, this is not the 
only option. If firms are looking to access more 
flexible labor contracts, they may choose to fire 
permanent employees or to open fewer permanent 
positions. Alternatively, when firms decide to hire 
new employees, they may choose to hire more 
temporary workers. Table 7.5 shows that most of 
the effect of outages on employment was due to 
a reduction in the permanent workforce. A one 
standard deviation increase in outages eliminated 
1.6 permanent jobs. Temporary jobs were not 
affected. The effect among firms with access to 
generators was higher, at 1.8 permanent jobs, and 
smaller among firms with no access to generators, 
where only one permanent job would be shed.
Table 7.5 takes the analysis a step further and 
disaggregates the effect on permanent employ-
ees by gender. Firms seem to have reduced 
female employment, but not male employment, 
in response to power outages. The female to male 
ratio decreased by 1.2 percent per hour of outage, 
amounting to an average reduction of 7.3 percent. 
When disaggregating firms by access to power 
generators, the pattern arose again: firms with 
access to generators cut more female jobs than 
those without. The marginal effect in the group 
with access to a generator was −0.07, while in the 
group without access, it was −0.40. A one standard 
deviation increase in outages was associated with 
2.4 fewer females in permanent positions among 
firms with generators, and with 0.4 fewer females 
in permanent positions among firms with no access 
to generators. The female-to-male ratio decreased 
among this latter group by 7.2 percentage points.
Table  7.6 analyzes the relationship between 
outages and innovation. The dependent variables 
in all columns are dichotomous indicators of inno-
vation, taking the value of 1 if the firm reported hav-
ing innovated and 0 otherwise. Column 1 indicates 
whether the firm made a monetary investment in 
the previous two fiscal years. Column 2 indicates 
whether the firm introduced a new or improved 
good or service to the market in the three years 
leading to the survey. Column 3 indicates whether 
FIGURE 7.1.  Revenues and Outages, Local Polynomials 
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the firm introduced innovations in marketing its 
goods or services. Only the dependent variable in 
Column  2 appeared in both surveys, so it is pos-
sible to estimate Equation  1 only for this variable. 
For the others, Equation 2 was estimated.
Column  2 in Panel B shows that firms with 
generators were less likely to innovate the more 
they were exposed to power outages. A one 
standard deviation in outages was associated with 
a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the likelihood 
of innovation, which represents a 10  percent 
reduction with respect to the mean value in 
the PROTEqIN survey. The point estimates in 
the remaining columns were not statistically 
significant, but regrettably their confidence 
estimates were not tight enough to conclude that 
the effect was zero. For instance, the 95 percent 
confidence interval of the change in investment 
in innovation implied by one standard deviation 
in outages ranged from −0.01 to 0.02, implying a 
reduction of 8 percent or an increase of 16 percent 
with respect to the mean value.
Implications for Lost Wages
Based on the employment results above, the 
following investigates their potential implications 
for lost wages. Table  7.7 provides average and 
median salary, standard deviation of outage 
duration, and number of firms per country. These 
TABLE 7.4. Outages and Employment
Panel A: Main regression
(1)
Employment
(2)
Permanent
(3)
Temporary
(4)
Permanent/temporary
Power outages −0.3356** −0.2646** 0.0014 −0.0218
(0.1464) (0.1057) (0.0082) (0.0353)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2458 2458 2168 1066
Mean dep. var. 59.1 53.6 7.9 11.9
Panel B: By generator ownership
(1)
Employment
(2)
Permanent
(3)
Temporary
(4)
Permanent/temporary
Power outages −0.1554* −0.1593* −0.0016 0.0137
(0.0860) (0.0866) (0.0048) (0.0714)
Power outages × generator −0.2364 −0.1398 0.0047 −0.0526
(0.1627) (0.1315) (0.0083) (0.0670)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2457 2457 2168 1066
Mean dep. var. 59.2 53.2 7.9 11.9
Marginal effect of outages for firms with 
access to a generator
−0.392** −0.299** 0.003 −0.039
(0.152) (0.112) (0.010) (0.028)
t-stat −2.581 −2.674 0.310 −1.400
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
Notes: Regressions in Panel B included an indicator of access to a generator. Standard errors were clustered at the country level. 
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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data allowed the total number of jobs lost due to 
outages to be estimated, as well as the economic 
loss workers faced. Table  7.7 shows that a one 
standard deviation reduction in outage duration 
could save between 1.5 (Trinidad and Tobago) 
and 6.0 (Jamaica) jobs per firm. The figure for 
Guyana was higher, at 17.5, but atypical, given its 
large standard deviation. On average, the region 
would save 5.5 jobs per firm from a one standard 
deviation reduction in outage duration.
PROTEqIN data allowed the mean wages in each 
firm to be estimated, as well as several percentiles 
of the wage distribution. These figures, together 
with the regression results, were used to estimate 
the income loss associated with outages. On 
average, a one standard deviation increase in 
outages reduced the wage bill by US$54,000 per 
firm. The lowest values were observed in Belize and 
Dominica (US$11,800 and US$11,900, respectively), 
while the highest loss was observed in Guyana 
(US$66,200).
Conclusions
This chapter studied how Caribbean firms responded 
to power outages. The main finding is that power 
outages were negatively associated with employ-
ment and, among firms with access to a generator, 
TABLE 7.5. Outages and Employment
Panel A: Main regression
(1)
Permanent 
employees
(2)
Female
(3)
Male
(4)
Female/male
Power outages −0.2646** −0.3295* 0.0574 −0.0121**
(0.1057) (0.1694) (0.0698) (0.0041)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2458 2412 2412 2397
Mean dep. var. 53.6 18.9 30.1 1
Panel B: By generator ownership
(1)
Permanent 
employees
(2)
Female
(3)
Male
(4)
Female/male
Power outages −0.1593* −0.0720*** −0.1031 −0.0138
(0.0866) (0.0232) (0.0961) (0.0103)
Power outages × generator −0.1398 −0.3261* 0.1987 0.0022
(0.1315) (0.1747) (0.1396) (0.0106)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of firms 2457 2411 2411 2396
Mean dep. var. 53.6 18.9 30.1 1
Marginal effect of outages for firms with access to 
generator
−0.299** −0.398** 0.096 −0.012**
(0.112) (0.173) (0.071) (0.004)
t-stat −2.674 −2.298 1.35 −2.801
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
Notes: Regressions in Panel B included an indicator of access to a generator. Standard errors were clustered at the country level. 
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 7.6. Outages and Innovation
Panel A: Main Regression
(1)
Invested in 
innovation
(2)
Goods
(3)
Marketing
Power outages 0.0007 –0.0012 –0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Firm FE No Yes No
Year FE No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes
Sector FE Yes No Yes
Lagged controls Yes No Yes
Number of firms 1886 1886 1886
Mean dep. var. 0.174 0.123 0.123
Panel B: By Generator Ownership
(1)
Invested in 
Innovation
(2)
Goods
(4)
 Marketing
Power outages 0.0025 0.0026 0.0005
(0.002) (0.0025) (0.0015)
Power 
outages*generator
–0.0028 –0.0049** –0.0017
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0017)
Firm FE No Yes No
Year FE No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes
Sector FE Yes No Yes
Lagged controls Yes No Yes
Number of firms 1886 1886 1886
Mean dep. var. 0.174 0.123 0.123
Mg effect of outages for –0.000 –0.002*** –0.001
firms with access to 
generator
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
t-stat –0.231 –2.721 –1.196
Source: LACES and PROTEqIN surveys.
Notes: Regressions in Panel B included an indicator of access to 
a generator. Standard errors were clustered at the country level. 
*Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
innovation. A one standard deviation increase in 
outages was associated with a 3 percent decline in 
employment. The evidence reviewed in this study 
suggests that the majority of these positions would 
be lost by women in permanent jobs. While nothing 
guarantees that reducing outages would increase 
female employment, the results suggest that pre-
venting further job losses is likely to favor women, 
who at present have a higher risk of being fired. 
Using mean wages, the estimated annual reduc-
tions in the wage bill per firm amounted to roughly 
US$54,000, but the sample variation was consid-
erable, with figures ranging from US$11,800 and 
US$11,900 in Belize and Dominica to US$66,200 in 
Guyana. These figures can be used as inputs in a 
cost–benefit analysis to determine the benefits of 
upgrading the power generation and distribution 
system to reduce outages.
There was also a strong negative association 
between power outages and innovation, 
concentrated among firms with access to generators. 
A one standard deviation increase in outages was 
associated with a 10 percent decline in the likelihood 
of introducing innovation in goods or services among 
firms with access to generators. Since innovation 
is a key driver of firm growth, this suggests that 
outages may have permanent consequences for firm 
performance and industry development.
A natural next step is to investigate why the 
relationship between power outages and employ-
ment more strongly affects female workers. 
PROTEqIN data indicate that firms with top female 
managers on average experience one additional 
hour of outages. Thus, it may be that some sec-
tors are more affected by outages than others, and 
those have more female employees. So, it may be 
that firms that have a high proportion of female 
workers belong to specific sectors and are geo-
graphically clustered in locations that are more 
prone to outages. A more disaggregated geo-loca-
tion of the firms would be needed to investigate 
whether they are geographically clustered. Then 
the issue to uncover would be why they are clus-
tered there and what is preventing them from mov-
ing to better locations.
 FIRM RESPONSE TO ERRATIC POWER SUPPLY: NEW EVIDENCE FROM CARIBBEAN FIRMS 117
TABLE 7.7. Wages Lost to Outages (× US$1,000)
SD outage
Jobs lost 
per firm
Wage Implied reduction per firm
(× US$1,000) (× US$1,000)
Mean 25% 50% 75% Mean 25% 50% 75%
Antigua and Barbuda 6.00 2.01 12.0 5.6 8.6 13.6 24.2 11.3 17.4 27.5
Bahamas, The 8.24 2.77 16.7 7.6 12.8 20.0 46.3 21.0 35.4 55.3
Barbados 6.40 2.15 14.6 10.4 15.0 16.7 31.3 22.4 32.2 35.8
Belize 4.87 1.63 7.2 5.5 6.8 8.4 11.8 9.0 11.1 13.7
Dominica 4.67 1.57 7.6 5.3 6.6 9.1 11.9 8.3 10.3 14.2
Grenada 8.92 2.99 13.2 3.7 6.0 9.9 39.5 11.2 18.1 29.7
Guyana 52.06 17.47 3.8 1.7 3.1 5.1 66.2 30.0 53.5 89.5
Jamaica 17.86 5.99 7.0 4.1 5.5 8.0 42.2 24.7 32.8 47.7
Saint Lucia 5.23 1.76 7.0 4.1 6.2 8.0 12.2 7.2 10.9 14.1
St. Kitts and Nevis 11.27 3.78 7.9 4.8 6.6 9.1 29.9 18.0 25.0 34.4
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 4.99 1.68 9.6 5.7 7.4 9.4 16.1 9.5 12.4 15.8
Suriname 6.99 2.35 7.9 4.8 7.3 9.1 18.6 11.2 17.1 21.4
Trinidad and Tobago 4.52 1.52 12.6 5.9 9.0 12.3 19.1 9.0 13.6 18.7
Region 16.36 5.49 9.9 4.9 7.1 10.8 54.1 26.7 38.9 59.0
Source: PROTEqIN survey.
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  119 
Assessing the Impact of 
Innovation and Business 
Development Programs in the 
Caribbean
Federico Bernini, Lucas Figal Garone, and Alessandro Maffioli
Long-term productivity growth is a crucial de-terminant of sustainable growth and develop-ment. Substantial research has been devot-
ed to the search for the sources and determinants 
of productivity, and it is increasingly acknowledged 
that it is not possible to foster growth by perfect-
ing domestic markets and liberalizing international 
transactions alone; some form of active public poli-
cy is needed. In this sense, innovation is widely con-
sidered to be a primary source of economic growth, 
and policies to encourage firm-level innovation and 
business development are high on the agendas of 
most developed economies and those that are suc-
cessfully catching up. Also, many Latin American 
countries are increasingly committing to collective 
actions to build capacity, knowledge production, 
and technological innovation.
The theoretical justification for active inter-
ventions with regards to innovation and produc-
tive development policies is based on the concepts 
(and evidence) of market and coordination failures. 
In response, several Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAC) countries have put into place an increasingly 
complex set of programs and instruments (Agosin, 
2013; Melo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2006). Indeed, 
multiple productive development programs (PDPs) 
are in place to enhance productivity, including the 
following:
 • Business development programs such 
as  extension and technical assistance pro-
grams, support to adopt quality control and 
certification, training in information technol-
ogy and management best practices, and sup-
port for marketing and logistics.
 • Business linkages programs such as supplier 
development programs, clusters, and value 
chains. 
 • Business innovation programs such as research 
and development (R&D) subsidies, technology 
adoption funds, R&D tax credits, and univer-
sity–industry collaboration.
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 • Export and investment promotions, such as 
international trade fairs, technical assistance 
and training for exporting, and tax incentives 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).
 • Entrepreneurship development programs such 
as support for seed capital, angel investor net-
works, incubators, and venture capital.
 • Programs to facilitate long-term financing. 
Moreover, at least for the largest countries in 
the region, several of these PDPs are managed at 
different levels of government—national, provin-
cial, and even municipal.
Given that, on average, LAC countries exhibit 
lower productivity growth rates than other devel-
oped and developing countries, and that public 
intervention is a basic ingredient in enhancing firm 
productivity, program evaluation is an essential 
contribution to policy learning and decision-mak-
ing. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
is strategically relevant for external evaluation of 
policy interventions aimed at supporting innova-
tion and enhancing the competitiveness of firms in 
general and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in particular.
In contrast with the situation in developed 
countries, few PDP programs have been 
rigorously evaluated in LAC. Until very recently, 
such evaluations mostly relied on beneficiary 
satisfaction surveys or simple case studies that, 
although interesting, cannot assess whether a 
program is actually working. Fortunately this 
situation has evolved and, since the mid-2000s, an 
increasing number of studies and evaluations have 
analyzed the effectiveness of PDPs in LAC more 
rigorously. The IDB has contributed significantly 
to this growing literature, in particular in the areas 
of innovation and export promotion policies. Since 
2005, the IDB Evaluation Office, the Strategy 
Development Division, and the Competitiveness 
and Innovation Division have evaluated the impact 
of innovation and research policies in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Panama. In 2008, 
The World Bank, building on previous IDB work, 
carried-out the “Impact Evaluation of Small and 
Medium Enterprise Programs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean” project, which assessed the 
impact of some of these programs in Mexico, Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru (Acevedo and Tan, 2011).1
In the Caribbean, the evidence on the effec-
tiveness of PDPs is even more scarce. In this con-
text, Compete Caribbean’s 2013 Productivity, 
Technology, and Innovation (PROTEqIN) survey 
provides data that can help shed some light on 
the potential effects of PDPs on firm performance 
in Caribbean countries. This is a firm-level survey 
of a representative sample of the economy’s pri-
vate sector. The survey covers a broad range of 
business environment topics, including perfor-
mance measures, innovation, access to financing, 
competition, labor and skills, and public support. 
Of particular relevance is the module on business 
strategy and support programs. This module con-
tains information on firms’ participation in business 
development and innovation programs that can be 
used to analyze the effects of technical assistance, 
technology adoption, and innovation programs 
on firm performance. For this purpose, the survey 
identifies different variables of program participa-
tion (treatment), constructs several measures of 
productivity (labor productivity and total factor 
productivity, or TFP) as main indicators of perfor-
mance, and uses a large number of covariates to 
control for selection into the PDPs.
This chapter describes the performance of 
Caribbean firms and the effectiveness of the PDPs 
intended to improve performance. We character-
ize what kinds of firms are participating or not par-
ticipating in the different programs. This analysis 
can help answer some questions about PDPs. Are 
the participating firms the right target? Are firms 
aware of these kinds of programs? What is the 
potential demand for such programs?
We inquire about the main sectors and areas in 
which firms are more likely to use these programs. 
1  See Benavente et al. (2012), Figal Garone et al. (2014), Cas-
tillo et al. (2015), Crespi et al. (2015), Castillo et al. (2016), 
Figal Garone and Maffioli (2016), and the references therein 
cited, for recent evaluations of PDP in LAC.
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This is important because such information could be 
helpful in readapting the programs (if necessary) to 
cover the needs of firms and to better target them. 
We then review the effect of PDPs on intermediate 
outcomes with short-term impact, such as 
innovation spending and training. We look at the 
association between these intermediate outcomes 
and productivity measures that we would expect 
to have a long-term effect. Finally, we see whether 
these PDPs affect the probability of successfully 
improving performance measures such as reduced 
costs or increased sales.
While this study did not make it possible to 
define causal parameters that could strongly con-
firm the existence of a relationship between several 
variables, we sought to generate ideas to begin 
discussions and research to find effective ways to 
promote innovation and development in Caribbean 
firms.
Literature Review
There is a large body of literature that emphasizes 
the importance of productivity in driving develop-
ment. Robert Solow (1956) introduced a new way 
to think about economic growth, disaggregating 
it into different components. A country can pro-
duce more with factor accumulation (increasing 
the level of capital and labor or improving human 
capital) or by increasing TFP. Several papers have 
shown the importance of TFP, highlighting that, in 
the long run, it is the main source of growth in GDP 
per capita.
In the past 50 years, growth in LAC’s per 
capita income has been low relative to developed 
countries. IDB (2014) demonstrated that this is not 
due to poor factor accumulation. Growth in physi-
cal and human capital of a typical Latin American 
country has been similar to that of the United 
States. The problem is related to the poor growth 
in TFP, which has led to an increase in the produc-
tivity gap with developed countries.
No real improvement has been seen in recent 
years. The World Bank (2014) analyzed produc-
tivity in LAC for the period from 2006 to 2010. It 
documented negative labor productivity growth 
over this period for both manufacturing and ser-
vices firms. Particularly, Caribbean countries per-
formed worse than the rest of the region in both 
sectors, increasing their disadvantages. Therefore, 
promoting a development agenda for LAC implies 
boosting productivity as well. Productivity is one of 
the challenges that the region must face in coming 
decades.
How can countries increase their productivity? 
Two common measures of productivity growth are 
innovation expenditures and training programs. 
However, the existence of market failures is one of 
the main reasons why firms’ investments in these 
activities tend to be lower than the socially optimal 
value. So, public intervention to boost innovation 
spending is a necessary productive development 
policy. Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) 
analyzed a program that financially supported 
the innovation activities of firms in Chile. They 
found that subsidies partially crowded out private 
investments in innovation and that they more 
effectively promoted technological upgrades 
and process innovations than radical product 
innovations. Subsidies also induced changes in the 
innovation strategies of firms.
Along the same line of research, Hall and 
Maffioli (2008) found that the effectiveness of 
Technology Development Funds depends on the 
financial mechanism used, the presence of firm–
university interaction, the presence of non-financial 
constraints, and the characteristics of the target 
beneficiaries. They also found that participation in 
these programs induced a more proactive attitude 
toward innovation activities, increased innovative 
output, and improved performance.
Complementing this literature, López-Acevedo 
and Tinajero (2010) found evidence that in Mexico 
the participation of SMEs in support programs 
improved key performance variables—even 
promoting exports. This is an important result 
because it is common to find that SMEs provide an 
important portion of employment. So, when SMEs 
see improvements, a big portion of the economy is 
improving as well.
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Such studies are part of a growing body of 
literature that demonstrates the importance of 
implementing innovation programs. Evidence 
suggests that innovation is a way of closing the 
productivity gap (Griffith, Redding, and Van 
Reenen, 2004). This chapter aims to incorporate 
evidence about PDPs in Caribbean countries. 
Mainly, we wanted to know what kinds of firms are 
involved (and not involved) in PDPs, what programs 
they participate in, and which ones most effectively 
improve firm performance.
Description of Caribbean Productivity
In this section, we characterize productivity in 
Caribbean countries. Figure 8.1 shows firm TFP and 
labor productivity2 for each country.
Figure 8.1 shows that the countries with pro-
ductivity levels in the middle of the range are simi-
lar, with a slightly larger difference from the most 
productive countries (Barbados, The Bahamas, 
and St. Kitts and Nevis) and from the least produc-
tive country (Guyana). Therefore, it seems that low 
levels of productivity are an issue experienced by 
almost all countries. Figure 8.2 shows productivity 
by sector (manufacturing or services) and industry.
The disaggregation shown in Figure  8.2 
provides an interesting picture of productivity in 
the Caribbean. First, there is more heterogeneity 
in the productivity levels of manufacturing firms 
than of firms in the services sectors. Second, 
some sectors are clearly more productive than 
others. In manufacturing, firms in the chemicals 
and electronics sectors are the most productive, 
while textile firms are the least productive. In 
services, firms that service motor vehicles are the 
most productive, while hotels and restaurants are 
the least productive. Finally, Figure 8.2 shows that 
the least productive services sector is still more 
productive than the best sector in manufacturing. 
So, it seems that part of the productivity problem 
in Caribbean countries is in manufacturing.
Figure 8.2 shows the productivity of the median 
firm in each industry, which could bias the analysis if 
there are many small, unproductive firms and a few 
big, productive firms in each industry. Therefore it 
may be that a big firm that can concentrate more 
resources is more representative of the industry than 
many small firms that together still may have fewer 
resources. To address this problem, we constructed 
two new figures to show aggregate productivity, a 
weighted mean of productivity in each industry. The 
2  TFP was estimated with industry shares and labor produc-
tivity as value added per employee, but the results were ro-
bust to the use of other shares, such as country or industry–
country shares for TFP estimates, and sales per employee 
for labor productivity estimates.
FIGURE 8.1. TFP and Labor Productivity by Country
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
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weights refer to the number of workers in each firm 
relative to the total employees in the industry.
Figure  8.3 confirms some of the trends 
shown in Figure  8.2—services firms are still more 
productive and homogenous than manufacturing 
firms. However, on this weighted aggregate basis, 
IT is much more productive than the rest of the 
services industries, which is curious since IT was 
one of the least productive services industries 
based on the previous measure. The difference 
may be related to how the firms are weighted 
since small unproductive firms are lower weighted 
than the few big productive firms, which are 
higher weighted. In manufacturing, the inverse 
is true for fabricated metal products. Based on 
the median measure, fabricated metals is one of 
the most productive industries; however, based 
on aggregate productivity, it is one of the least 
productive. It could be that there are a few small, 
productive firms (which are lower weighted) and 
many big unproductive firms (which are higher 
weighted). The rest of the industries in each sector 
FIGURE 8.2. TFP by Sector and Industry
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FIGURE 8.3. Aggregate Productivity by Sector and Industry
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are ordered similar to the previous measure. Based 
on this measure, services are still more productive 
than manufacturing.
What Kinds of Firms Are Involved (and 
Not Involved) in PDPs?
The focus of this chapter is evaluating how PDPs 
are working in Caribbean countries. Understanding 
how such programs are working provides informa-
tion about whether support is reaching target firms 
(and industries) and the impact they are having on 
its performance. Problems identified in this analy-
sis will be useful in readapting programs to make 
them more efficient. Benefits can be a guide for 
what elements should be further enhanced.
The first step in making a PDP successful is 
making companies aware of its existence, which 
may increase the likelihood that target companies 
participate in the program. So, first we analyzed 
which kinds of firm are and are not aware of PDPs. 
Table  8.1 looks at various characteristics of firms 
that are aware or not and shows whether the mean 
differences are statistically significant.
Table 8.1 shows that firms that are aware of the 
program are bigger and more likely to export. They 
also have a higher percentage of skilled workers 
and are more likely to provide employee training. 
There are no significant differences in performance 
measures. This preliminary result is interesting 
because it suggests that firms that are not aware 
of PDPs have fewer skilled workers and do not train 
them to reverse this situation. 
It is also interesting to see what percentage of 
firms were aware of PDPs and how they are distrib-
uted. Table  8.2 differentiates awareness levels by 
country and sector. 
There is some heterogeneity in this measure; 
however, most countries show awareness levels of 
over 50  percent (particularly in manufacturing), 
but a few show a significantly lower level. Moreover, 
TABLE 8.1.  Characteristics of Aware and Not Aware 
Firms 
Not aware Aware Difference
Employees (#) 49.56 59.76 −10.20**
Export (% of firms) 0.19 0.23 −0.04**
Foreign (% of firms) 0.16 0.15 0.003
Skilled (% of employees) 0.26 0.30 −0.03***
Age (years) 25.55 25.01 0.54
TFP1 4.52 4.55 −0.03
TFP2 4.37 4.46 −0.09
TFP3 4.55 4.53 0.02
Value added per employee 
(US$)
41,746 41,726 20.01
Sales per employee (US$) 69,933 73,979 −4,045
Innovation spending (US$) 40,716 69,279 −28,562
Capital (US$ millions) 24.9 33.1 −8.2
Training (% of firms) 0.43 0.66 −0.23***
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 8.2.  Percentage Awareness of Program by 
Country and Sector
Sector
Manufacturing Services
Antigua and Barbuda 80.77 79.05
Bahamas, The 63.64 64.89
Barbados 55.56 46.38
Belize 38.60 43.08
Dominica 77.27 80.77
Grenada 71.43 61.11
Guyana 34.88 20.78
Jamaica 68.03 43.54
Saint Lucia 71.93 78.87
St. Kitts and Nevis 67.86 55.67
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 73.81 75.82
Suriname 28.79 29.63
Trinidad and Tobago 71.55 61.61
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
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there is heterogeneity within some countries. For 
example, 35  percent of manufacturing firms in 
Guyana know about PDPs while only 21  percent 
of services firms are aware of them. However, 
between-country variability seems to be more 
important than within-country variability.
Once we understood how aware firms were 
about PDPs, it was important to know about par-
ticipation. For an overview of companies partici-
pating in programs, we replicated the awareness 
analysis. The results are shown in Table 8.3.
Descriptive statistics of participating and non-
participating firms show that they are quite simi-
lar. Only four variables were significantly different. 
Participating firms were bigger, more likely to 
export, nationally owned, and more likely to train 
their employees. However, performance measures, 
percentage of skilled workers, and age of the firm 
were similar between the two groups. Also, they 
were similar on capital and innovation expenditures.
We also replicated the analysis of percent-
age of firms participating in PDPs and the distribu-
tion between and within countries. The results are 
shown in Table 8.4.
The pattern for participation by country and sector 
(Table 8.4) is similar to that for awareness (Table 8.2), 
but the levels of participation are significantly lower 
than the levels of awareness. Countries (and sectors) 
that were more aware of public programs also had 
higher levels of participation, with some exceptions. 
The Bahamas showed good awareness, but had the 
lowest level of participation in programs to support 
both manufacturing and services. Suriname had 
the lowest level of awareness but a good level of 
participation relative to other Caribbean countries. 
So, to be aware seems important to firm participation, 
but it is not the only factor. The next sections focus on 
characterizing what kinds of companies participate in 
PDPs and which do not.TABLE 8.3.  Characteristics of Participating and Not 
Participating Firms 
Not 
participating Participating Difference
Employees (#) 53.63 65.25 −11.62**
Export (% of firms) 0.20 0.25 −0.05**
Foreign (% of firms) 0.16 0.13 0.03*
Skilled (% of 
employees)
0.28 0.29 −0.01
Age 25.31 24.83 0.48
TFP1 4.54 4.57 −0.04
TFP2 4.44 4.33 0.11
TFP3 4.54 4.52 0.02
Value added per 
employee (US$)
42,659 37,160 5,499
Sales per employee 
(US$)
70,536 81,289 −10,752
Innovation spending 52,851 81,931 −29,080
Capital (US$ million) 29.8 29.6 0.2
Training (% of firms) 0.53 0.74 −0.23***
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 8.4.  Percentage Participation by Country and 
Sector
Sector
Manufacturing Services
Antigua and Barbuda 26.92 32.38
Bahamas, The 3.03 9.57
Barbados 20.37 20.29
Belize 14.04 16.92
Dominica 22.73 25.96
Grenada 14.29 12.96
Guyana 11.63 7.79
Jamaica 16.84 8.84
Saint Lucia 15.79 22.54
St. Kitts and Nevis 21.43 6.19
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 16.67 30.77
Suriname 15.15 18.52
Trinidad and Tobago 21.55 11.61
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
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Description of Non-participant Firms
It is important to know which companies partici-
pate in PDPs to support improvements in different 
areas, such as innovation. But it is also essential to 
know which companies are not participating and 
why not. 
First, we identified which firms were interested 
in participating in a PDP. Table 8.5 shows several 
characteristics of firms, distinguishing between 
interested and not interested firms.
Table  8.5 shows that, of firms not participat-
ing in PDPs, the characteristics of interested and 
not interested firms were not statistically different 
in number of employees, firm age, or proportion 
of foreign and export firms. The main differences 
were in performance measures. For example, firms 
not interested in participating were more produc-
tive and spent more money on innovation than 
firms interested in participating. However, they had 
a higher proportion of skilled employees and pro-
vided their employees more training.
We also disaggregated the analysis and 
described interested and non-interested firms in 
terms of preferences. We began with firms that 
were interested in PDPs, asking what kind of pro-
gram they would participate in. This information 
provided an idea of potential demand for PDPs. 
Table 8.6 shows what types of programs were of 
interest.
The comparison of firms interested in 
different areas for PDPs showed a number of 
interesting results. Firms that would participate 
in technology and innovation programs had the 
highest number of employees, more capital, and 
the most spending on innovation. Also, they were 
the most productive in terms of both measures of 
labor productivity—value added per employee and 
sales per employee. Firms that would participate 
in marketing and operations programs were the 
second youngest, had the fewest employees, the 
least amount of capital, and the second lowest 
spending on innovation. They were also the least 
likely to export and the least productive in terms of 
labor productivity. We did not find big differences 
in other characteristics, such as proportion of 
foreign firms and skilled workers, or in performance 
measures, such as the TFP estimates. 
We were not only concerned with firms that 
wanted to participate in PDPs; we also wanted 
to know why firms did not want to be involved. 
Firms were asked why they were not interested 
in participating. The intention of gaining this 
information was to help policymakers readapt 
support programs (as necessary) to attract 
participants. 
Table 8.7 characterizes the disinterested firms 
and the reasons for their lack of interest. Firms that 
considered PDPs too expensive were, on average, 
smaller and there was a higher proportion of national 
firms. Firms that indicated that the administrative 
procedure was cumbersome were the oldest firms, 
spent most on innovation, and had higher levels 
of capital and productivity. Those that indicated 
TABLE 8.5.  Characteristics of Interested and Not 
Interested Non-participant Firms 
Not interested Interested Difference
Employees (#) 53.91 55.19 −1.28
Foreign (% of firms) 0.16 0.16 0.00
Export (% of firms) 0.19 0.21 −0.02
Age (years) 25.05 25.60 −0.55
Skilled (% of employees) 0.59 0.62 −0.02***
TFP1 4.57 4.52 0.05**
TFP2 4.50 4.38 0.12*
TFP3 4.55 4.53 0.02
Value added per 
employee (US$)
50,799 38,028 12,771***
Labor productivity (US$) 83,391 63,881 19,510
Capital (US$ million) 35.2 29.2 6.1
Innovation spending 
(US$)
90,697 34,963 55,734*
Training (% of firms) 0.55 0.52 −0.03*
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE 8.6. Area of Interest for PDPs
General management, 
business development,  
and strategies
Marketing and
operations
Financial management, 
and tax and customs 
administration
Technology 
and innovation
Human 
resources
Employees (#) 44.20 36.21 54.65 69.48 47.42
Foreign (% of firms) 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
Export (% of firms) 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.24
Age (years) 26.01 23.87 25.52 27.54 21.72
Skilled (% of employees) 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27
TFP1 4.48 4.51 4.55 4.53 4.56
TFP2 4.39 4.49 4.52 4.33 4.40
TFP3 4.44 4.53 4.54 4.53 4.59
Value added per employee (US$) 36,756 30,976 38,243 44,419 32,862
Sales per employee (US$) 59,856 51,799 62,085 74,449 54,730
Capital (US$) 33.9 7.8 25.6 59.7 9.7
Innovation spending (US$ 29,231 26,561 95,323 99,871 23,560
Training (% of firms) 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
TABLE 8.7. Main Reason for Disinterest
Not 
needed
Too 
expensive
Used such 
assistance in past 
and wasn’t useful
Administrative 
procedure is 
cumbersome
Too many 
strings 
attached
Not aware of such 
assistance and don’t 
know its advantages
Employees (#) 56.44 38.95 61.79 55.51 64.94 45.00
Foreign (% of firms) 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.17
Export (% of firms) 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.17
Age (years) 24.91 23.72 25.33 27.23 19.98 26.74
Skilled (% of employees) 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.29
TFP1 4.47 4.60 4.63 4.62 4.82 4.55
TFP2 4.55 4.49 4.23 4.50 4.46 4.67
TFP3 4.55 4.56 4.41 4.46 4.62 4.67
Value added per employee (US$) 44,861 46,173 50,224 69,673 78,442 37,985
Labor productivity (US$) 71,033 77,392 86,448 106,480 139,649 61,452
Capital (US$ millions) 27.8 2.4 6.7 78.8 3.2 80.8
Innovation spending (US$) 33,044 110,178 5,128 396,834 16,726 48,905
Training (% of firms) 0.51 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.38
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
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there were too many strings attached were the 
most productive, the youngest, and had the most 
employees. Finally, firms that indicated that they 
did not need public support or they were not 
aware of this type of assistance and did not know 
its advantages were the least productive, spent a 
medium amount on innovation, and had the lowest 
proportion of training programs for their employees.
These tables show that firms that were inter-
ested in participating in a PDP for innovation were 
also the firms that spent more money on innova-
tion, had more capital, and were more productive. 
Moreover, within the firms not interested in partici-
pating, those that argued that they were not aware 
of this type of assistance, did not know about its 
advantages, or did not need this kind of program 
were also the least productive, spent less on train-
ing, and had lower levels of capital. Thus, lack of 
interest may be a result of firms not understanding 
the benefits of innovation in and of itself. 
Determinants of Participation
After characterizing firms that participated in pub-
lic support programs and those that did not and 
those that were interested and those that were 
not, we wanted to figure out the determinants of 
participation in PDPs. The goal of understanding 
the determinants of participation was to find out 
whether targeted firms are those actually partici-
pating. Table 8.8 shows the regression estimates.
We ran different estimations looking for 
different relationships. First, we wanted to see 
whether firm characteristics partially explained 
participation. The number of employees had a 
positive and significant association with program 
participation; an additional employee was 
associated with 0.02 percentage points in the 
probability of participation. In addition, foreign 
firms had a lower participation rate by more than 
4 percentage points. However, there were no 
significant effects of age or a firm’s export position.
In the remaining estimates, we exploited dif-
ferent variables to help understand why a firm 
decided (or not) to participate. For example, firms 
were asked if they paid less tax than they were 
required to. We found that those firms that admit-
ted to having paid less tax participated in PDPs by 3 
percentage points lower. This result was expected 
since firms that avoid taxes do not want to par-
ticipate in programs for fear of an audit, which 
would be more damaging than the benefits they 
perceive of a PDP. However, the result led to the 
discussion of how rigorous governments should 
be with tax regulations. On one hand, strict regula-
tions can encourage firms to formalize, increasing 
the opportunity cost of evading taxes. On the other 
hand, governments want to promote productivity 
and being very strict with regulations may restrict 
the success of this goal.
We also wanted to know whether there was 
any link between participation in a PDP and vari-
ous measures of a firm’s relationship with the gov-
ernment. The dataset has several questions that 
make it possible  to identify whether an inspector 
expected a gift or an informal payment from a firm 
(a corruption measure) or if it had a formal contract 
with the government. Neither variable had a signifi-
cant impact on the probability of being part of a 
PDP. Moreover, we saw that applying for an import 
license had no significant effect on the probabil-
ity of a firm participating. So, we did not find any 
corruption mechanism by which firms could obtain 
advantages to participating in PDPs.
Then, we inquired about the possibility that 
companies that had senior managers spending 
more time on requirements imposed by govern-
ment regulations were less likely to participate in 
PDPs. We found no significant association. Finally, 
we looked for a relationship between firm struc-
ture and the probability of participating in PDPs. 
Intuitively, companies with more departments may 
have a department responsible for applying to 
such programs. But we found no significant effect.
Female Discrimination
Another element of the dataset that we exploited 
was the part of the questionnaires where firms were 
asked about gender characteristics. Following 
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the analysis in the previous section, we explored 
whether a female owner or manager adversely 
affected a firm’s access to PDPs. Table 8.9 shows 
the results of these estimates.
Table 8.9 shows an interesting yet worrisome 
result. Firms with a female owner who makes 
major strategic and financial decisions participate 
less in PDPs. When we disaggregated the data by 
program, we found that the effect was a result of 
lower participation in innovation programs. These 
results are not enough to prove that there has been 
discrimination. However, it is important to be aware 
that this relationship exists and continue this line 
of research to determine how governments can 
address this problem if it is present.
Impact of Productive Development 
Programs
In this section, we focus on firms that received 
public support. To look for possible impacts of the 
programs, it is important to know which programs 
were used and the goals of the firms that used them. 
We concentrated on two types of PDPs—marketing 
TABLE 8.8.  Determinants of Participation
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Participate Participate Participate Participate Participate Participate Participate
Employees 0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
Export 0.0335
(0.0240)
0.0329
(0.0240)
0.0336
(0.0240)
0.0336
(0.0240)
0.0337
(0.0240)
0.0336
(0.0240)
0.0325
(0.0241)
Foreign −0.0435*
(0.0231)
−0.0431*
(0.0230)
−0.0433*
(0.0231)
−0.0435*
(0.0231)
−0.0437*
(0.0231)
−0.0433*
(0.0231)
−0.0459**
(0.0231)
Age −0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0002
(0.0004)
Avoid taxes −0.0304*
(0.0180)
Informal payment 0.0099
(0.0333)
Contract with government −0.0008
(0.0208)
Management time 0.0093
(0.0194)
Import licence −0.0083
(0.0285)
Management structure −0.116
(0.0941)
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922
R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
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and innovation—because they make it possible to 
understand if firms were looking for new methods 
to commercialize their products or if they wanted 
to improve product characteristics or their produc-
tion process.
First, we looked at whether being supported 
by a public marketing program had an effect on 
the probability of introducing improvements. 
Table 8.10 shows the results.
The results show whether different character-
istics and a marketing PDP had an effect on the 
probability of introducing or improving distribution 
methods, adopting new methods of product place-
ment in retail stores, sales networks, developing 
franchising, developing online promotion, develop-
ing online sales, or adopting new methods of pric-
ing goods and services.
First, we noted that bigger firms were more 
likely to introduce an improvement in every ele-
ment of marketing except franchising. Moreover, 
firms that exported were more prone to introduce 
improvements in sales networks and developing 
online sales. However, the most important result 
was that firms that participated in a marketing PDP 
used it to improve online promotion. We then con-
centrated on firms that received public support for 
innovation, analyzing its effect on different mea-
sures.3 Table 8.11 presents the estimation results.
We identified two effects. First, we saw that big-
ger firms and those that exported were more likely to 
perceive all possible improvements as more impor-
tant than smaller firms and those that did not export. 
This make it possible to understand why such firms 
were the highest spenders on innovation. Finally, we 
observed that firms supported on innovation saw 
important effects on sales and the ability to develop 
new goods and services or production processes.
Given that firms were asked about whether 
improvements they tried to implement were suc-
cessful and whether they were funded for those 
3  These measures are constructed from the firms’ points of 
view.
TABLE 8.10. Uses of Marketing Support Programs
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distribution 
methods
Product 
placement
Sales 
network Franchising
Online 
promotion Online sales Pricing
Marketing support 0.0360
(0.0219)
−0.00186
(0.0157)
0.0325
(0.0231)
0.00721
(0.0169)
0.0623**
(0.0269)
0.0155
(0.0218)
0.0302
(0.0221)
Ln(employees) 0.0274***
(0.00699)
0.0199***
(0.00543)
0.0314***
(0.00719)
0.00171
(0.00483)
0.0205***
(0.00740)
0.0139**
(0.00703)
0.0169***
(0.00635)
Age 2.72e-05
(0.000347)
−4.69e-05
(0.000225)
−1.70e-05
(0.000356)
−7.05e-05
(0.000292)
7.19e-05
(0.000374)
−0.000296
(0.000327)
5.62e-05
(0.000258)
Foreign −0.00423
(0.0163)
−0.0114
(0.0118)
−0.0131
(0.0161)
−0.0124
(0.0124)
−0.0150
(0.0182)
−0.0237
(0.0168)
0.00218
(0.0147)
Export 0.0109
(0.0153)
0.0160
(0.0117)
0.0275*
(0.0158)
0.0124
(0.0130)
0.0198
(0.0176)
0.0409**
(0.0174)
0.0201
(0.0143)
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922
R-squared 0.135 0.132 0.164 0.078 0.106 0.059 0.101
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
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improvements, we could test previous results. 
However, here we inquired as to whether the firm 
was supported with public funds for this particu-
lar goal as a treatment, which made it possible to 
know whether the public program helped firms to 
reach the goal. Table 8.12 shows the results of this 
estimation.
Firms were asked about reducing costs, the 
quality of goods and services, increasing national 
markets, increasing number of goods, developing 
TABLE 8.11. Impact of Innovation Support Programs
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goods offered Increased sales New customers Quality Reduced cost
Develop new goods 
or processes
Innovation support 0.0310
(0.0237)
0.0767***
(0.0292)
0.0372
(0.0263)
0.0298
(0.0284)
−0.00717
(0.0174)
0.0693**
(0.0297)
Ln(employees) 0.0285***
(0.00708)
0.0427***
(0.00843)
0.0232***
(0.00766)
0.0314***
(0.00821)
0.0200***
(0.00639)
0.0342***
(0.00836)
Age 0.000248
(0.000388)
−0.000213
(0.000398)
0.000426
(0.000446)
0.000264
(0.000466)
0.000294
(0.000343)
2.34e-05
(0.000431)
Foreign −0.0169
(0.0171)
0.0251
(0.0235)
0.0348
(0.0216)
−0.0127
(0.0225)
0.0419**
(0.0188)
0.00853
(0.0230)
Export 0.0468***
(0.0180)
0.0970***
(0.0225)
0.0550***
(0.0200)
0.0648***
(0.0222)
0.0311*
(0.0160)
0.0481**
(0.0221)
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922
R-squared 0.088 0.128 0.094 0.094 0.066 0.088
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
TABLE 8.12. Impact of PDPs on Success of Improvements
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reduce 
cost Quality
National 
markets
Number of 
goods
Foreign 
markets
Promote 
exports Innovation
Quality 
certification
Treatment 0.133
(0.123)
0.0255
(0.0602)
0.0856
(0.0830)
0.0963
(0.107)
−0.101
(0.0944)
−0.0915
(0.0918)
0.329***
(0.0713)
0.142*
(0.0763)
Employees 0.000178
(0.000219)
0.000299**
(0.000139)
0.000290*
(0.000175)
0.000186
(0.000130)
7.15e-05
(0.000222)
3.73e-05
(0.000161)
−0.000102
(0.000126)
7.85e-05
(0.000168)
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 348 355 706 441 184 312 335 430
R-squared 0.289 0.629 0.197 0.302 0.594 0.683 0.565 0.363
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
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new foreign markets, promoting exports, support-
ing innovation, and obtaining quality certification. 
There were only two goals where the probability 
of success depended on public support: innovation 
and quality certification. Both were positively and 
significantly correlated.
This result is important because it demon-
strates that not all programs effectively introduce 
improvements. However, both estimations show 
that public innovation programs effectively intro-
duce improvements for firms, while other pro-
grams do not seem to have a significant impact on 
firm performance.
It is also important to see the effects of PDPs 
on several variables. It is hard to imagine that there 
was an immediate effect on measures such as pro-
ductivity since the dataset referred to recent PDPs 
and performance measures. However, we were 
able to look at intermediate outcomes: innova-
tion spending and training. We expected to see a 
higher level of innovation spending by firms par-
ticipating in an innovation PDP. Following the same 
insight, we expected to see firms participating in 
a training support program being more likely to 
train their employees. The estimates are provided 
in Table 8.13.
TABLE 8.13. Impact of Innovation PDP on Intermediate Outcomes
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Innovation 
spending
Ln(innovation 
spending)
Innovation 
spending
Ln(innovation 
spending)
Innovation 
spending
Ln(innovation 
spending) Training Training Training
Ln (employees) 7,882
(21,729)
0.212**
(0.0956)
7,792
(21,729)
0.240**
(0.0979)
8,162
(21,615)
0.173*
(0.0960)
0.0860***
(0.0157)
0.0860***
(0.0157)
0.0898***
(0.0136)
Foreign −40,396
(45,207)
0.00972
(0.170)
−40,362
(45,215)
0.0223
(0.169)
−41,634
(46,389)
0.0198
(0.170)
0.0481*
(0.0289)
0.0481*
(0.0289)
0.0818***
(0.0263)
Export 25,089
(39,080)
−0.0368
(0.163)
25,099
(39,084)
−0.0251
(0.164)
26,038
(38,836)
−0.0684
(0.163)
0.0791***
(0.0280)
0.0791***
(0.0280)
0.0615**
(0.0248)
Age −206.5
(510.9)
0.0014
(0.0021)
−178.3
(507.5)
0.0015
(0.0021)
−214.9
(508.8)
0.002
(0.0022)
0.0006
(0.0005)
0.0006
(0.00047)
0.0002
(0.0005)
Value  
added (ln)
88,778*
(50,314)
0.627***
(0.0837)
88,592*
(50,300)
0.612***
(0.0851)
88,911*
(50,426)
0.647***
(0.0824)
0.0258**
(0.0112)
0.0258**
(0.0112)
0.0292***
(0.0097)
Public funding −20,232
(13,995)
−0.455***
(0.173)
0.00398
(0.0277)
Innovation 
support
−28,774
(39,854)
0.382**
(0.168)
Training 
program
0.572***
(0.0165)
Country fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,825 352 1,825 352 1,825 352 1,838 1,838 1,838
R-squared 0.061 0.668 0.061 0.676 0.061 0.672 0.170 0.170 0.392
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
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Since many firms in the Caribbean spend noth-
ing on innovation, we had a truncated data prob-
lem. So, we completed two estimations: one with 
the entire sample and the other with the subset 
of firms that invested in innovation (using a loga-
rithm). What we found was that there was no effect 
when using the entire sample, but a positive and 
significant effect on the number of employees and 
the value added when we restricted the sample to 
firms that spent on innovation. So bigger firms and 
those with a higher value added invested more in 
innovation. The same is true for innovation pro-
grams. Firms that participated in an innovation 
PDP spent more on innovation.
The variable public funding refers to whether 
access to public funding is an obstacle or not (it 
takes the value 1 if it is not an obstacle). The nega-
tive sign associated with this variable may indicate 
that firms financed their most profitable projects 
with their own liquidity, but that they looked for 
external financing when they wanted to expand to 
other, less profitable projects and faced an obsta-
cle to accessing public funds.
We also noted that larger firms, foreign firms, 
exporters, and firms that generated a higher value 
added were more likely to train their employees. 
However, the interesting result here was that, with 
public support for training, firms were more likely 
to develop training programs.
Why is it important to invest in innovation and 
employee training? There is a substantial body of lit-
erature that proves that firms benefit from a number 
of different mechanisms. One is productivity. Firms 
that invest more in innovation generally have higher 
levels of productivity. Moreover, firms that train their 
employees are more likely to have higher labor pro-
ductivity. We looked for these relationships in the 
dataset. Table 8.14 reports the results.
TABLE 8.14. Impact of Training and Innovation Spending on Productivity
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TFP1 TFP1 TFP2 TFP2 TFP3 TFP3
Value 
added per 
employee 
(ln)
Value 
added per 
employee 
(ln)
Sales per 
employee 
(ln)
Sales per 
employee 
(ln)
Ln(employees) 0.0368***
(0.00997)
0.0322***
(0.00970)
−0.155***
(0.0333)
−0.145***
(0.0333)
0.0430***
(0.0104)
0.0388***
(0.0103)
0.0898***
(0.0217)
0.0829***
(0.0208)
0.109***
(0.0221)
0.0995***
(0.0210)
Foreign 0.0671**
(0.0291)
0.0741**
(0.0292)
−0.0983
(0.0947)
−0.0941
(0.0953)
0.0668**
(0.0303)
0.0721**
(0.0305)
0.141**
(0.0654)
0.153**
(0.0657)
0.122*
(0.0637)
0.135**
(0.0638)
Export 0.0488*
(0.0261)
0.0501*
(0.0259)
−0.0486
(0.0928)
−0.0393
(0.0927)
0.0394
(0.0279)
0.0392
(0.0278)
0.127**
(0.0591)
0.131**
(0.0586)
0.149**
(0.0583)
0.152***
(0.0578)
Training 0.034
(0.0210)
0.0376
(0.0703)
0.0166
(0.0231)
0.107**
(0.0462)
0.105**
(0.0454)
Innovation 
spending
6.39e-08***
(1.59e-08)
−9.88e-08
(6.27e-08)
4.54e-08***
(1.47e-08)
1.55e-07***
(2.89e-08)
2.01e-07***
(6.61e-08)
Sector fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,843 1,831 1,843 1,831 1,843 1,831 1,879 1,866 1,891 1,877
R-squared 0.346 0.351 0.242 0.244 0.716 0.718 0.194 0.201 0.178 0.195
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN survey.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; *** at 
the 1 percent level.
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such programs could be ignoring the possible 
advantages that they would receive if they 
participated.
Looking for determinants of program 
participation, we found that larger firms and national 
firms were more likely to participate in PDPs. 
Moreover, we found that those firms that admitted 
to having avoided taxes participated less in such 
programs. We also found that firms with a female 
owner were less likely to participate in an innovation 
PDP. This effect was more significant if the female 
owner made major strategic and financial decisions, 
which suggests possible gender discrimination.
Among participant firms, those that 
participated in an innovation program were more 
productive, larger, and spent more on innovation. 
From the firm point of view, participating in this 
kind of program produced important effects, 
increasing sales and developing new goods/
services or processes. We tested several possible 
improvements and which ones are more likely, with 
public support, to be successful. We only obtained 
a positive and significant result for innovation and 
obtaining a quality certification.
We also found that firms that participated in 
an innovation support program invested more in 
innovation—an intermediate outcome. Training 
PDPs generated a higher probability of a firm 
training its employees. Finally, we found that firms’ 
investments in innovation and training had direct 
effects on productivity.
Table  8.14 shows the effects of innovation 
spending and training programs on several 
measures of productivity (3 TFP estimates and 2 
labor productivity measures). The results are clear 
and robust for every measure, except TFP2.
First, we found that productivity was corre-
lated with some firm characteristics. Particularly, 
larger firms, exporters, and foreign firms were 
significantly more productive. That result was to 
be expected because there may be economies 
of scale, more productive firms are more likely to 
export, and foreign firms are only likely to come 
to the Caribbean if they are likely to be among the 
most productive firms in the region.
The crucial point is that firms that spent more 
on innovation were more productive. This is key 
because it highlights the importance of innovation 
expenditures and why governments need to pro-
mote innovation. Regarding training, though there 
was no a significant effect on TFP, it was positively 
and significantly correlated with measures of labor 
productivity.
Conclusions
This chapter contributes to understanding 
participation of Caribbean firms in PDPs and its 
possible effects on several performance measures. 
We also described non-participant firms and 
their interests. We suggest that firms that do 
not participate in PDPs and are not interested in 
136 EXPLORING FIRM-LEVEL INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
References
Acevedo, G. L., and H. W. Tan (Eds). 2011. “Impact 
Evaluation of Small and Medium Enterprise 
Programs in Latin America and the Carib-
bean.” Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Agosin, M. R. 2013. “Productive Development Poli-
cies in Latin America: Past and Present.” Work-
ing Paper No. 382. Santiago: Department of 
Economics, University of Chile.
Benavente, J. M., G. Crespi, L. Figal Garone, and 
A. Maffioli. 2012. “The Impact of National 
Research Funds: A Regression Discontinu-
ity Approach to the Chilean FONDECYT.” 
Research Policy 41(8):1461–75.
Benavente, J. M., G. Crespi, and A. Maffioli. 2007. 
“Public Support to Firm-Level Innovation: An 
Evaluation of the FONTEC Program.” Working 
Paper No. OVE/WP-05/07. Washington, DC: 
Inter-American Development Bank.
Castillo, V., L. Figal Garone, A. Maffioli, S. Rojo, and 
R. Stucchi, R. . 2016. “The Effects of Knowledge 
Spillovers through Labor Mobility.” MPRA 
Paper No. 69141. 
Castillo, V., L. Figal Garone, A. Maffioli, and L. 
Salazar. 2015. “Tourism Policy: A Big Push to 
Employment? Evidence from a Multiple Syn-
thetic Control Approach.” IDB Working Paper 
Series No. 572. Washington DC: Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank.
Crespi, G., L. Figal Garone, A. Maffioli, and M. Meléndez. 
2015. “Long-term Productivity Effects of Public 
Support to Innovation in Colombia.” Emerging 
Markets Finance and Trade 51(1):48–64.
Figal Garone, L., and A. Maffioli. 2016. “Impact 
Evaluation of Cluster Development Programs: 
An Application to the Arranjos Produtivos 
Locais Policy in Brazil.” In A. Maffioli, C. 
Pietrobelli, and R. Stucchi (eds.), The Impact 
Evaluation of Cluster Development Programs: 
Methods and Practices. Washington DC: Inter-
American Development Bank.
Figal Garone, L., A. Maffioli, J. A. De Negri, C. Rodri-
guez, and G. Vázquez Baré. 2014. “Cluster 
Development Policy, SME’s Performance, and 
Spillovers: Evidence from Brazil.” Small Busi-
ness Economics 44(4): 925–48.
Griffith, R., S. Redding, and J. Van Reenen. 2004. 
“Mapping the Two Faces of R&D: Productivity 
Growth in a Panel of OECD Industries.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 86(4):883–95.
Hall, B. H., and A. Maffioli. 2008. “Evaluating the 
Impact of Technology Development Funds 
in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Latin 
America.” The European Journal of Develop-
ment Research 20(2):172–98.
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). 2014. 
“Rethinking Productive Development, Sounds 
Policies and Institutions for Economic Transi-
tion.” Washington, DC: Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank.
López-Acevedo, G., and M. Tinajero. 2010. “Mex-
ico: Impact Evaluation of SME Programs Using 
Panel Firm Data.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper Series. Washington, DC: The 
World Bank.
Melo, A., and A. Rodríguez-Clare. 2006. “Produc-
tive Development Policies and Supporting 
Institutions in Latin America and the Carib-
bean: The State of State Reform in Latin Amer-
ica.” Competitiveness Studies Series Working 
Paper C-106. Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank.
Solow, R. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 70(1):65–94.
World Bank. 2014. “Measuring Firm Performance 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Latin 
America and Caribbean Series Note 2. Wash-
ington, DC: The World Bank.
  137 
9
Conclusions and Policy Discussion
Sylvia Dohnert, Alessandro Maffioli, and Gustavo Crespi
Economists, policymakers, and private sector representatives have long been aware of the competitive weaknesses of the productive sec-
tor in the Caribbean. The region has been getting 
poorer over recent decades as its economy has stag-
nated due to weak economic growth and high fiscal 
deficits. It is widely known that economic growth is 
influenced by the productivity of an economy. In the 
Caribbean, very high debt to GDP levels, scant econ-
omies of scale, weak diversification, high vulnerability 
to trade shocks, and weak overall competitiveness—
partly due to high labor, financing, and energy costs, 
but also to weak institutions and a complex business 
climate—have induced low productivity levels. 
Against this backdrop, the private sector is called 
upon to be the region’s motor for growth since pro-
ductivity starts at the firm level and is related to the 
efficiency with which firms convert inputs into out-
puts. Around the world, the recognized importance 
of productivity to economic growth and the discov-
ery of micro-level productivity differences among 
firms have shaped several research agendas that seek 
to understand what influences varying productivity 
outcomes at the firm level. Therefore, in recent years 
a vast economic literature that exploits micro-data 
at the firm level has developed that tries to deter-
mine the main factors (e.g., competition, innovation, 
human capital, and organizational forms) that induce 
higher levels of productivity in firms, as relocation 
of economic activity from lower toward higher pro-
ductivity firms explains aggregate economic growth 
(Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001). 
An analysis of the determinants of the produc-
tivity of Caribbean firms would help inform policy-
makers about mechanisms to jump-start private 
sector-driven growth in the region, especially since 
the Caribbean is characterized by small, inward-
looking, and unsophisticated firms (Ruprah, 
Melgarejo, and Sierra, 2014). Up to now the lack of 
micro-level information has limited the possibility 
of identifying the main factors contributing to the 
region’s low level of innovation and productivity. 
For many years, the Caribbean did not have inter-
nationally comparable, statistically relevant data 
at the firm level to perform empirical analysis of 
what drives firm performance and innovation. The 
datasets from the World Bank Latin American and 
Caribbean Enterprise Survey (LACES) and the fol-
low-up Productivity, Technology, and Innovation 
(PROTEqIN) survey, both funded by the Compete 
Caribbean Program,1 offer the first opportunity to 
systematically and rigorously test key hypotheses 
and shed some light on limiting factors. LACES and 
1  Compete Caribbean is a private sector development pro-
gram funded by the IDB, the UK’s Department of Interna-
tional Development, and the Government of Canada. In the 
Eastern Caribbean countries, Compete Caribbean is execut-
ed in partnership with the Caribbean Development Bank.
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the Caribbean, constrained access to finance and 
innovation were negatively related and that finan-
cial constraints are a major barrier to innovation 
regardless of geographic location and idiosyn-
crasy.3 Given that in Chapter 2, Mohan, Strobl, and 
Watson found that cost barriers were the major 
barrier to innovation in the Caribbean, it is very 
likely that, similar to advanced countries, finan-
cial constraints are highly complementary to other 
impediments to innovation, such as perceived 
risk and innovation costs (Mohnen and Roller, 
2005). Moreover, in Chapter 6, Moore, Presbitero, 
and Rabellotti found that there was a gender 
gap related to access to finance in the region, as 
women owned or managed firms were less likely 
to demand credit and more likely to report access 
to finance as a severe obstacle to growth. These 
authors also found that a gender gap in access 
to credit particularly affected the performance of 
female-managed firms. Interestingly, for all firms, in 
Chapter 3, Morris found that financial constraints in 
the Caribbean seemed to negatively affect process 
innovation more than product innovation.
Since overall credit constraints retard innova-
tion, policy options that increase access to credit to 
the private sector should have spillover effects on 
innovation. In terms of debt financing, several pol-
icy options could be appropriate for the Caribbean. 
Given that loans in the region require collateral with 
fixed assets, policies that help reduce the risk pro-
file and allow the use of moveable assets (includ-
ing patents, designs, copyrights, and other forms 
of intellectual property) could have a positive 
impact on credit. In this regard, in 2014, Jamaica 
pioneered by implementing the first secured trans-
actions’ framework and collateral registry in the 
region. Moreover, access to debt financing can be 
influenced by bankruptcy legislation—an impor-
tant area of reform in the Caribbean, where overall, 
PROTEqIN are two powerful datasets that provide 
an in-depth picture of firm-level behavior related 
to sales, supplies, foreign trade and competition, 
innovation, conflict resolution, crime prevention, 
business environment and government relations, 
labor and skills, financing, and performance, among 
others. 
Even though each chapter herein has focused 
on a different topic, this first round of studies sheds 
light on important, cross-cutting issues found to 
be affecting productivity in the Caribbean. These 
important cross-cutting factors are: access to 
finance, human capital, business climate and regu-
latory issues, and infrastructure. The following sec-
tions will explain the book’s contribution to a better 
understanding of each of these factors.
Access to Finance
The global literature has documented a clear link 
between innovation and financial sector devel-
opment and, by extension, economic growth at 
the macroeconomic level.2 Productivity, and sub-
sequently growth, is restricted when access to 
finance is constrained. Prior research indicates 
that in the Caribbean access to finance is diffi-
cult and affects firm performance. More firms in 
the Caribbean experience constrained access to 
finance than firms in comparable small countries 
(Ruprah et al., 2014). Moreover, across the region, 
access to finance is cited by business managers 
as one of the top three constraints to firm growth 
(Dohnert, Persaud, Pereira et al., 2016). Access to 
finance constraints negatively affect productivity, 
as Caribbean firms in the highest productivity quin-
tiles that reported access to finance as their big-
gest obstacle underperformed firms in the same 
quintile who did not report this barrier as their big-
gest obstacle (Cathles and Pangerl, 2016). 
This publication goes further into the nuances 
of how access to finance impacts firm performance 
by providing evidence that access to finance 
is a recurring constraint on innovation in the 
Caribbean, and that it particularly affects female 
managed firms. In Chapter 3, Morris found that, in 
2  See Baumol (2002) and Aghion and Durlauf (2014), which 
illustrate the importance of innovation for growth and de-
velopment.
3  Results from the third Eurostat Community Innovation Sur-
vey (CIS) indicate that in Europe financial constraints are the 
second greatest obstacle to innovation (Savignac, 2008).
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resolving insolvency is a lengthy and costly pro-
cess (Dohnert et al., 2016). Other forms of pub-
lic policy that can help innovative firms with debt 
financing involve guaranteeing credit (Barbados 
recently launched a credit guarantee program), 
long-term loans, providing credit mediation,4 sup-
porting alternative debt financing (e.g., convertible 
loans), and promoting competition within the bank-
ing sector. 
Policies that foster alternative mechanisms of 
financing, such as peer-to-peer lending and crowd-
funding, could also create new sources of credit 
for innovative firms. In particular, equity could be 
an attractive alternative way to finance innovation. 
Some studies have identified equity as much more 
concerned with the overall value of the business 
model than with collateral when evaluating proj-
ects (Savignac, 2008). Inroads have been made to 
stimulate angel capital groups in the region, with 
some clubs having already formalized and funded 
ventures.5 Finally, policies aimed at promoting firm 
growth and access to finance for businesses man-
aged by women are likely to be the most effective 
at narrowing the gender productivity gap.
Although improving the functioning of capi-
tal markets with the measures described above 
would help private sector development as a whole, 
for projects that are highly innovative, other 
mechanisms of support are needed. As Navarro, 
Benavente, and Crespi (2016) demonstrated, inno-
vation is wrought with market failures because 
it has elements of public good (new knowledge 
being produced, workers being trained), asymmet-
ric information (unwillingness to share information, 
difficulty of accurately measuring future income 
streams), and coordination failures (need for firms 
to engage with other actors to produce innovation) 
that warrant a very specific type of policy response. 
In Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, these mar-
ket failures are widely recognized (as is the impact 
of innovation on productivity and growth) and 
specific instruments have been designed to over-
come them. Consequently, these countries have 
long-standing, direct transfer and tax credit public 
support programs that help individual firms miti-
gate the risk of innovation. In any given year, 
between 10 and 45 percent of manufacturing firms 
in the OECD receive support (Navarro et al., 2016). 
In contrast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
only 3.8  percent of all firms receive public sup-
port for innovation (Grazzi, Pietrobelli, and Szirmai, 
2016), a number that declines to 2.7 percent of firms 
if only the Caribbean is considered (PROTEqIN). 
Interestingly, despite this scant supply of public 
support services for innovation, nearly 30 percent 
of firms in the Caribbean report an interest in tech-
nical assistance for technology and innovation, 
compared to 5 percent of firms interested in sup-
port for human resources (PROTEqIN), as shown in 
Figure 9.1. 
Unfortunately, there are very few instances of 
programs in the Caribbean that fund innovation 
specifically as opposed to other types of business 
support programs that assist firms with marketing, 
operations, quality compliance, and other chal-
lenges. The better known programs that specifi-
cally fund innovation in the region are as follows:
 • Compete Caribbean Program: Funds innova-
tive projects implemented by individual firms 
or groups of firms across the 15 CARIFORUM 
countries.
 • Entrepreneurship Program of Innovation in the 
Caribbean (EPIC): Stimulates alternate financ-
ing mechanisms for innovation, such as creat-
ing angel investing groups.
4  Credit mediation involves appointing mediators to help 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) deal with loan rejec-
tions. By assisting in the loan application process, credit me-
diators bridge the information gap between entrepreneurs 
and loan officers. This type of activity could be helpful in 
the Caribbean. The PROTEqIN data shows that, on average, 
only 18 percent of firms applying for loans in the region are 
successful, and that 26 percent of loan rejections are due to 
incomplete loan applications (Dohnert et al., 2016). Credit 
mediation is the main role played by Small Business Devel-
opment Centers in the United States, which prepare SMEs to 
become creditworthy.
5  Trident Angels was formed in Barbados and First Angels 
in Jamaica.
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 • Caribbean Export’s Regional Angel Investor 
Network (RAIN): Boosts the capacity of SMEs 
to access funding from angel investors.
 • Idea to Innovation (i2i) in Trinidad and Tobago: 
Provides risk capital for early stage and poten-
tial high-growth companies.
 • Innovation Grant from New Ideas to 
Entrepreneurship (IGNITE) in Jamaica: 
Provides grant funding to implement new 
ideas in new firms.
 • Productivity and Competitiveness (PROCOM) 
challenge: Launched by the government of 
Saint Lucia to co-finance private sector solu-
tions to enhance process and incremental 
innovation. 
These instruments are all demand-based, 
direct subsidy programs. This is a positive fea-
ture, as research on direct subsidy programs 
indicates that they are effective, have a positive 
impact on the innovation intensity of the firms 
involved and on their performance, and are fiscally 
rewarding (Hall and Maffioli, 2008; López, 2009; 
Crespi, Maffioli, and Meléndez, 2011; Rivas, 2010). 
Moreover, these programs tend to have spillover 
effects on non-beneficiary firms (Castillo, Maffioli, 
Rojo et al., 2014). However, three of the five fund-
ing initiatives identified above are donor funded, 
which raises questions about the sustainability of 
such activities over time, and the overall quantum 
of funding that is being channeled toward innova-
tion in the region. The Caribbean has had other 
instances of schemes to fund innovation that have 
not been sustained over time due to changes in 
government priorities and/or weak implementa-
tion. It is important to recall that one of the findings 
herein is that the absence of direct public funding 
was considered to be the most important barrier to 
innovation for surveyed firms (43 percent of inno-
vators and 54 percent of potential innovators) and 
that a firm facing cost obstacles was 46  percent 
less likely to introduce a product or process inno-
vation (Chapter 2). Therefore, it is very clear that, 
in the absence of well-run, dynamically consistent, 
and relatively sizeable programs, innovation will 
not pick up at the pace required to help the region 
resume growth.
Human Capital
This publication shows that the lack of adequately 
skilled human capital and the high level of infor-
mality, as well as some gender-related issues, play 
a crucial role in hampering innovation and pro-
ductivity. Improved human capital would lead to 
increased capacity to absorb new technologies and 
practices, including those brought to the region by 
foreign investors.
FIGURE 9.1. Caribbean Firms Expressing Demand for Business Development Services 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on PROTEqIN.
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Labor Force Skills
Policymakers in the Caribbean are preoccupied 
with being able to educate and retain human capi-
tal adequate for development. This preoccupation 
encompasses the quality of educational curriculum 
and their coverage, including the ability to offer 
vocational training and tertiary-level training, par-
ticularly in the very small countries of the Eastern 
Caribbean. Their worries are well founded. Nearly 
one-third (29  percent) of firms in the Caribbean 
surveyed for PROTEqIN cited an inadequately edu-
cated labor force as a major or very severe obstacle 
to their business operations (Dohnert et al., 2016). 
Studies on innovation around the world have 
found that an inadequately skilled labor force is 
an important external barrier to innovation. In 
Chapter 2, Mohan et al. found that inadequate labor 
force skills contributed to a knowledge barrier that 
in turn was cited as a severe barrier to innovation, 
second to funding opportunities, by both innovat-
ing firms and potentially innovating firms. In partic-
ular, inadequately skilled employees, among other 
knowledge barriers such as technical uncertainties 
and lack of collaboration with knowledge brokers, 
reduced the probability of a product or process 
innovation by reducing the firm’s ability to discover, 
incorporate, and benefit from new knowledge. For 
his part, in Chapter 3, Morris found that increasing 
the proportion of skilled workers increased the like-
lihood that a firm in the Caribbean would innovate 
and that managerial experience positively influ-
enced the likelihood of process innovation, albeit 
marginally. In this regard, policies that stimulate 
on-the-job training and skills upgrading may be 
very beneficial to firms in the region that are con-
sidering innovating. 
In terms of general policy prescriptions, in 
OECD countries much has been written about the 
kinds of attributes that educational systems would 
ideally have to foster for innovation in the work-
force. These attributes concern disciplines in three 
skill categories: technical, thinking and creativity, 
and behavioral and social. Beyond specific dis-
ciplines, the method of teaching used to develop 
competency matters. Active teaching methods 
such as problem-based learning, cooperative learn-
ing, metacognitive learning, and new approaches 
to focusing on innovation such as design thinking 
are promising ways to foster innovation. Further, 
assessment instruments that can measure creativ-
ity and other mind habits, rather than mere knowl-
edge, are important for a skills-for-innovation 
curriculum. Finally, international mobility of stu-
dents, faculty, programs, and institutions is a major 
trend in higher education and an important way to 
expose students to new ideas while internalizing 
tacit knowledge (OECD, 2012).
Informality
Another aspect indirectly related to human capi-
tal is the significant presence of informal firms in 
the Caribbean and the impact informality has on 
the innovative behavior of formal businesses in the 
economy. Although the LACES and the PROTEqIN 
survey did not survey informal firms, the datasets 
include responses to questions about the degree 
to which informality is an obstacle. The studies 
discussed in several of the chapters herein were 
able to explore the extent to which informality 
affected innovative behavior in the surveyed firms 
because of the inclusion of such questions in the 
two surveys. 
Authors found that more than half of the sur-
veyed firms (55 to 60 percent) faced competition 
from unregistered firms and that competition from 
other firms—formal or informal—increased firms’ 
decision to innovate (Mohan et al. in Chapter  2; 
Ambrozio and de Sousa in Chapter 4).6 However, 
Ambrozio and de Sousa go further and separate 
the contribution of informal competition from 
that of formal competition on innovative behavior. 
They found that the influence of both formal and 
informal competition on innovative behavior was 
an inverted-U shape. That is, innovative behavior 
rises at lower levels of competition but then falls 
6  Interestingly, local firms were more affected by informal 
competition than foreign firms (Mohan et al. in Chapter  5).
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as competition gets very intense. Interestingly, 
Ambrozio and de Sousa also found that informal 
competition reached its maximum impact on inno-
vation a little before it was considered a moderate 
obstacle. That is, informal competition positively 
affected innovative behavior below the level of 
moderate obstacle but reduced innovation expen-
diture when it became very severe. On the other 
hand, formal competition was also found to stim-
ulate innovation in an inverted-U. In particular, 
Ambrozio and de Sousa found that the level of for-
mal competition in the region was on average below 
the maximum. Therefore, they recommended 
reducing informality to increase competition in 
the formal market, which should lead to increased 
innovation rates. 
To reduce informality, some countries have 
experimented with reducing the costs of registra-
tion while increasing the benefits from registra-
tion (i.e., improving access of micro-enterprises to 
formal loans, providing formal firms with business 
support services, or enabling SMEs to participate 
in public procurement), as well as increasing the 
availability of information about the benefits of 
formalizing. Facilitating the dissemination of inno-
vations and technologies that can help increase 
overall performance can lessen the productivity 
gaps between informal firms and the innovative 
part of the economy (Paunov, 2013) and provide 
incentives to formalize. 
Gender Gaps
In the past decade, there has been a growing body 
of literature focused on gender and productivity. 
This literature has focused on the productivity and 
wage gaps of female employees and/or on the 
impact of female employees on the productivity 
and profitability of firms (see for example Pfeifer 
and Wagner, 2012). In this publication a different 
question was explored, namely if the gender of the 
business’ leadership—in terms of ownership and 
management—matters for productivity. 
In Chapter 6, Moore et al. found that female-
owned firms were as productive as male-owned 
ones but that female-managed firms were not. 
They concluded that there is a gender gap in firm 
performance for female-managed firms, even after 
controlling for country and sector characteristics 
and for a large set of firm-level variables that drive 
productivity. However, the authors also found that 
differences in firm size, age, and access to finance 
across gender explained a significant part of the 
productivity gap of female-managed firms. Thus, 
policies aimed at promoting firm growth and access 
to finance for businesses managed by women are 
likely to be the most effective way to narrow the 
gender productivity gap. 
Interestingly, in Chapter 2 on barriers to inno-
vation, Mohan et al. found that potential innovators 
had the largest  percentage of female managers 
(24 percent), followed by innovators (18 percent) 
and non-innovators (12  percent). This suggests 
that female-managed firms are especially deterred 
by barriers to innovation. Given a growing litera-
ture documenting a long tail of persistently badly 
managed firms in all countries and all sectors 
(see for example Dowdy and Van Reenen, 2014), 
more research is warranted to identify the linkages 
between female management, skills, organizational 
practices, and innovation. 
In addition to the discovery of a gender pro-
ductivity gap, in Chapter 8, Bernini, Figal Garone, 
and Maffioli showed that female-owned or -man-
aged firms participated less in innovation pro-
grams. Thus, innovation policy should better target 
these firms and their specific needs, thus contrib-
uting to reducing potential gender discrimination. 
More research on the specific determinants of lower 
female participation in innovation programs would 
also be very helpful to improve policy design.
Business Climate and Regulatory Issues
Various chapters herein reference business climate 
and regulatory issues that impact productivity and 
innovation. Access to finance and human capital 
have already been discussed. Aside from these, 
themes like competition, time to market, compli-
ance requirements with international standards, 
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some aspects of knowledge diffusion, and intel-
lectual property protection affect innovation in 
the Caribbean in important ways. In Chapter 2 on 
barriers to innovation, Mohan et al. indicated that 
innovators and potential innovators considered 
time to market, protection against copycats, and 
some knowledge-related barriers (e.g.,  linkages 
with public universities and tertiary-level institu-
tions, flexibility and openness of laboratories and 
research centers to collaborative approaches, and 
flexibility and openness of other companies in 
the sector to collaborative approaches) as more 
important barriers to innovation than the qualifica-
tions of employees. However, these specific busi-
ness climate issues had a different level of impact 
on the probability of innovation. While the knowl-
edge-related barriers deterred innovation expendi-
ture and firms with patents tended to invest more 
in innovation, the impact of time to market on inno-
vation expenditure was negative and significant for 
innovators and potential innovators alike.
The average time to export for the 13 coun-
tries covered under the PROTEqIN dataset was 
112 hours. In comparison, in a small economy like 
Costa Rica, which competes with the Caribbean 
in some industries, it took less than half as much 
time (50 hours) to process an export. Moreover, the 
cost of documentary compliance and border com-
pliance in Costa Rica was significantly lower than 
in the Caribbean. In Costa Rica, documentary and 
border compliance amounted to only 58  percent 
and 74  percent, respectively, of the average cost 
for these transactions in the 13 Caribbean countries 
(The World Bank’s 2016 Doing Business report 
and authors’ calculations). These facts, along with 
Mohan et al.’s findings of the deterring impact of 
market barriers point toward the importance of 
government efforts to reduce the time and cost 
to export, especially given that Mohan et al. also 
found that those Caribbean firms that exported 
significantly increased their probability of investing 
in innovation. 
Do policy and regulatory barriers affect local 
and foreign firms differently? In Chapter  5 on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation, 
Mohan et al. offered an interesting insight to this 
question. Similar to the overall figures for innova-
tors and potential innovators, local and foreign 
firms assessed the absence of direct public fund-
ing for innovation as the most important barrier 
to innovative activity. As in the case of innovators 
and potential innovators, time to market, protec-
tion against copycats, and knowledge brokerage 
barriers were considered more important barriers 
to innovation than the qualifications of employees. 
Interestingly, local firms and foreign firms were not 
significantly different in their assessment of the 
importance of these constraints on innovation. The 
only aspect on which there was a big variation was 
their assessment of the importance of the flexibility 
and openness of laboratories and research centers 
to collaborative approaches. A smaller percentage 
of foreign firms considered this an important bar-
rier to innovation compared to local firms (37 per-
cent vs. 43  percent). Presumably, foreign firms 
have better access to in-house research and devel-
opment (R&D) services. 
Given that innovation is related to the acqui-
sition, application, creation, and transmission of 
knowledge, with collaborative innovation becom-
ing increasingly important, the knowledge barriers 
FIGURE 9.2.  Average Time and Cost of Exporting in 
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outlined above become crucial in discussing increas-
ing productivity and innovation in the Caribbean. 
Mohan et al. demonstrated that knowledge barriers 
had a negative and significant effect on the prob-
ability of technological innovation, reducing prod-
uct and process innovation by 25 percent. In turn, 
policy barriers—among which protection against 
copycats, current organizational and managerial 
culture, and compliance requirements to interna-
tional standards stand out as the most important—
also had a negative and significant effect on the 
probability of technological innovation, reducing 
product and process innovation by 34 percent. 
As expected (Table 9.1), innovators seemed to 
have mastered or overcome most of the barriers 
to innovation, expressed as lower perceptions of 
the importance of these barriers in comparison to 
potential innovators. Conversely, potential innova-
tors stood at the other end of the spectrum and 
gauged these barriers as very important. Overall, 
surveyed local and foreign firms stood somewhere 
in between.
The existence of barriers to innovation and that 
these barriers are sorted in roughly the same order 
of importance by innovators and potential innova-
tors alike and by the larger mass of firms produce 
consistent messages in terms of the types of policy 
response. An appropriate policy response to these 
barriers would encompass: (i)  designing instru-
ments to fund innovation; (ii) reducing the time and 
cost to market; (iii)  promoting an effective prop-
erty rights’ system; and (iv)  supporting mecha-
nisms to stimulate knowledge flows between firms 
and universities, research centers, laboratories, and 
other firms. 
In addition, in Chapter 8, Bernini et al. showed 
evidence that firms that admitted to having paid 
less tax participated less in productive develop-
ment programs. This finding suggests that produc-
tive development policies should not be designed 
in isolation. Synergies and complementarities 
between these policies and others, such as tax and 
regulatory policies and even formalization efforts 
should be considered by policymakers to boost 
innovation and productivity.
Foreign Direct Investment and Knowledge 
Diffusion
The topic of knowledge flows warrants a specific 
analysis of the role of FDI, which could be consid-
ered a mechanism to finance growth and achieve 
technology transfer through knowledge spillovers. 
Historically and throughout the world, multination-
als have been, on average, the most productive 
companies, and they have had the potential to cre-
ate powerful dynamics that stimulate productivity 
by increasing competition and bringing technology 
and know-how to the host country (Dowdy and 
Van Reenen, 2014). 
In the Caribbean, FDI has not lived up to 
expectations in terms of knowledge transfer. In 
Chapter  5 on FDI and innovation, Mohan et al. 
found that, consistent with the literature, foreign 
firms tend to be larger than domestic firms and 
tend to export, two characteristics that are corre-
lated with higher innovation expenditures. Further, 
they found that the proportion of foreign firms that 
engage in innovative activity (spend on innovation, 
have an R&D department, cooperate on innovation, 
use a licensed technology, or have patents) and 
that have innovative outputs (product, process, 
market, or organizational innovation) is higher than 
that of local firms. However, Mohan et al. also found 
that the innovative efforts of foreign firms in the 
Caribbean did not spill over to local firms either 
through demonstration effects or labor mobility 
in the way expected from the literature. Rather, 
foreign technology transfer seemed to be taking 
place as a result of local firms importing machin-
ery, equipment, and materials. The authors hypoth-
esized that the distance in knowledge between 
foreign and local firms, and weak knowledge bro-
kerage systems—research and development cen-
ters, and effective linkages between firms and 
research institutions—affected local firms’ abilities 
to absorb and use this new knowledge. 
Low spillovers from multinational subsidiaries 
might also be related to the kind of innovative activ-
ities that these firms implement locally. The typical 
local operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE) 
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is based on exploiting natural resources or access-
ing domestic markets using competencies built on 
technology developed in their home countries. In 
most cases, the foreign technological package is 
operated locally with just minor adaptations to the 
imported technology. In this context, demonstration 
effects and spillovers from labor mobility become 
highly restricted. Unleashing the potential of MNEs 
to become a source of knowledge transfer also 
depends on the capabilities of each national innova-
tion system to attract higher value-added segments 
of each MNE’s value chain (e.g., R&D labs or corpo-
rate innovation centers), which is something that 
requires development of local research capacities 
and a policy to attract FDI focused on innovation.
Competition
Competition is a very important ingredient of an 
effective ecosystem of innovation. Competition criti-
cally affects firms’ innovation performance by pro-
viding incentives to generate new products and/or 
TABLE 9.1.  Barriers for Innovators and Potential Innovators, and Local and Foreign Firms
Barriers
Innovator Potential Innovator Local firms Foreign firms
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Financial/cost barriers
Direct public funding for innovation 219 43 625 54 804 49 151 49
Level of available financial resources 209 41 526 45 714 43 126 41
Knowledge barriers
Flexibility/openness of other companies of the sector 
for collaborative approaches
213 42 615 53 819 49 145 47
Flexibility/openness of laboratories /research 
centers for collaborative approaches
199 39 523 45 707 43 116 37
Linkages with public universities /tertiary level 
institutions
177 35 466 40 617 37 120 39
Qualification of employees 169 33 452 39 590 36 118 38
Level of information on new trends of the market 155 31 455 39 599 36 113 36
Technical uncertainties 135 27 412 36 545 33 90 29
Technical capacity in key institution responsible for 
innovation promotion
100 20 282 24 355 21 70 23
Level of information on available technologies 98 19 286 25 371 22 68 22
Market barriers
Time to market 195 39 583 50 749 45 138 44
Client flexibility/openness towards new goods or 
services
61 12 180 16 231 14 41 13
Policy/regulation barriers
Protection against copycats 208 41 575 50 764 46 147 47
Current organizational/managerial culture 147 29 399 34 524 32 98 32
Compliance requirements to international standards 141 28 414 36 555 34 97 31
Investment/Policy framework to foster innovation 109 22 301 26 394 24 67 22
Degree of self-confidence for innovation 104 21 267 23 374 23 63 20
Internal remuneration policy and incentive structure 59 12 200 17 244 15 47 15
Source: Data drawn and sorted from two tables in Mohan et al.’s chapters herein.
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become more effective. However, competition does 
not always benefit innovation. Too much competi-
tion may decrease the benefits insofar as it does not 
allow innovative firms to recover their investment.
As stated before, in Chapter 4, Ambrozio and de 
Sousa determined that, similar to developed coun-
tries, competition and innovation in the Caribbean 
followed an inverse-U relationship, where innovation 
was stimulated by competition up to a maximum, 
after which the impact on innovation diminished. 
Moreover, they found that the level of competition 
existing in the Caribbean had not yet reached that 
maximum. While these authors were not able to 
determine which industries were on the ascending 
part of the U-curve and which were on the descend-
ing part, they made some distinctions that may be 
useful for competition and innovation policy in the 
Caribbean. First, manufacturing firms spent more 
on innovation than service firms. Second, in the 
Caribbean, service firms experienced more com-
petition than manufacturing firms. The authors 
concluded that increasing competition in the man-
ufacturing sector might have a higher impact on 
innovation than increasing competition in services. 
An innovation-focused competition policy 
would also need to build capacities in the local 
competition agencies. Improving the capacities 
to monitor the relationship between competition 
and innovation in each sector is critical, as the 
results suggest that this relationship is heteroge-
neous across sectors. This means that an across-
the-board competition policy would not be optimal 
to encourage innovation in the different sectors. 
Competition authorities also need to recognize that 
more competition might not be good for innova-
tion in every sector, while some practices, such as 
collaborative agreements among producers, which 
could be considered detrimental for competition 
overall, might be positive if collaboration is aimed 
at innovation and increasing competitiveness. 
Infrastructure
Finally, it is widely known that electricity is one 
of the main inputs in manufacturing and some 
service-oriented firms, since all economic activities 
require energy. However, in the Caribbean there is 
empirical evidence that infrastructure gaps, par-
ticularly in the energy sector, are severely limiting 
productivity and innovation. Beyond the high price 
of energy in the region, unreliable electricity supply 
and unexpected outages or surges can hurt firm 
performance by lowering profits and outputs or 
damaging equipment, as has been demonstrated 
for other regions of the world. 
Firms have different coping strategies to 
handle power outages, including self-genera-
tion. In Chapter  7, Barron analyzed the relation-
ship between outages and firm behavior in the 
Caribbean and found that, throughout the region, 
increases in power outages reduced employ-
ment. Firms that had been continuously exposed 
to power outages reduced the size of their perma-
nent labor force or hired fewer permanent work-
ers. Furthermore, most of the lost jobs appeared 
to occur among female workers. Job shedding in 
the median firm amounted to roughly US$40,000 
a year in lost wages. Results also suggested that 
increases in outages were associated with reduced 
likelihood of introducing innovation in goods or 
services, particularly for firms that resorted to 
self-generation as a coping mechanism. This find-
ing suggests that firms allocate resources to self-
generation that would otherwise be allocated to 
innovation.
These findings bear important policy impli-
cations since the likelihood of innovation and, 
by extension improvement in productivity levels, 
is clearly affected by the energy supply. Thus, 
governments in the Caribbean need to increase 
investment in energy infrastructure to reduce its 
deficit, therefore maintaining employment and 
improving the likelihood of innovation and eco-
nomic activity. Further research highlighting the 
type of firms and sectors that are most affected 
by the lack of appropriate (energy) infrastructure 
would provide relevant insight to better target 
policies and improve infrastructure solutions with 
lasting effects on innovation and productivity in 
the region.
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